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Abstract 
 
This dissertation analyzes recent attempts to devise rules and regulations to 
govern humanitarian action.  Specifically, it asks:  What drives humanitarian 
organizations to collectively regulate their principles, practices, and policies?  Self-
regulation, or self-organized attempts at collective action within direct state intervention, 
is a recent global phenomenon, affecting both the for- and non-profit worlds.   In 
humanitarianism alone, there are now dozens of codes of conduct and other mechanisms 
that implicate all manner of humanitarian practice, from principles to aid provision.  This 
research focuses on four key self-regulatory projects:  the Code of Conduct for the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief; the 
Sphere Project; HAP International; and the Code of Conduct on Images and Messages. 
Contrary to the widespread view that firms regulate for branding and competitive 
reasons, this study finds that principled reasons better account for the origins of these 
initiatives.  Specifically, it shows that self-regulation has emerged out of a crisis of 
legitimacy in the humanitarian sector, whereby aid veterans concluded that good 
intentions were no longer enough as a basis for action.  As Rwanda demonstrated, good 
intentions can lead to terrible outcomes.  Through self-regulation, aid workers have 
sought to shift humanitarianism’s ideational foundations from charity and good deeds to 
professionalism, technical standards, and human rights.  Contestations over self-
regulation, in turn, derive from different understandings of humanitarianism – of its 
meanings and knowhow. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction: Codified Compassion 
 
In the space of three decades, humanitarianism has evolved from a modest 
endeavor undertaken by small, volunteer organizations to a global industry populated by 
thousands of professional organizations (Barnett and Weiss 2008 ; Calhoun 2008).  
Collectively, these organizations, including CARE, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), 
Oxfam, and World Vision International (WVI), account for the majority of roughly $18 
billion in yearly humanitarian spending (ALNAP 2010 ; Stoddard 2002).  In political 
discourse, media coverage, and advertising, humanitarian organizations and themes are 
nothing short of omnipresent.  It is little wonder that scholars and social commentators 
are now focusing considerable attention on humanitarianism.
1
 
Indeed, some of the most consequential recent international events are simply 
incomprehensible outside of a humanitarian frame of reference.  From Rwanda (1994) to 
the Southeast Asian tsunami (2004) to the earthquake in Haiti (2010), humanitarian 
organizations are ubiquitous features of the crisis and recovery environment.  Their 
successes and, increasingly, failures dominate the news coverage.  After the earthquake 
in Haiti, for instance, roughly 1000 international nongovernmental organizations 
(INGOs) helped raise more than $1 billion in funding for relief and rebuilding.  It was an 
unparalleled mobilization, but it was also deeply problematic – media outlets lambasted 
waste, poor coordination, and a lack of accountability among organizations (e.g. Katz 
                                                 
1
 Mika Aaltola suggests:  “Humanitarianism has arguably become the key frame through which the 
multifarious actors of the world evaluate each other’s legitimacy and determine their roles in the current 
world.  The emerging “humanitarian paradigm” has become an essential expression of what is meant by 
“international community” and the contemporary world behind it” (Aaltola 2009: 1). 
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2010 ; Carroll and Phillips 2010 ; McGreal and Addley 2010).  In Haiti and elsewhere, 
news coverage is increasingly critical of NGOs (Bendell 2006). 
Given the tenor of the news coverage, we tend to overlook the fact that some of 
the strongest criticisms of humanitarian action have actually come from within the sector 
(Terry 2002 ; Stockton 2000 ; Vaux 2003).  Motivated by principled beliefs about the 
proper practice of humanitarianism, and responding to a growing sense of crisis in the 
sector, humanitarians have expended considerable time and effort debating core 
principles and developing rules and regulations to govern the sector.  Self-regulation, 
defined as self-organized attempts at collective action without direct intervention from a 
state or public authority, has become a veritable humanitarian phenomenon (King and 
Lenox 2000 ; also Leader 1999).
2
   Today, there are more than a dozen international self-
regulatory initiatives, most developed in the last two decades, with scores more at 
regional and local levels (Sphere Project 2009e ; Shenoy et al. 2007 ; HAP 2010e).  They 
range from voluntary codes of conduct to more elaborate institutional structures with 
enforcement and sanctioning mechanisms and, collectively, touch on every single aspect 
of organizational life. 
My goal in this dissertation is to capture the evolving organizational reality of 
international humanitarian action through an analysis of the means by which it is 
governed and reproduced.  Specifically, I seek to understand humanitarian self-
                                                 
2
 This same phenomenon is also known as Quality and Accountability (Q&A) or accountability clubs.  I 
prefer the term “self-regulatory,” which captures both the origins of these codes (within the sector) and 
their ultimate function, which is to regulate, or codify, humanitarianism.  Each of the initiatives I study self-
identifies as self-regulatory.  The common denominator is that they come from within the sector; unlike 
donor funding mechanisms or national non-profit regulations, humanitarian self-regulation is designed by 
and enforced by NGOs themselves. 
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governance by charting the origins of key codes of conduct and quality mechanisms.  
Prior to 1989, the notion of a code of conduct in humanitarianism was basically 
inconceivable.  Three decades later, codes are ubiquitous features of the sector.  How are 
we to account for the sudden, recent emergence of humanitarian self-regulation?  What 
drives organizations to develop these mechanisms? 
I argue that self-regulation has emerged out of a fundamental crisis of legitimacy 
in the field of global humanitarianism.  Following emergencies in the horn of Africa in 
the 1980s and Rwanda in 1994, especially, humanitarianism has been subject to a 
growing cacophony of voices that no longer take as sacrosanct its practitioners’ claims to 
be doing good in times of need.  From within the sector, too, has come a realization that 
good intentions are no longer enough, that aid may bring harm to the very people it 
intends to assist, and that something must be done to ensure the field’s future viability.  
Confronted with the perception of crisis and experience of existential doubt, 
humanitarians turned to self-regulation in a bid to shift the very bases of humanitarian 
legitimacy.  From charity and good-heartedness, these initiatives, which include the Code 
of Conduct,
3
 the Sphere Project, and HAP International, have in different ways attempted 
to enact an identity of humanitarianism as professional, regulated, and rooted in 
International Law and human rights. 
To date, the phenomenon of non-profit, and specifically humanitarian, self-
regulation has received little systematic scholarly attention, particularly in International 
                                                 
3
 The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster 
Relief. 
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Relations (IR).
4
  This is puzzling given the significant scope, magnitude, and ambitions 
of the various self-regulatory projects.  For instance, the Sphere Project, analyzed in 
Chapter 4, creates globally applicable minimum standards for the provision of disaster 
relief, including standards for shelter construction, medical treatment, and water 
provision.  The project has been groundbreaking in its scope, involving hundreds of 
NGOs, states, and institutions, as well as thousands of individuals.  Its widely used 
Minimum Standards handbook has undergone three revisions and sold tens of thousands 
of copies.  As I outline below, the scale and ambition of projects like Sphere herald 
changes in the governance of humanitarianism and in its organizational reality.  For 
scholars, humanitarian self-regulation presents a valuable opportunity to understand 
emergent forms of global governance. 
Humanitarian self-regulation is also puzzling inasmuch as the very idea of 
regulated humanitarianism, or “codified compassion,” is at odds with popular ways of 
understanding humanitarianism, which emphasize the central position of ethics and trace 
action to spontaneous outpourings of we-feeling, what Norman Fiering called “irresistible 
compassion” (Fiering 1976).  In the traditional understanding, humanitarians represent a 
more virtuous, even elemental, side of humanity.  Humanitarians may indeed be “the last 
of the just” (Rieff 2002: 333; Barnett and Weiss 2008: 6), but the reality is that they are 
increasingly oriented around rules, standards, and procedures. 
 
Understanding humanitarianism 
                                                 
4
 The “accountability club” approach is an obvious exception, whose claims I address below.  Humanitarian 
practitioner-oriented publications, especially Disasters and the Journal of Humanitarian Assistance are 
partial exceptions, to the extent that they have covered individual initiatives. 
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In the tradition of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
humanitarianism is often understood as the impartial, neutral, and independent actions 
undertaken to protect the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and other 
situations of violence and to provide them with assistance.  Following recent scholarship, 
I opt to define humanitarianism more broadly, as “the desire to relieve the suffering of 
distant strangers” (Barnett 2009: 622).  This definition remains agnostic about the 
principles and organizational practices by which humanitarian relief is distributed.  Given 
that self-regulation attempts to define principles and practices, it is useful – and 
theoretically consistent – to have a definition that avoids spelling these out a priori. 
As a practical matter, there is considerable overlap between humanitarianism and 
development.  As HAP International acknowledges, “the dividing line … is fluid.  For 
example, activities such as disaster risk reduction include both types of assistance and, 
over time, an organisation may provide both disaster relief and development aid to the 
same group of people” (HAP 2010d: 2; also Borton 2009: 6).  Following Margaret 
Buchanan-Smith, and in recognition of the fact that few agencies have a mandate that is 
solely humanitarian, I include agencies so long as their mandates and objectives are 
partially humanitarian (Buchanan-Smith 2002: 40). 
Scholars customarily date modern humanitarianism to Solferino, Italy, where in 
1859 Swiss businessman Jean-Henri Dunant organized relief for wounded soldiers 
following a battle between France’s Napoléon III and Austria’s Franz Josef.  The 
institutional outgrowth of this was the formation of the ICRC in Geneva, Switzerland in 
1863 (Ignatieff 1998 ; Barnett and Weiss 2008).  However, the humanitarian impulse 
6 
 
 
runs much deeper.  Humanitarianism emerges from Western philosophy and post-
Enlightenment social movements, including social movements to end slavery, 
temperance movements, education activism, missionary work, and colonialism (Fiering 
1976 ; Hunt 2007 ; Rist 2002).  These sentiments took root in the 1800s as a way to 
remake the world to better serve humanity, specifically by transforming living conditions 
(Calhoun 2008). 
As recent histories of humanitarianism make quite clear, the organizational and 
political realities of humanitarian action have evolved considerably since the era of 
Dunant (e.g. Barnett 2011 ; Walker and Maxwell 2008).  Three trends are of particular 
relevance to the study of self-regulation.  First, humanitarianism has experienced 
tremendous growth – in agencies, size, and complexity.  In Chapter 2, I provide evidence 
of the historical shift from small, amateur organizations to a field populated by large, 
increasingly networked and professional INGOs.  This shift has facilitated efforts at rule-
making – professionalization and inter-organizational linkages are preconditions for the 
development of field-wide standards – and been, itself, intensified by the standards, each 
of which professes to increase professionalization. 
Second, the organizational development of humanitarianism is very strongly 
correlated with crisis and social disruption; it would not be inaccurate to say that 
humanitarianism is defined by “the event.”  The Red Cross dates to Solferino and 
developed into an institutionalized, global actor during the First and Second World Wars.  
Save the Children dates to World War I; Oxfam to World War II; MSF to the Nigerian 
Civil War in the late 1960s.  In the 1980s and 1990s, famine in Ethiopia and genocide in 
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Rwanda again precipitated tremendous growth in the number and size of humanitarian 
NGOs.  Crisis is central to the humanitarian narrative, as it is in moments of extreme 
social disruption that we find the starkest expressions of human need.  Crises galvanize 
public attention, facilitate massive outlays of funds, and precipitate large-scale 
international mobilizations.  Numerous scholars have noted the capacity of crisis to 
provide impetus and space for political or normative change (Rozario 2007 ; Legro 2005 ; 
Price 1998: 622; Sunstein 1997: 47). 
Crisis figures quite prominently in the development of each of the major 
humanitarian codes and regulatory initiatives.  The first codes were motivated by the 
experiences of aid veterans in the Horn of Africa in the mid-1980s; a second wave of 
initiatives, including Sphere, followed the Rwandan genocide.  These specific events 
helped open opportunities for change in the sector by crystallizing humanitarian 
sentiments that reform was needed – what I later refer to as a crisis of legitimacy. 
Finally, historically, geopolitical changes have impacted humanitarianism.  For 
academics, as for policymakers, the end of the Cold War was the beginning of the era of 
“complex humanitarian emergencies,” conflicts owing to multiple causes, featuring 
multiple local actors, and compelling an international response (Calhoun 2008 ; c.f. 
Barnett 2011).  On a policy level, particularly since September 11, security is 
increasingly about managing under-development and transition (Duffield 2001 ; Hoffman 
and Weiss 2006).  Heightened state interest in humanitarianism has meant greater 
funding for aid and development – a three-fold increase in official assistance in the 1990s 
– but this aid comes with stringent conditions, and more pressure is being placed on 
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humanitarians to demonstrate impact and to increase coherence with donors’ political 
agendas.
5
  The politicization of aid is a constant subtext in the history of self-regulation. 
 
Understanding self-regulation 
Self-regulation, concerning rules and procedures formulated by humanitarians to 
govern themselves, fits broadly within the category of global governance.  Global 
governance, defined as a set of codified rules and regulations of transnational scope, and 
the collection of authority relationships that arrange, monitor, or enforce these rules, 
provides a general framework for understanding the development of ordering 
mechanisms outside of government (Avant et al. 2010b ; Held and McGrew 2002).  For 
the most part, though, scholarship on global governance has not led to greater attention to 
NGO governance.
6
  To the extent that nongovernmental organizations figure in this 
literature, they are generally portrayed as promoters and enforcers of rules and norms on 
other parties, be they states or transnational corporations (TNCs)(e.g. Keck and Sikkink 
1998 ; Price 2003 ; Khagram 2002).  To date, little research has been conducted on 
NGOs’ efforts to regulate themselves. 
The major exception to this rule has come from the intersection of IR and public 
policy, where a group of scholars, grouped under the “accountability club” framework, 
has developed an approach to nonprofit self-regulation.  Club theory links self-regulation 
to the increased public scrutiny of NGOs (agents) by their principals (especially donors).  
In a recent volume, Gugerty and Prakash (2010) argue that nonprofit scandals impose 
                                                 
5
 (See Barnett and Weiss 2008 for an overview; see Macrae 2002 ; Brusset and Tiberghien 2002 ; Stoddard 
2002 on funding and growth in size and complexity of NGOs; and see Randel and German 2002 on ODA, 
earmarking, and bilateralism). 
6
 (See Stroup 2012 for a similar critique). 
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reputational costs, not just on the wrongdoers, but on similar actors as well.  
Consequently, “credible nonprofits – the good apples – can be expected to seek ways to 
differentiate themselves from the bad apples and credibly signal their commitment 
towards good governance” to their principals, including supporters and donors (Gugerty 
and Prakash 2010: 4; see also Tschirhart 2010 ; Frumkin 2010).  Self-regulation thus 
arises out of competitive pressures, whereby nonprofit agencies seek ways to increase 
brand awareness and market share.  Accountability clubs enable NGOs to signal their 
reputation to principals; they also impart benefits for a firm’s brand or reputation 
(Gugerty and Prakash 2010: 16-7; Bowman 2010 ; Bekkers 2010 ; Gugerty 2010). 
A rationalist approach to the study of politics, club theory is predicated on the 
assumption that actors are strategic, self-contained units that pursue consistent, ordered 
preferences and calculate costs and benefits to maximize utility in light of these 
preferences.  Rationalism refers to a set of ontological propositions that, collectively, 
emphasize the impact of constraints and incentives on actors (Keohane 1986: 11; Shepsle 
1989 ; Snidal 2002 ; Moravcsik 1997).  In International Relations, rationalism is the 
dominant way of addressing questions of cooperation, regulation, institutional design, 
and enforcement, all themes with relevance for self-regulation (Koremenos et al. 2001 ; 
Hasenclever 1997 ; Oye 1985 ; Downs et al. 1996).  Rationalism has underpinned recent 
analyses of humanitarian resource competition (Cooley and Ron 2002 ; Koch 2008), the 
relationship between non- and for-profit actors in relief provision (Hopgood 2008), NGO 
responses to credibility challenges (Gourevitch et al. 2012), and strategies for 
10 
 
 
humanitarian intervention (Barnett and Snyder 2008).  Research on corporate and NGO 
codes of conduct is also frequently conducted through methodological rationalism.
7
 
Applied to humanitarianism, rationalism emphasizes organizations’ interest in 
survival and expansion in an environment characterized by uncertainty and fierce 
competition for resources.  Collectively, rationalists challenge the widely held notion that 
NGOs differ from businesses and other organizational forms simply because they pursue 
principled beliefs rather than material interests (Cooley and Ron 2002 ; Sell and Prakash 
2004 ; Siméant 2005).  Self-regulation is a strategic response by actors to specific 
external pressures, especially those from funders, to self-regulate before being externally 
regulated, and to achieve brand benefits.  Rule-making will be easiest in areas of 
preexisting agreement, but more effective, with significant branding benefits, where 
membership imposes real costs (i.e. enforcement).
8
 
The accountability club approach has a number of compelling features.  For 
instance, I agree that concerns over poor practice (“bad apples”) has motivated 
regulation, that a function of self-regulation is to deter external regulation, and that codes 
with less stringent membership and enforcement requirements have had the easiest time 
attracting members (though this does not mean that they have not had an impact).  Like 
the accountability club approach, I also identify competition as a significant variable in 
                                                 
7
 In industry self-regulation, “companies join together to regulate their collective action to avoid a common 
threat or to provide a common good by establishing a standard code of conduct” (King and Lenox 2000: 
698). 
8
 As Bowman writes, the most credible clubs have clear standards and monitor and impose sanctions for 
non-compliance.  However, designers engage in a balancing act:  standards must be stringent enough to 
affect perceptions of quality, but not too arduous, lest no one join (Bowman 2010: 65; see also Tschirhart 
2010 ; Gourevitch et al. 2012: 15-8; on ease of regulation, see Ramalingam and Barnett 2010). 
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the development of new standards.
9
  However, my research raises serious doubts about 
this approach’s applicability to humanitarian self-regulation.10 
First, while the accountability club correctly identifies the importance of 
competition in the development of self-regulation, its account of this competition is thin 
and under-politicized, limited to questions of resources and branding.  My research finds 
that debates over self-regulation, while certainly carrying resource implications, are 
fundamentally rooted in basic definitional differences over the meaning, nature, and 
content of humanitarian action.  Consequently, prioritizing instrumental self-interest and 
resource acquisition tends to obscure meaningful variation within and among aid agencies 
on questions of identity.  In Chapter 6, on the Code of Conduct on Images and Messages, 
I encounter salient cleavages within NGOs over self-regulation and find that the Code has 
become a means for Development Education staffers to promote ethical organizational 
change.  In Chapters 4 and 5, on the Sphere Standards and HAP International, I find 
important differences in approach among French and Anglo humanitarian agencies that 
stem from mission, identity, and history.  Strategic logics alone cannot help us understand 
why even the weakest codes have been subject to fierce contestations. 
Second, the accountability club approach lacks a macro-level framework for 
conceptualizing the recent, sector-wide spread of self-regulation.  As such, while it can 
account for the creation of individual initiatives and competition among initiatives for 
members and resources, it lacks a broader understanding of the systemic forces – 
including professionalization and institutionalization – that have prepared the terrain for 
                                                 
9
 In the accountability club narrative, self-regulatory initiatives compete over members and market share. 
10
 Similarly, Maryam Deloffre has argued that the development of Sphere owed more to principled beliefs 
about proper humanitarian action than it did to strategic thinking (Deloffre 2010). 
12 
 
 
regulation.  Moreover, while these scholars are accurate in arguing that external pressures 
have been a feature of the NGO environment, my research does not find evidence to 
support their claim that self-regulation emerges out of a direct relationship between 
Principal and Agent.  Though the pressures faced by humanitarian agencies to clean up 
their act are real, they are more diffuse than concrete, and the choice to regulate, let alone 
the choice of mechanisms and issue area, owes greatly to humanitarians’ understandings 
of self and other.  Thus, in each case, I find that the impetus for regulation has come from 
segments within the humanitarian community, with the initiatives often finding 
themselves in the position of lobbying for donor support for self-regulation, not vice-
versa.  To argue, as I do, that there is a generalized crisis of legitimacy is different from 
situating self-regulation in specific relations between principles and agents.
11
 
To put it another way, the accountability club is attentive to only one of three 
possible levels of analysis, while my research indicates the need for a more holistic 
framework.  Situating self-regulation at the level of resource competition among NGOs – 
a meso-level framework of analysis (concerning the relationships among actors) – can 
clarify some of the processes by which individual regulations are developed, but it cannot 
account for the macro-level spread of self-regulation, which is a more generalizable 
phenomenon that extends beyond criticism from Principals.  Even the account of external 
pressure, which is potentially a macro-level force, is framed as a P-A relationship, and 
thus at the meso-level.  My framework, which I develop in Chapter 2, calls specific 
attention to macro-level forces of legitimacy, professionalization, and structuration. 
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 This is similar to Barnett and Duvall’s distinction between compulsory power, which is a direct relation 
between A and B, and productive power, which inheres in discourses but is not traceable to one sole locus 
(Barnett and Duvall 2005). 
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Third, and related, humanitarian self-regulation is directed inward as much as it is 
outward.  I argue that self-regulation is fundamentally about identity, and relatively less 
about what might be considered instrumental self-interest.  While agreeing with club 
theorists that self-regulation may function to preserve sector independence, I find that the 
motivations, rhetoric, and rationale for regulation derive from principled critiques of 
humanitarian action.  In Chapter 3, for instance, I show that the Code of Conduct was the 
product of ideational entrepreneurs within the sector reacting to their perceptions of poor 
practice.  So, too, do I note in Chapter 4 that the Sphere Project actually preceded the 
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR).  Moreover, from a 
purely instrumental standpoint, I find that the benefits humanitarian organizations derive 
from self-regulation are not always apparent.  Branding benefits, for instance, are not yet 
realized – a point I make in Chapter 6.  As I demonstrate throughout, the impact of self-
regulation on agencies is often assumed or taken on faith; proponents have had 
difficulties systematically demonstrating its impact. 
 
Humanitarianism as an organizational field 
Whereas club theorists focus on external pressures and strategic self-regulation, I 
source NGO self-regulation to principled argumentation by ideational entrepreneurs 
responding to environmental cues, and see self-regulation as raising fundamental, even 
existential, questions about the nature, identity, and scope of humanitarian assistance.  
While it is clear that many NGOs are concerned with survival, growth, or brand, my 
research leads me to question whether these concerns are sufficient proxies for analyzing 
14 
 
 
humanitarian action, and suggests that there remains something distinctly humanitarian 
about humanitarian NGOs.
12
 
I argue that self-regulation emerges out of a crisis of legitimacy in the 
humanitarian field.  I understand humanitarianism as an organizational field, a concept I 
draw from Sociology’s new institutionalism.13  In Chapter 2, I spell out my approach, 
which blends the organizational analysis of new institutionalism with the dynamism and 
contingency implied in Pierre Bourdieu’s original formulation of the “field.”  
Organizational fields are local social orders composed of organizations and characterized 
by rules, values, and knowledge specific to them.
14
  Field boundaries “affect how 
organizations select models for emulation, where they focus information-gathering 
energy, which organizations they compare themselves with, and where they recruit 
personnel” (DiMaggio 1991: 267; Koelble 1995: 234). 
To approach humanitarianism as a field is to contextualize the actions of 
individual humanitarians and agencies (individual and meso level) within broader social 
structures (humanitarianism itself, macro level), and to apprehend individual actions to 
regulate, and contestations over these regulations, as struggles over the rules and 
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 There is plenty of evidence to demonstrate that INGOs consider branding and visibility in planning and 
implementing campaigns, including in Goma, DRC after Rwanda and in Southeast Asia after the Tsunami 
(Cooley and Ron 2002 ; Schloms 2005 ; Stirrat 2006: 16; on branding, see Vestergaard 2008 ; Cottle and 
Nolan 2009).  At issue is not whether NGOs are interested in funding or act in ways consistent with 
survival and expansion.  Rather, the issue is whether self-interest and strategic thinking are sufficient for 
explaining the development of humanitarian self-regulation, and whether the search for funding has, as 
Cooley and Ron claim, pushed concerns like ethics, efficiency, and self-criticism “to the margins” (16). 
13
 Like other constructivist scholars, I find sociological institutionalism valuable for the attention it calls to 
the social structures that legitimate actors (Finnemore 1996 ; Barnett and Finnemore 2004 ; Stroup 2012). 
14
 I am especially indebted to Dezalay and Garth, who define a field as a “symbolic terrain with its own 
networks, hierarchical relationships, and expertise, and more generally its own rules of the game, all of 
which are subject to modification over time and in relation to other fields” (Dezalay and Garth 1996: 16).  
Bourdieu elaborates:  “Fields present themselves synchronically as structural spaces of positions (or parts) 
whose properties depend on their position within these spaces and which can be analyzed independently of 
the characteristics of their occupants (which are partly determined by them)” (Bourdieu 1993: 72). 
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ideational resources of the humanitarian game.  These contests in turn occur in an 
international context characterized by changing global understandings of legitimacy and 
authority that reconfigure social capital within the humanitarian field.  The concept of the 
organizational field provides a basis for understanding three elements of humanitarian 
self-regulation:  constitution, contestation, and connection. 
When we speak of constitution, we are assessing the stakes in humanitarian self-
regulation.  Is it about securing market share and responding to Principal-Agent 
dilemmas?  Or are the stakes more fundamental?  I find that individual instances of self-
regulation are vehicles for ideational entrepreneurs to advance specific understandings of 
humanitarian identity.  From principles (what is humanitarianism?), to delivery (how 
does humanitarianism operate?), to organizational processes (how are organizations 
developed?), self-regulation is directed within the field, and at the field itself.  Put 
another way, self-regulation is performative; it is a practice that brings into being that 
which it claims to regulate – humanitarianism as a professional field.15  As Bourdieu 
argued, the structure itself, definitions, and identities are always at stake in the struggle 
over the field
16
 (Bourdieu 1993: 73; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 99). 
The field also shapes our understanding of humanitarian action in general, and 
self-regulation in specific, as essentially contested by its participants.  To understand 
humanitarianism as a field is not to see it as a fixed structure, but as constantly in flux.  
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 I am grateful to Lisa Disch for this point. 
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 “The very notion of writer, but also the notion of lawyer, doctor, or sociologist, despite all efforts at 
codification and homogenization through certification, is at stake in the field of writers (or lawyers, etc.):  
the struggle over the legitimate definition, whose stake – the word definition says it all – is the boundary, 
the frontiers, the right of admission, sometimes the numerus clausus, is a universal property of fields” 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 245). 
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Humanitarian agencies do indeed compete over self-regulation, but for reasons other than 
those predicted by club theorists.  Fights over self-regulation spring from different 
conceptions of humanitarianism as an endeavor, and through these contests the field is 
recreated.
17
  For instance, though MSF has fought the popular Sphere Standards, which 
define standards for the provision of humanitarian relief, this should not be seen as MSF 
casting off the mantle of a humanitarian agency.  Rather, the very fact of contestation 
presupposes agreement about what is worth fighting about (Bourdieu 1993: 73). 
Finally, analyzing humanitarianism as a field enables the drawing of connections 
between diverse groups and initiatives.  To approach the Code of Conduct, the Sphere 
Project, HAP, and the Code of Conduct on Images and Messages as isolated instances of 
regulation risks overlooking the complex ways that these initiatives have cross-fertilized, 
the links in personnel and missions, and the often similar circumstances from which they 
emerge.  At times, they even resemble a web of regulation, though the relationships, and 
competition, among them is indelibly more complex.  New institutionalism, in particular, 
calls attention to field-level processes, such as professionalization and structuration, that 
interpenetrate organizations and link initiatives. 
IR scholars have a number of conceptual tools for understanding linkages among 
actors and organizations; the field is generally not one of them.
18
  However, the field is 
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 “A field is simultaneously a space of conflict and competition, the analogy here being with a battlefield, 
in which participants vie to establish monopoly over the species of capital effective in it—cultural authority 
in the artistic field, scientific authority in the scientific field, sacerdotal authority in the religious field, and 
so forth—and the power to decree the hierarchy and “conversion rates” between all forms of authority in 
the field of power.  In the course of these struggles, the very shape and divisions of the field become a 
central stake, because to alter the distribution and relative weight of forms of capital is tantamount to 
modifying the structure of the field” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 17-8). 
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 Though there are exceptions.  On fields, see (Guzzini 2000 ; Leander 2008); on organizational fields, see 
(Tvedt 2002 ; Hall and Taylor 1996).  Barnett also refers to humanitarianism as a field (Barnett 2005b). 
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uniquely suited to the present analysis, for reasons that are clear in comparing it to the 
most common alternative concept, the network.  Networks, or patterns of regular and 
purposive relations among units, are certainly highly relevant to the study of 
humanitarianism.  Humanitarian interventions themselves are networked operations 
involving NGOs, states, international organizations, and a multiplicity of other actors 
(Holohan 2005 ; Duffield 2001 ; Stephenson 2005).  However, the network is primarily 
an organizational concept, which is to say that it says a great deal about how diverse parts 
are arrayed, but says little about shared ideas beyond reputational considerations and 
reciprocity (Powell 1990).  There is nothing essentially social about a network.
19
  
Moreover, a core principle of networks is complementarity, whereby actors offer 
different, mutually reinforcing services.  Like a network, a field implies links among 
actors, but these links form not on the basis of complementarity or issue-specific 
cooperation, but on shared domain of practice and common principles.  Finally, perhaps 
most essentially, while a field may contain networks – and I would consider the network 
to be a complementary concept – it is not reducible to them.  Thus, though InterAction 
(US) and VOICE (Europe) are powerful humanitarian networks, the humanitarian field 
extends beyond them and their membership. 
The humanitarian field is not an autonomous entity, no more than any social 
realm exists in isolation.  Humanitarianism exists in relation to other fields – the 
development and human rights fields being close cognates – and humanitarians, 
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 Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) are an obvious exception; they function based on shared ideas 
and in pursuit of principled objectives (Keck and Sikkink 1998 ; Khagram 2002 ; Price 2003).  However, 
this literature has paid little attention to the norms that govern TANs themselves.  Social networks are 
another exception.  Both TANs and social networks are “network plus” concepts – they have expanded on 
the network concept to include elements that are not present in all networks. 
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especially in times of crisis, search for models from outside their field.  Indeed, whereas 
sociological institutionalism tends to highlight isomorphism and stability (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983 ; Koelble 1995 ; Finnemore 1996), one of my insights is that crisis, periods 
of instability involving the disruption of the established social order, serves as a pivot 
point for deep political change (see Rozario 2007 ; Legro 2005 ; Price 1998: 622; 
Sunstein 1997: 47).  In humanitarianism, the preeminent crisis, precipitated by growth, 
high profile failures, and increasing state intervention, has been one of legitimacy.
20
  It is 
legitimacy, more than direct pressure from “principals,” that has helped spur codification. 
Legitimacy is “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman 1995: 574).  In IR, legitimacy has to do with 
perceptions of the right to rule; it is thus intimately linked to authority (Buchanan and 
Keohane 2006 ; Avant et al. 2010a: 360; Reus-Smit 2007).  Humanitarianism’s 
legitimacy, and therefore its basis for action, is traditionally derived from its principles of 
charity, humanity, and moral selflessness.  Humanitarians, driven by feelings of moral 
duty, act when states fail to fulfill their duties (Rieff 2002 ; Calhoun 2008).  Increasingly, 
though, practitioners are finding that good intentions are no longer enough, and that 
NGOs’ normative claims are no longer accepted at face value by publics.  Indeed, while 
opinion polls show that public trust of NGOs is still higher than in government and 
business, it is on the decline (Bendell 2006: ix-x; Slim 2002 ; Naidoo 2004).  Nick Leader 
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 Michael Barnett notes that “many contend that the humanitarian system is in trouble;” Wolf Dieter-
Eberwein writes of the veritable “destruction of the international humanitarian order;” and David Rieff and 
Nicholas Leader lament humanitarianism’s “crisis” (Barnett 2005a, 2003 ; Eberwein 2005 ; Rieff 2002 ; 
Leader 1998 ; see also Frangonikolopoulos 2004 ; Walker 2005).  This crisis is also the subject of a recent 
edited volume looking on NGO credibility (Gourevitch et al. 2012). 
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has noted an “appreciable shift of the Western media perception of the aid worker away 
from the white heroine to a much more ambiguous figure who may be ‘feeding killers’” 
(Leader 1998: 292). 
Like club theorists, then, I find that external factors matter in understanding 
humanitarian self-regulation.  Like states and corporations, civil society actors are 
increasingly under pressure to account for their actions internationally.  A veteran of the 
Irish nonprofit sector explained: 
We’re very conscious of the fact that, ok, the Church has come under scrutiny, 
business, banking, government – we’re next.  You know, there’s already 
beginning to be.  And you have a generation now that aren’t just going to accept 
that they’re doing good.  We’ve got to show that we make a difference, and 
therefore we’ve got to be transparent and accountable, and the organizations that 
are closest to the donors – if you’re fundraising, you have to answer those 
questions (Int. 24). 
 
However, I show that external pressure is an enabling factor – in many cases, it is 
necessary, but not sufficient, to explain humanitarian self-regulation.  In each chapter, I 
find that legitimacy challenges facilitated the action of normative entrepreneurs by 
contributing to an atmosphere of crisis and urgency, and thus opening space for action.  
To call self-regulation a response to a crisis of legitimacy is to situate these actions in a 
general mood (existential angst), rather than in specific pressures from Principals to 
Agents.  Indeed, the pressure for codes of conduct is not simply (or, perhaps, even 
primarily) external!  The key proponents of codification – Peter Walker, Nick Stockton, 
and Tony Vaux, among others – are long-time humanitarian veterans who advanced 
principled arguments for humanitarian reform.  Crisis has provided political space and 
20 
 
 
discursive resources for these ideational entrepreneurs to advocate specific visions of 
humanitarian action, and to re-situate humanitarianism onto new bases of legitimacy. 
But onto which bases?  Legitimacy is not a singular concept, in the sense that 
multiple actions and orientations may confer it, and different sources carry different 
weight depending on the context – and the audience (Thaut et al. 2012).21  Ossewaarde et 
al distinguish among normative legitimacy (moral claims), regulatory legitimacy 
(rootedness in International Law and rules), cognitive legitimacy (claims of expertise), 
and output legitimacy (proof of impact)(Ossewaarde et al. 2008).  The perception that 
good intentions are no longer enough is an argument that normative legitimacy alone is 
insufficient.  In different ways, in every single case I study, humanitarians are using self-
regulation to make specific legitimacy claims, to bolster humanitarianism’s normative 
legitimacy with additional elements.
22
 
 
Significance of the question 
Beyond the fact that self-regulation is a growing, but under-studied, phenomenon, 
there are several important substantive and theoretical reasons why we should be 
interested in this area of research.  First, the study of humanitarian self-regulation opens 
new insights into NGO normativity.  Whereas IR, and particularly liberalism and 
constructivism, has turned the study of non-state actors into a major area of inquiry, 
                                                 
21
 A number of recent studies highlight morality, expertise, and impact as sources of legitimacy (Boli 1999 
; Slim 2002 ; Barnett and Finnemore 2004 ; Avant et al. 2010a). 
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 For instance, the Sphere Project embodies claims to normative legitimacy, regulatory legitimacy, 
cognitive legitimacy, and output legitimacy.  Normative legitimacy is ensured by the Humanitarian Charter, 
which defines core humanitarian principles.  Regulatory legitimacy derives from the clear linking of 
humanitarian responsibility to a broad set of international laws and conventions.  Cognitive legitimacy 
comes from the Sphere Minimum Standards, which diffuse expertise and good practice on a range of areas 
of intervention, including shelter and water.  Finally, output legitimacy is supported by Sphere’s focus on 
quantifiability, which lends itself to post-intervention impact assessment. 
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approaches to the study of NGOs remain poorly attuned to social forces working among 
them.  This is illustrated by the literature on transnational activism, in which the focus is 
on NGOs as norm promoters and enforcers targeting states and corporations (e.g. Keck 
and Sikkink 1998 ; Price 1998 ; Khagram 2002).  We now know a great deal about the 
strategies NGOs adopt to compel recalcitrant actors to adhere to international norms and 
standards, but we know little about their own governance and how they develop shared 
ideas about appropriate behavior.  The study of self-regulation, and hence of NGO efforts 
to codify their own practices, potentially offers deep insights into how contestation over 
norms and principles shapes the bounds of conceivable action.
23
 
Second, and related, taking ideas seriously means taking seriously the role of 
identities in the creation of institutional structures.  This might seem a surprising 
statement, given constructivism’s explicit focus on logics of appropriateness (e.g. Wendt 
1999 ; Ruggie 1998 ; Adler 2002 ; Guzzini 2000).  However, in practice, constructivism 
has often ceded ground to other approaches when it comes to explaining the origins of 
institutions.  Thus, scholars advocating for “two-step” approaches and mixed methods 
cite rationalism’s strength in explaining the origins of cooperation, institutionalization, 
and rule formation, leaving constructivists to theorize existing institutions’ impact on 
identity through mechanisms of socialization in already created institutions.
24
  My 
research finds that identity, specifically competing identity claims, can underpin efforts at 
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 Hilhorst and Schmiemann suggest that “an imagined humanitarian community is evolving in which 
humanitarians learn from each other and start to develop common agendas for change, despite differences 
that continue to exist between agencies” (Hilhorst and Schmiemann 2002: 498-499). 
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2008 ; Gheciu 2005 ; Risse and Sikkink 1999). 
22 
 
 
devising rules and regulations, and also that identity, not just strategic positioning, is a 
significant variable in understanding difficulties coordinating action. 
Stemming from this is a third proposition:  identity as a source of self-regulation 
provides grounds for assessing the impact, and deeper meaning, of voluntary (and 
frequently unenforced) codes of conduct.  Put another way, though compliance with rules 
clearly matters, compliance is not the be all and end all when assessing voluntary codes.
25
  
In my case studies, I demonstrate that voluntary initiatives still matter to the extent that 
they change ideas about humanitarianism, are integrated into practices, or serve as 
precedent for future regulatory efforts.  Self-regulation is about power, specifically about 
the power of rules to shape actions, define standards of appropriate behavior, and 
determine who is and who is not a humanitarian.  Codes, if used and internalized, have 
the potential to restructure fields of action. 
Fourth, my research, and specifically my understanding of the organizational 
field, suggests that structural approaches to the study of international politics need not be 
static or deterministic.  This has historically been a tension in the IR subfield.  Called the 
agent-structure debate, it has to do with whether international phenomena are more 
accurately attributed to individual agency or, instead, to overarching structures (Adler 
2002 ; Wendt 1999).  I find that while self-regulation involves situated social actors 
acting on environmental cues, the strategies they adopt, the ways they conceive of their 
actions, and the contestations that emerge are informed by, but in no way predetermined 
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2003: 43; Lancaster 1998 ; Lloyd and de las Casas 2006). 
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by, structure.
26
  Moreover, the field approach holds significant promise for understanding 
how sectors in general evolve, especially to the extent that other types of organizations 
(nonprofit, corporations, states) are impacted by similar global forces.  After all, 
humanitarians are not the only organizations facing growing public reassessment, nor, as 
I discuss in my conclusions, are they the only ones to have turned to self-regulation.  The 
relevance of this approach thus goes beyond the specific area of humanitarianism. 
Finally, at a more fundamental level, lives and livelihoods are at stake in 
humanitarian self-regulation.  For populations affected by war or disaster, the standards 
to which aid providers adhere may quite literally mean the difference between life and 
death.  Immediately after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, for instance, 50,000 refugees in 
the neighboring DRC (then Zaire) died in one month alone from disease and violence.  
Despite the best intentions, the humanitarian system failed to react in a sufficient, 
coordinated manner and “may also have contributed to an unnecessary loss of life” (RRN 
1996: 23).  Good intentions may yield terrible outcomes.  If self-regulation is successful, 
the argument goes, it should mean that more lives are saved. 
 
Research design 
The universe of humanitarian self-regulation is large and growing.  There are 
currently more than a dozen international initiatives, with scores more at the regional and 
national levels.
27
  They vary widely in institutional mechanisms and regulatory focus, 
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 Bourdieu conceives of a two-way relationship between objective structures (of social fields) and 
incorporated structures (of the habitus); agents are not simply epiphenomena of structure (See Bourdieu 
1998: vii-viii). 
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 The universe of cases includes the Red Cross/NGO Code of Conduct; the Sphere Project; the HAP 2010 
Standard; the People In Aid Code; the Code of Good Practice for NGOs Responding to HIV/AIDS; 
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running the gamut from voluntary and unenforced codes of conduct to institutions with 
reporting requirements and enforcement mechanisms.  Taken collectively, these 
initiatives implicate all aspects of a humanitarian organization’s existence, codifying 
humanitarian principles, standardizing agency performance, rationalizing organizational 
processes, and addressing advertising portrayals. 
I approach case selection with two considerations in mind.  First, as an emerging 
area of research, case selection should prioritize theory-building (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 
5-6).  This research must thus account for the early and most significant examples of 
humanitarian self-regulation.
28
  In humanitarianism, the Code of Conduct for the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief 
(henceforth, “the Code of Conduct”) is the first example of a system-wide self-regulatory 
initiative; the Sphere Project is the largest, in terms of numbers of organizations involved 
and research output.  I devote separate chapters – Chapters 3 and 4 – to these codes.  
Within cases, I emphasize process tracing, a method intended to understand development, 
change, and evolution through the investigation of causal mechanisms (George and 
Bennett 2005: 6; Lohse and Johnson 1996 ; Mahoney 2010).  My evidence consists 
primarily of archival materials, supporting documents, and interviews – 66 in-depth, 
semi-structured interviews with key figures (average duration: 55:43 min.) – and is 
                                                                                                                                                 
Antares’ guidelines on Managing Stress in Humanitarian Workers; GHP’s Principles of Partnership; 
INEE’s Minimum Standards for Education; the Code of Good Conduct in Food Crisis Prevention and 
Management; ECB’s Good Enough Guide; the Livestock Emergency Guidelines and Standards Project; 
SEEP’s Minimum Standards for Economic Recovery after Crisis; and COMPAS Qualité. 
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 The case study approach has specific advantages that make it more amenable to theory building, 
including its depth of analysis and descriptive richness (Gerring 2004: 347-8; George and Bennett 2005: 
19-22).  A disadvantage is that case units are assumed to be relatively bounded, which is not necessarily 
always true for humanitarian self-regulation.  To overcome this, I attempt to draw explicit links, especially 
in personnel and patterns of influence, among my case selections. 
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directed at fleshing out the circumstances under which codes were developed.  In so 
doing, I call specific attention to linguistic and conceptual argumentation on the part of 
humanitarians involved in self-regulation.
29
  Regulators’ self-understandings are 
extremely important for ascribing motives to behavior. 
Second, I attempt in my case selection to account for the wide range of self-
regulatory initiatives.  Scholars distinguish among three categories of initiatives:  
aspirational codes of principles; codes of conduct with defined technical standards; and 
certification schemes with third party verification (Lloyd and de las Casas 2006; Davis 
2007).  Of these, aspirational codes are most common (Bendell 2006: 58; HAP 2011e: 
25).  I have accounted for all three categories in my research.  The Code of Conduct is an 
example of an aspirational code of principles; Sphere is a code with defined technical 
standards; and HAP International is a certification scheme with third party verification.  
The Code of Conduct on Images and Messages is a hybrid; at the European level, it most 
resembles an aspirational code of principles; in Ireland, where I focus my research, it has 
evolved towards more robust forms of monitoring and verification. 
Why do the founders of initiatives opt for particular institutional arrangements?  
By looking at the range of regulation, it is possible to more generally theorize the origins 
of codification, and specifically to assess whether different types of institutional forms 
derive from different motivations on the parts of the “coders.”  For scholars of “club 
theory,” institution design derives from two factors:  external pressure from principals 
(especially donors) and strategic action by agents (aid agencies).  Where external 
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pressure is strong, we would expect self-regulation to more closely mirror the concerns of 
powerful principals (e.g. donors).  Institutional design, given concern over market 
failures, is a strategic attempt to attract organizations through branding benefits.  As 
depicted in Table 1, club theory would lead us to expect the strongest branding benefits to 
come from HAP International, which most closely resembles a strong accountability club 
for its specific dictates and rigorous enforcement regime, and the weakest from the Code 
of Conduct.  HAP and Sphere, both strongly influenced by the fallout from Rwanda, 
would be expected to most closely mirror donor preferences. 
 
Table 1 
 External pressure 
Weak Strong 
Enforcement 
Weak Code of Conduct Sphere Project 
Strong Code on Images HAP International 
 
 
Like club theorists, I acknowledge the role of external factors, but I find that self-
regulation cannot be traced solely, or even primarily, to these factors.  Such criticisms as 
are leveled are more general than specific, and external pressure is not sufficient to 
explain the diversity of initiatives.  In fact, even HAP International and Sphere, both of 
which emerged in the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda, derive largely from internal, 
especially principled, motivations, and both are primarily directed at practitioner, not 
donor, audiences.  External pressure matters to the extent that it facilitates action, 
especially by opening space for change and providing discursive resources for code 
proponents, but code design in general cannot be explained by donor or principal 
preferences, even where pressure has been intense. 
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Institutional strength is also not strongly related to branding.  On the contrary, I 
find that institutional arrangements and sanctioning capacities relate more to beliefs on 
the part of ideational entrepreneurs about how best to promote normative change in light 
of their personal experiences and preexisting codes.  In the first instance, code designers 
are bound by the realm of the conceivable; later initiatives have been built on the 
foundations left by their predecessors, and the successes and failures of the preceding 
initiatives are reflected in institutional design.  Consequently, there has been a historical 
trend from weak and vague codes to stronger and more specific codes.  Second, the 
identities of the ideational entrepreneurs themselves is important in determining each 
initiative’s final shape and focus.  In each case, I find that experiences on the ground and 
in the sector have helped mold the attitudes of the founding figures regarding how best to 
pursue social change, such as through consensus or sanctions. 
A final implication of looking in comparative fashion at a range of initiatives is 
that it allows for a preliminary assessment of impact.  I do so with a major caveat.  
Humanitarians have long asserted that emergency relief is massively difficult, even 
impossible, to measure (Watson 2008 ; Webster et al. 2009: 10; GHA 2009: 21; Borel et 
al. 2004: 85).  Interventions are multivariate, involving hundreds of actors with divergent 
responsibilities in highly irregular situations.  In each chapter, I observe that measures, 
such as are available, often fail to provide systematic evidence that self-regulation has 
substantial impact on practice, though qualitatively, practitioners believe that the impact 
is profound.
30
  It is significant that many in the sector advocate so strongly for self-
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regulation in the absence of systematic evidence.  As much as anything, this speaks to the 
ideational function played by codes. 
 
Chapter outline 
 The dissertation is organized as follows:  In Chapter 2, I flesh out the concept of 
the organizational field and connect it to self-regulation.  I look to new institutionalism 
for guidance mapping out the humanitarian field – its key components and governing 
mechanisms – but find that new institutionalism alone is insufficiently flexible to account 
for self-regulation.  I suggest that, by returning to Bourdieu’s original formulation of the 
field, and thus emphasizing contestation and flux, it is possible to sidestep new 
institutionalism’s tendency towards isomorphism and continuity.  The key to 
understanding self-regulation, and, indeed, the reason it is so frequently contested, is that 
it acts on the level of the humanitarian field itself.  Codes of conduct establish principles 
for action, norms of behavior, and definitions of the domain of endeavor. 
 Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 consist of case studies that analyze the origins of key self-
regulatory initiatives.  The RC/NGO Code of Conduct, I explain in Chapter 3, originates 
out of ideational entrepreneurship on the part of a small group of humanitarian veterans.  
Frustrated by practices that diverged from their understanding of proper practice, these 
individuals sought to codify humanitarianism’s core principles.  The Code, though vague 
and unenforced, set the precedent for the Sphere Project, subject of Chapter 4.  Sphere, 
too, emerges from within the sector, but its development was also deeply marked by the 
humanitarian response to Rwanda and the increased international pressures on 
                                                                                                                                                 
it surely must be true” (Knox-Clarke and Mitchell 2011: 3). 
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humanitarians to reform their practices.  Through an analysis of the fierce debate between 
Sphere’s supporters and its largely French opponents, I argue that Sphere’s seemingly 
impartial technical standards were so controversial because they functioned to advance a 
specific vision of humanitarianism rooted in international law, human rights, and 
principles of “do no harm.” 
 Sphere was not the only initiative to emerge out of Rwanda.  In Chapter 5, I 
investigate the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) International.  HAP most 
closely resembles a strong accountability club, but I find branding and impact to be of 
secondary concern compared to principled arguments about power and responsibility.  I 
also discover that the focus on accountability is not simply the result of donor pressure; 
HAP’s specific brand of accountability (beneficiary accountability) functions to empower 
the recipients of assistance while simultaneously pushing back against donor-centric, 
“upward” models of accountability. 
 The final case study is peripheral to the others.  Whereas direct links connect the 
Code of Conduct, Sphere, and HAP – there are shared personnel, motivating ideas, and 
member organizations – the Code of Conduct on Images and Messages (Chapter 6) is 
largely outside of these main regulatory trends.  However, I find that the Code on Images 
shares a number of features with these other initiatives:  it, too, is the result of normative 
entrepreneurs responding to a perceived crisis of legitimacy.  In this case, the Code was 
promoted by a group of Irish NGO staff seeking to check the pervasive use of shocking 
images and messages to sell humanitarianism and development projects.  I portray this as 
an effort by development educators to provoke a conversation with fundraisers and 
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bureaucrats about humanitarian principles.  In the process, it is also a means for Dóchas 
(Ireland’s NGO platform) to insert itself into European discussions on quality and 
accountability and to demonstrate leadership in the field. 
 In my conclusions, I return to questions of competition, constitution, and 
connection; survey the trends that emerged in the research; and assess recent 
developments, including the Joint Standards Initiative (JSI).  I also suggest future lines of 
research, including the need for comparative studies of the sources of self-regulation in 
corporate and non-profit contexts. 
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Figure 1 
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Ch. 2 - Surveying the Humanitarian Field 
 
 
In this chapter, I develop a framework for understanding nonprofit, specifically 
humanitarian, self-governance.  I do this by conceptualizing humanitarianism as an 
organizational field, a concept I derive from a joint reading of the sociological theories of 
Bourdieu and new institutionalism.  Organizational fields, or local social orders 
constituted by organizations, foreground the societal contexts in which actors are 
embedded and the webs of meaning and intelligibility that govern their actions.  In 
analyzing humanitarianism as a field, I focus on the shifting nature of inter-organizational 
relations, thereby contextualizing my specific object of inquiry – NGO self-regulation – 
in a contemporary moment marked by trends of professionalization and 
bureaucratization. 
This chapter unfolds in four sections.  Section I provides an overview of the 
provision of humanitarian relief, highlighted by advances in communication 
technologies, evolving organizational structures, and strengthened networked 
connections.  Collectively, these shifts herald changes in the architecture of 
humanitarianism and necessitate new ways of conceptualizing NGO practices.  I turn to 
Sociology’s concept of the “organizational field” to capture these shifts.  In Section II, I 
explore two related variants of field theory, putting the new institutionalist work of Paul 
DiMaggio and Walter Powell into conversation with Pierre Bourdieu.  I seek to marry 
new institutionalism’s analytic precision with Bourdieu’s appreciation of competition, 
contestation, and flux.  As I articulate it, the field captures changes in the humanitarian 
terrain (specifically professionalization and institutionalization) and highlights struggles 
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to define its rules and boundaries. 
The remainder of the chapter applies these concepts to humanitarianism.  In 
Section III, I sketch the outlines of the contemporary humanitarian field, paying special 
attention to patterns of structuration and professionalization, two characteristics 
highlighted by new institutionalists that differentiate contemporary humanitarianism from 
its predecessors.  Finally, Section IV connects self-regulation to the field through a 
discussion of mechanisms for change, specifically by presenting struggles over self-
regulation as struggles over the nature of humanitarianism itself. 
 
Section I – Broad changes in humanitarianism 
In a recent study of humanitarian professionalization, Peter Walker and Catherine 
Russ observe that: 
Until recently the ability of humanitarian workers to organise and communicate as 
a global community was severely limited. Humanitarians came together for 
limited periods of time at various crisis spots of the world and then dispersed, 
returning home or moving onto [sic] the next crisis.  It is really only in the last 
decade, with the advent of web-based tools, that it has been possible to talk in any 
meaningful way about a global humanitarian community (Walker and Russ 2010: 
14). 
 
As Walker and Russ aptly observe, humanitarianism has evolved considerably in recent 
decades.  Technology has transformed how organizations mobilize, agencies have 
bureaucratized, the sector has institutionalized, and the bonds connecting humanitarian 
organizations have, in many cases, been strengthened (Borton 2009 ; Donini 2007 ; 
Barnett 2005b).  These trends have a significant bearing on how we apprehend 
humanitarian self-governance. 
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To fully appreciate the evolution of the humanitarian system, we must begin with 
an understanding of its earlier characteristics.  Simply stated, until fairly recently, 
humanitarianism remained a relatively limited domain of activity.  As former President of 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) Rony Brauman has noted, the noun “humanitarian” was 
almost unheard of before the 1980s (Brauman 2006: 105).  For decades, the Red Cross 
was by far the predominant actor in crisis situations, joined, at times, by religious 
charities such as Caritas Internationalis.  As for NGOs, by measure of size, reach, or 
complexity, they little resembled their modern day variants.  For instance, World Vision, 
today one of the largest and most technically proficient humanitarian agencies, active in 
over 90 countries, remained a largely “non-operational” charity with a loose 
organizational structure until a set of organizational changes in the 1970s (Whaites 1999: 
419).  Other important agencies, including MSF, were not even founded until the 1970s.
31
 
MSF provides an interesting case in point.  Founded in 1971 in a union of 
[largely] left-wing doctors and journalists, it is today one of the largest humanitarian 
NGOs in the world, with a combined humanitarian expenditure of US$495 million in 
2006 (Development Initiatives 2009: 1-2).  MSF also features prominently in the history 
of efforts to regulate the field.  However, in the 1970s, MSF, like the field as a whole, 
remained small in scale and amateur in operations.  Though today MSF is one of 
thousands of aid agencies worldwide, in its first decade, the sector was still so diffuse that 
MSF was largely alone in its domain in France.
32
  MSF ‘biographer’ Anne Vallaeys 
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 Of the major players today, Oxfam, Save the Children, and the International Rescue Committee predate 
World War II; Catholic Relief Services (CRS), CARE, and World Vision International (WVI) were 
founded during or just after; and MSF and Mercy Corps were formed in the 1970s. 
32
 Only after 1979 was MSF joined by organizations like Médecins Du Monde, Aide Médicale 
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writes that the agency’s initial appeals for public support were “unfocused,” but 
possessed “a certain emotion”; MSF was an “empty envelope,” an idea to be built on 
(Vallaeys 2004: 106, 130-3).  Indeed, in its early years, MSF lacked the wherewithal to 
launch even the most rudimentary interventions; such missions as it did launch were 
amateuristic and incoherent.
33
  Vallaeys characterizes MSF’s first mission, to Nicaragua 
in 1972, as a “flop”; they did not arrive for 72 hours after the earthquake and the Red 
Cross was so incensed that MSF had not coordinated its operations that, for a time, it 
swore off future cooperation (Vallaeys 2004: 136-41).  Again in Cambodia in 1977 and 
in Thailand in 1978 personnel were sent without support, communication, or supplies. 
MSF soon realized that the agency could not function without an organizational 
structure and operational independence; “symbolic missions” went only so far (Vallaeys 
2004: 245-8; Ninin and Deldique 1991: 237-8).
34
  MSF, like other agencies, faced a 
choice as it developed:  it could stay small and unencumbered, or it could grow and 
professionalize (Ninin and Deldique 1991: 133-4).  The process of developing internal 
codes and structures was slow and fraught.  But, Vallaeys remarks, “times had changed.”  
By the 1980s, “humanitarian action had become a system endowed with cogs, rules, 
actors, professionals who, under the cover of a pseudo-humanism, generate a new 
economic activity, equipped with budgets, media plans, and employees.  Furthermore, 
prone to discharge the social onto the private, the States opened extraordinary markets in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Internationale, and Action Internationale Contre la Faim (Ninin and Deldique 1991). 
33
 MSF served as a placement agency for charitable organizations with the resources to launch 
interventions, including the ICRC, Croix de Malte, and Frères des Hommes (Vallaeys 2004: 127-8). 
34
 For the perspective of former MSF president Rony Brauman, see (Brauman 2002: 35-6; 2006: 69-70). 
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the service sector” (Vallaeys 2004: 732).35  By the 1980s, MSF had hired its first full-
time staff, created a team of marketing professionals, and was engaged in new and 
different types of missions.  Today, MSF is an international federation with 5 operational 
centers, 19 national offices, and half a billion dollars of yearly revenues. 
The case of MSF is hardly unique.  World Vision International, founded in 1950, 
also underwent a “dramatic 15-year period of transformation” by the end of the 1980s, 
evolving from an agency dominated by the charismatic leadership of its founder into an 
NGO with international reach (Whaites 1999: 419).  Today, WVI is one of the most 
important humanitarian actors with revenues of $712 million in 2001 and a central 
position in key institutions, including the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response 
(SCHR), the Inter-Agency Working Group (IWG), and the International Council of 
Voluntary Agencies (ICVA).  In the sector as a whole, while good deeds and conviction 
provided humanitarianism with its initial moral authority, organization and structure 
progressively followed.  Table 2 provides a simplified overview of the major changes; 
Section III expands on these points. 
Table 2 
Development of the Humanitarian Field 
 Pre-1980s Post-1980s 
Number of actors
36
 
Limited (40 NGOs in 
Ethiopia, 1985) 
Expanded (1000 NGOs in 
Haiti, 2010) 
Organizational logic Flexible, loosely structured Hierarchical, rationalized 
Work culture Amateur/ volunteerism Professional/ vocational 
Interagency cooperation Ad hoc 
Institutionalized (e.g. Clusters, 
SCHR, VOICE, InterAction) 
Shared Knowledge Limited 
Increasing (e.g. ALNAP, ODI, 
Development Initiatives) 
Regulation of sector Limited Increasing (e.g. donors, 
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 All translations my own. 
36
 Data from (Rambaud 2005) and (Bhattacharjee and Lossio 2011). 
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Sphere, PIA, HAP) 
Official humanitarian asst.
37
 $2 billion (1990) $12.4 billion (2010) 
 
In short, self-regulation occurs against a backdrop of tremendous changes in the 
funding, provision, and organization of humanitarian action.  Today, roughly 2600 aid 
and development agencies operate across the globe and continue to increase in number 
and size (Barnett and Weiss 2008 ; Borel et al. 2004).  Humanitarian activities are funded 
to the tune of $18 billion a year, 60% of which is disbursed by NGOs (ALNAP 2010 ; 
Stoddard 2002 ; Walker and Pepper 2007).  Without a doubt, humanitarian organizations 
are no longer, to paraphrase MSF’s Xavier Emmanuelli, the “cowboys” or “boy scouts” 
of emergency medicine (Emmanuelli 1991: 165). 
 
Section II – The Organizational field 
As the preceding section illustrates, contemporary humanitarianism has 
demonstrated marked tendencies towards increased professionalization, organization, and 
expansion.  As I find in subsequent chapters, each of these trends manifests itself in the 
drive for codification and standardization.  What is particularly noteworthy is how these 
trends express themselves as much at the system level as they do at the level of individual 
organizations.  That is to say, the specific example of MSF bureaucratizing is also 
experienced at the sectoral level as bureaucratization, institutionalization, and rule-
formation (including self-regulation) has swept across humanitarianism.  This is why I 
have argued, in Chapter 1, that organizational behavior is too complex to be understood 
simply or exclusively as the outcome of individual agencies pursuing their egoistic 
                                                 
37
 Data from (Macrae 2002) and (Development Initiatives 2011). 
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preferences.  The concept of the organizational field, which I derive from Sociology, 
calls attention to the relationship between humanitarian actors and the social structures 
within which they are embedded.
38
 
Sociology’s influence on International Relations has been profound, particularly 
on constructivist approaches to the study of organizations.  Research on legitimacy, 
norms, institutions, and socialization is, more often than not, deeply indebted to 
Sociology (Finnemore 1996 ; Guzzini 2000).  As a sociological approach, field theory 
calls attention to the social structures within which agents are embedded, arguing that 
without an analysis of these structures, we are denied a full understanding of the agents 
themselves.  This puts it immediately at odds with economistic or rational choice 
approaches, as I have noted in Chapter 1; indeed, Bourdieu and new institutionalist 
scholars alike suggest, contra ‘homo economicus,’ that individual choice and preferences 
are not autonomous but embedded in cultural and historical frameworks, and institutions 
shape preferences themselves.
39
 
At a basic level, fields are “local social orders” in which organized groups of 
actors gather and frame their actions vis-à-vis one another (Fligstein 2001: 108).
40
  As a 
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 Humanitarian practitioners will note that the ‘field’ can also refer to operations on the ground.  However, 
the usage of ‘field’ to refer to a domain of activity is not entirely unprecedented, even in the humanitarian 
literature.  For instance, Walker and Russ refer to “practitioners working in the field of humanitarian 
affairs” (Walker and Russ 2010: 45).  Suffice to say, when the term field is used in this study, it refers to 
the “organizational field,” not to activities taking place exclusively on the ground. 
39
 For Bourdieu, rational choice is “thoroughly oblivious to the social genesis of historically varying forms 
of interests;” “this narrow, economistic conception of the ‘rationality’ of practices ignores the individual 
and collective history of agents through which the structures of preference that inhabit them are constituted 
in a complex temporal dialectic with the objective structures that produced them and which they tend to 
reproduce” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 123-5; also Powell and DiMaggio 1991).  Though Bourdieu 
uses the language of ‘interest,’ it is interest defined by historically delimited fields. 
40
 Within Sociology, there are several research tracks, some of which differ dramatically in focus and 
research program.  Similar terms include organizational fields, interorganizational fields, fields, and 
societal sectors (Scott 1991 ; Fligstein 2001). 
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tool of analysis, the field highlights the social links – shared knowledge, norms, rules – 
among actors in a given area.  I focus on two variants of the concept:  on the new 
institutionalism
41
 of Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, which explicitly addresses fields 
constituted by organizations, and on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, which is most clear 
about the mechanisms by which fields are maintained and transformed.  While 
emphasizing points of commonality, in areas of disagreement, my approach is 
Bourdieuian.  These approaches do, in fact, differ in several respects, notably in their 
objects of study (organizations vs. embedded individuals), focus (isomorphism vs. 
contestation), and terminology (legitimacy vs. capital); however, there are also significant 
areas of overlap.  My goal in this section is to explore the “natural affinity,” as Powell 
and DiMaggio put it, between Bourdieu and new institutionalism (Powell and DiMaggio 
1991: 38, fn. 28; also Fligstein 2001: 108).  I find that a joint reading yields a powerful 
account of field design.  Specifically, while DiMaggio and Powell’s analytic rigor offers 
clear guidance in identifying organizational fields, Bourdieu’s attention to contestation 
corrects for new institutionalism’s tendency towards structural explanations.  
I define an organizational field as a local social order composed of organizations 
and characterized by rules, values, and knowledge specific to it.  I take as a starting point 
DiMaggio and Powell’s keen observation that fields can be composed of organizations – 
not just of individuals – and identification of field-specific knowledge and norms 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983 ; also Koelble 1995).  As DiMaggio puts it, field boundaries 
“affect how organizations select models for emulation, where they focus information-
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 Also called “sociological institutionalism” to differentiate it from rational choice and historical variants 
(Koelble 1995). 
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gathering energy, which organizations they compare themselves with, and where they 
recruit personnel” (DiMaggio 1991: 267).  Organizations in a field are led to adopt 
normatively sanctioned practices and respond to the actions of other organizations. 
With Bourdieu, I share an understanding of the centrality of power and positions 
to field maintenance and transformation.  Contra DiMaggio and Powell’s functionalism,42 
I view the domain itself as a central stake in the game.  In other words, we cannot simply 
look at an area of endeavor – such as humanitarianism – and expect to find a field.  
Rather, we must view the domain of endeavor as itself the outcome of the field.  For 
Bourdieu, fields are sets of objective, historical relations between positions (posts) 
anchored in certain forms of power (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 16; Bourdieu 1993: 
72).  As phrased by Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth, a field is thus a “symbolic terrain 
with its own networks, hierarchical relationships, and expertise, and more generally its 
own rules of the game, all of which are subject to modification over time and in relation 
to other fields” (Dezalay and Garth 1996: 16).43  Each field, be it humanitarianism, 
international commercial arbitration (Dezalay and Garth 1996), or U.S. art museums 
(DiMaggio 1991), is defined by rules and stakes and interests specific to the field.  Fields 
are relational configurations – like a magnetic field – in the sense that they impose a 
specific gravity on objects and agents (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 17). 
One can compare a field to a game in that struggles are central to its workings; 
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 This is a point of distinction between the Bourdieuian approach and new institutionalism; the latter is 
more explicitly functional, defining boundaries by identifying a group of organizations producing similar 
products or services (Scott 1991: 173).  For Bourdieu, the boundaries cannot be identified outside of 
analysis as they are themselves the product of contestation. 
43
 As an example, in several of the case studies, ideas from human rights and public sector fields come to 
exercise a tremendous influence on the founders of humanitarian self-regulatory initiatives. 
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competition does not entail dissolution of the game.  Participants vie to establish the 
monopoly over the species of capital effective in the field and the power to decree the 
hierarchy and conversion rates between forms of capital – in short, there is a struggle 
over the authority to define which material and symbolic goods are worth being sought 
after (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 17, 98; Bourdieu 1993: 32-5; 1998: 34).  It is 
through these struggles that the game is reproduced.  In Dezalay and Garth’s Dealing in 
Virtue, for example, contestations in the field of international commercial arbitration 
hinge on the relative weights of different forms of symbolic capital – the prestige and 
charisma of the ‘grand old men’ versus the professionalism and technical proficiency of 
the younger generation.  Ultimately, “conflicts over what and who represent 
‘international commercial arbitration’ comprise a key part of the inquiry” (Dezalay and 
Garth 1996: 1).  In Section IV, I argue that humanitarian contestations over self-
regulation are proxy battles over accepted authority in the humanitarian field.  The shape 
and divisions of the field are thus at stake in the game. 
Whereas contestation is central to the work of Bourdieu and his adherents, and, 
indeed, to my research, it is largely absent from the work of new institutionalists.  For 
new institutionalists, the focus is instead on stability and recurrence, what Powell and 
DiMaggio call the “constant and repetitive quality of much of organizational life” 
(Powell and DiMaggio 1991: 9; Meyer and Rowan 1991).  This is exemplified by the 
concept of isomorphism, which is the idea that one unit in a population will resemble 
other units that face similar environmental conditions.  Rather than viewing this as an 
essential difference between new institutionalism and Bourdieu, I would characterize it as 
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a difference in focus.  After all, Bourdieu himself captures recurrence and repetition 
through the idea of habitus – dispositions attuned to the field –, expressed as a ‘feel for 
the game’ (Bourdieu 1993: 18).  Habitus accounts for regulated and regular behavior 
outside of explicit rule-following; it is structure, internalized in bodies.
44
  Isomorphism 
might even be seen as a possible end result of the workings of habitus.  We should also 
note that a theory of contestation is not inconsistent with new institutionalism.  Powell 
and DiMaggio themselves acknowledge that rules are typically constructed by a process 
of conflict and contestation (Powell and DiMaggio 1991: 28; DiMaggio 1991: 268).  
Prior to isomorphism, then, power and interests shape organizational fields. 
Differences in focus and terminology aside, Bourdieu and new institutionalism 
accord on many of the key questions.  Both approaches disavow agent-centered analysis, 
instead viewing agent and structure as co-constitutive.  Individual attributes such as 
interest and identity are, in many ways, produced by the field, but, especially for 
Bourdieu, agents are not mere products of structure.  For both, the state plays an 
important role in defining fields, whether as a sort of ‘meta-field’ in Bourdieuian thought 
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 Habitus refers to dispositions or tastes associated with a position in the field (Bourdieu 1998: 7-8).  Like 
its root, “habit,” and cognate, “habitual,” the concept accounts for regularity.  More specifically, it signifies 
“systems of durable, transposable dispositions… [that function] as principles which generate and organize 
practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a 
conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them” 
(Bourdieu 1990: 53).  Habitus is that which generates “reasonable” or “common sense” behaviors, which 
are internalized as second nature.  The relationship between habitus and field is one of mutual constitution:  
the field structures, or conditions, habitus; habitus, in turn, constitutes the field as knowable.  The 
intersection of the two is what Bourdieu calls a ‘feel for the game’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 127, 16; 
Bourdieu 1990: 66).  While my analysis of humanitarianism is more directly focused on the field, habitus 
certainly occupies an important background position.  For instance, the extent to which rules or principles 
come to serve as taken-for-granteds, to become the accepted rules of the game, is an important marker of a 
successful code.  Thus, a humanitarian respondent whose first response to a refugee crisis is to consult page 
239 of the Sphere Standards (Minimum Standards in Shelter, Settlement and Non-Food Items) 
demonstrates the functioning of habitus.  More generally, habitus functions when a humanitarian self-
identifies as a professional and commits to upholding a set of personal and occupational standards. 
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or as a source of isomorphism in new institutionalism.
45
  And, finally and crucially, 
symbolic resources play a pivotal role in the functioning of fields, whether depicted as 
symbolic capital (Bourdieu) or as legitimacy (new institutionalism). 
Indeed, one of the field’s key strengths lies in its depiction of the centrality of 
ideational factors in organization and constitution.  Though Bourdieu writes of symbolic 
capital and new institutionalists prefer legitimacy,
46
 the general thrust is similar:  in both 
cases, group recognition is central to the maintenance of authority.  Recall that in Chapter 
1, I defined legitimacy, following Suchman, as “a generalized perception or assumption 
that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman 1995: 574).  For 
new institutionalists, legitimacy pertains to “societal evaluations of organizational goals” 
and organizations adopt externally legitimated elements to maximize changes of survival 
(Scott 1991: 169; also Meyer and Rowan 1991 ; DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  This is not 
unlike Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic capital, what he calls “recognized power,” 
wherein “the weight of different agents depends on their symbolic capital, i.e. on the 
recognition, institutionalized or not, that they receive from a group” (Bourdieu, qtd. in 
Dezalay and Garth 1996: 18).  Just as new institutionalists point to elements such as 
registration and certification (Singh et al. 1991: 398), Bourdieu identifies educational 
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 The state functions as a sort of meta-field in its structuring role.  The state is simultaneously composed of 
an ensemble of fields (bureaucratic and administrative) and constitutive of them – Bourdieu calls the state 
the “great fount” of symbolic power, and it is in a position to regulate the functioning of other fields, such 
as through finances and regulation (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 111; Bourdieu 1998: 33).  For new 
institutionalism, the state provides an impetus for bureaucratization, especially through coercive 
isomorphism – imposition of regulations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983 ; Powell 1991). 
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 It is worth noting that legitimacy – specifically, the legitimacy of law – plays an important part in 
Dezalay and Garth’s Bourdieuian analysis of international commercial arbitration (Dezalay and Garth 
1996). 
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degrees, tests, connections, and expertise (Bourdieu 1998: 22).  Different kinds of 
symbolic capital gain or lose value over time, and change in the field comes through 
contests about the value of various forms of symbolic capital (Dezalay and Garth 1996).  
As I argue in Section IV, self-regulatory initiatives are a major vehicle whereby moral 
entrepreneurs attempt to set the value of forms of symbolic capital. 
As Sections III and IV demonstrate, the organizational field is a useful concept for 
structuring our analysis of humanitarianism because it foregrounds several of the major 
trends and transformations in the sector.  In Section III, I use Powell and DiMaggio to 
highlight the elaboration of the field through processes of professionalization and 
structuration.  As I noted in Section I, in the last 30 years, humanitarianism is 
increasingly professionalized and organized.  Indeed, one of the strengths of the new 
institutionalist reading of the field is its capturing of the centrality of professionalization.  
Whereas traditional IR perspectives pay little attention to professionalization, in 
humanitarianism, the notion of “professional” behavior and identity has become a 
buzzword for the maturation of the sector.  In Section IV, I draw on Bourdieu to highlight 
ideational competition over truths, discourses, and boundaries as a mechanism for field 
transformation.
47
  The stakes in humanitarian self-regulation are high indeed – the 
struggle is over humanitarianism itself.  Compliance or non-compliance matters less 
when we look at the symbolic function played by self-regulatory initiatives.
48
 
 
Section III – Surveying the humanitarian field 
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 Fields define what is sayable and not sayable, nameable and not nameable (Bourdieu 1993: 91). 
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 As Meyer and Rowan argue, organizations engage in decoupling – they seek to maintain external 
legitimacy while simultaneously avoiding inspection and evaluation through ambiguous goals and 
immeasurable criteria (Meyer and Rowan 1991). 
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It is one thing to define a field in the abstract; it is quite another to identify one in 
practice.
49
  In this section, I look to Powell and DiMaggio (1983) to identify the salient 
features of the contemporary humanitarian field.  Specifically, I rely on DiMaggio’s 
(1991) analysis of the field of U.S. art museums, in which he identifies a set of 9 
dynamics of professionalization and structuration (institutional definition).  While I 
would not wish to suggest that these are the exclusive metrics by which an organizational 
field can be identified, I find them singularly useful in highlighting the growing 
complexity of the humanitarian endeavor.  In analyzing the field in this manner, I call 
attention to the dramatic increase in the number and density of inter-organizational 
linkages and to the recent moves to professionalize the sector.  Linkages matter because 
they illustrate the growing connectedness among organizations.  Professionalization 
matters because it points to the development of standards of appropriate behavior and the 
development of specialized humanitarian knowledge.  These trends serve as the backdrop 
before which self-regulatory dramas are acted out. 
Figure 2 
Professionalization 
1 University-trained experts 
2 Body of knowledge 
3 Professional associations 
4 Professional elite 
5 Professional experience 
+ 
Structuration 
1 Dense inter-org contacts 
2 Field-wide flow of info 
3 Outer/periphery structure 
4 Collective definition of the 
   field 
= 
Mature 
Organizational 
Field 
 
 
 DiMaggio identifies the production of university-trained experts as the first 
dimension of professionalization (DiMaggio 1991: 275).  Without a doubt, this has 
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 Bourdieu defines the field as a space within which its effects are exercised (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
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become a boom area in humanitarianism.  There are now at least 80 different master’s 
level programs worldwide in humanitarian and development studies and an even larger 
number of professional training programs
50
 (Walker and Russ 2010).  Important centers 
of learning include the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University (FIC), the 
Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute at the University of Manchester, the 
Humanitarian Futures Programme at King’s College, and the Network on Humanitarian 
Action, which comprises nine European Universities that deliver the Postgraduate 
Programme in Humanitarian Action.  Outside of these centers, many universities offer 
courses in humanitarianism, development, and related fields like health sciences, 
epidemiology, and public policy.  For instance, the University of Minnesota consistently 
offers humanitarianism and development-related courses in the departments of Political 
Science, Public Affairs, and Epidemiology.
51
  University training fulfills two functions:  
first, it forms a highly trained humanitarian professional core; second, it helps promulgate 
field knowledge, humanitarian norms, and standard practices. 
A second aspect of professionalization is the creation of a body of knowledge.  In 
DiMaggio’s work, this includes the commissioning of surveys, creation of databases, and 
publication of studies on efficacy (1991: 276).  We find humanitarians taking similar 
steps to build field-specific knowledge through surveys and research publications.  For 
instance, Walker and Russ’ recent (2010) study of professionalization surveyed more 
than 1300 humanitarian workers; Dorothea Hilhorst’s 10 year anniversary survey of the 
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 Walker and Russ include an annex of more than 9 pages of training programs. 
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 For instance, “Global Health, Relief, Development, and Religious and Non-Religious NGOs” (PubH 
6807) was offered in the Public Health Department, Spring 2012; “Humanitarianism” (PA 5821) was 
offered at the Humphrey School of Public Affairs, Fall 2011. 
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Code of Conduct was also wide-ranging (Hilhorst 2005).  Other studies have examined 
funding trends, efficacy, and best practices (e.g. Development Initiatives 2009 ; GHA 
2009).  The proliferation of studies is the logical result of an increase in think tanks and 
learning initiatives, such as Development Initiatives (London), the Feinstein International 
Center (Medford, MA), the Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI, London) and the ODI-affiliated Global Humanitarian Assistance 
programme (GHA), and the Emergency Capacity Building project (ECB).  Additional 
research comes from increasing collaborative links between academics and 
practitioners.
52
  Many of these studies explicitly aim to guide future growth and 
development.  For instance, the recent study “One for All” hopes to “clarify and support 
organizational change within the humanitarian sector so that organizations can increase 
effectiveness and efficiency, ultimately improving the lives of their beneficiaries while 
balancing local needs and global realities” (Webster and Walker 2009: 5)53  These studies 
help create the field of humanitarianism by developing knowledge specific to it. 
The humanitarian field lags in the third indicator of professionalization:  the 
organization of professional associations (Walker and Russ 2010).  There is, as yet, no 
single field-wide organization that encompasses all humanitarian actors, though there are 
associations with significant coverage, including the Humanitarian Logistics Association 
(founded in 2005), a Humanitarian Professionals group on LinkedIn, the Association of 
Humanitarian Lawyers (1982/ 1990), and the International Humanitarian Studies 
Association (2009).  In addition, self-regulatory initiatives like People In Aid promote 
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increasingly common and suggested that there was room for more growth (Walker 2010: 39). 
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 What is particularly interesting is the use of examples of best practices to stimulate emulation. 
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good practice in the management and support of aid personnel, and various national and 
international organizations and initiatives count professional development among their 
mandates, such as InterAction (USA), Dóchas (Ireland), and Kehys (Finland), and 
Concord (Europe).  Recent studies on professionalization in the sector have found that 
humanitarian workers self-identify as humanitarian professionals and would welcome the 
formation of a professional organization (Kene et al. 2009 ; Walker and Russ 2010).  
Professional organizations are important as focal points and arenas of socialization. 
A fourth aspect of professionalization is the consolidation of a professional elite 
(1991: 276).
54
  In humanitarianism, this is reflected in the creation of specialized 
university programs, field-wide training sessions (such as the trainings offered by Sphere 
and HAP International), and in job requirements (the typical job now requires a 
university degree and appropriate training and experience).  Among humanitarian 
veterans, there is something of a rotating door among organizations.  For example, Peter 
Walker, a key figure for both the NGO Code of Conduct and Sphere, worked for Oxfam, 
African environmental organizations, and the International Federation of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) before directing the influential Feinstein International 
Center.  Among the key regulatory initiatives, as a veteran of the American sector noted, 
“it’s basically the same 50 people involved in all of them” (Int. 53).  These are the 
individuals with the connections, experience, and knowledge to navigate the field. 
Finally, professionalization is seen in the increasing organizational salience of 
professional experience.  Antonio Donini has remarked that: 
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distinguished by their cosmopolitanism, their expertise, their pedigree, and their proximity to the field 
center (1996: 21). 
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Humanitarian work used to have a connotation of “voluntariness” – indeed this 
remains a key Red Cross Principle – it has now become a career.  It is defined by 
management objectives, standard operating procedures, human resource 
development tools – necessary as they are in any “business” – that create 
structures and organizational patterns that tend to stifle innovation and the 
questioning of the status quo (Donini 2007: 3). 
 
Today, the humanitarian field is increasingly – if not completely – the domain of 
professional aid workers.  Walker and Russ are quick to point out that despite the 
proliferation of courses and degrees in humanitarianism, consistent humanitarian 
occupational standards do not exist, training is ad hoc, and there are gaps in curricula and 
few internships (2010: 1).  But, as this overview indicates, times are changing.  When 
asked what attributes are most important, “organizations named a range of hard and soft 
skills that are critical among staff, including management and communication skills and 
specific sector skills such as water and sanitation” (Webster and Walker 2009: 25).  In 
interviews, excerpts of which I cite in later chapters, aid workers consistently praised 
professionalization, training, and expertise. 
 In addition to professionalization, which hints at the ideational makeup of the 
field – knowledge, norms, training – new institutionalism also identifies as significant the 
institutional makeup of organizational fields (called structuration, from Anthony 
Giddens). Structuration encapsulates the net or frame of relations within which 
organizations are embedded and the arrangement of positions within this frame.  For 
DiMaggio and Powell, organizational fields are, by nature, institutionally defined; and, 
though fields exist independent of actual institutions, their analysis reveals important 
things about how the field is structured.  Structuration is thus how DiMaggio and Powell 
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account for the significance of positions in fields – the location of institutional centers of 
power, the fit of the components, and the pathways along which influence travels.  In 
humanitarianism, structuration directs our attention to the key nodes in the network, the 
relationships among various players, and the forums in which decisions are made. 
Fields are structurally defined, first, by increases in the density of 
interorganizational contacts.  In humanitarianism, Abby Stoddard writes, NGOs 
naturally inhabit relationships of mutual dependence. The scale of modern humanitarian 
emergencies and the comparatively limited capacities of NGOs demand that they 
coordinate their activities with each other, with multilateral agencies, with governments, 
and with the media.  In most emergencies, even the largest agency is incapable of 
launching an effective response individually (Stoddard 2002: 4).  This manifests itself in 
niche specialization.  For instance, Lutheran World Federation specializes in camp 
management; Oxfam International in water and sanitation; World Vision Canada in 
nutrition; and WV Australia in disaster risk reduction (Webster and Walker 2009).
55
  At 
the sectoral level, there are a plethora of learning initiatives and collaborative 
mechanisms, including the UN Cluster System, the Steering Committee for Humanitarian 
Response (SCHR), and the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA). 
 Most studies expect collaboration only to increase.  A recent report from the 
Feinstein Center, entitled “Humanitarian Horizons,” predicts that “in the next twenty 
years, the expansion of collaborative networks, both traditional and non-traditional, is 
likely to become more common, if not essential, to effective humanitarian action. These 
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networks will include NGOs, states, corporations, experts, and communities and impact 
on every facet of humanitarianism, from fundraising to program design (Walker 2010: 
37; also Borel et al. 2004). 
 As networking increases, so too does the field-wide flow of information, 
particularly because it follows along many of the same pathways.  I have already cited 
from the wide range of studies addressing trends in humanitarian organization, future 
crises, and response practices.  The spread of information and techniques has been 
facilitated by advanced communications technologies.  For instance, WVI operates an 
electronic database in which all documents and strategies are posted during emergencies 
and CARE conducts monthly global learning exchange programs between members of 
different agencies via conference call or web presentation (Webster and Walker 2009).  
In addition, there are a number of journals targeted to the humanitarian academic and 
practitioner audience, including Disasters, the Journal of Humanitarian Studies, 
Voluntas, and the online Humanitarian Exchange magazine.  To one degree or another, 
these journals are widely read by practitioners.
56
 
 These linkages matter, not only because they connect individual organizations in 
webs of intelligibility, but also because they are pathways for the exercise of power and 
the transmission of ideas.  Field scholars, not least Bourdieu, have emphasized that fields 
are spaces of positions, which means something very simple:  not all humanitarian actors 
are created equal.  For DiMaggio, this is expressed in the emergence of an outer-
periphery structure, which functions much like a gravitational field in attracting other 
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organizations into orbit around powerful NGOs and funding agencies.
57
  The 
humanitarian field has various centers.  In general, we might speak of the dominance of 
the global North (including donors and agencies).  Thus, Donini argues that “the official 
humanitarian enterprise remains a select club in which the rules are set by a rather 
peculiar set of players who are generally far-removed from the realities of the people they 
purport to help” (2007: 2). 
Breaking this down further, we can identify a de facto oligopoly of 7-8 major 
humanitarian organizations that wield disproportionate influence.
58
  Indeed, “what is 
often portrayed as an unseemly NGO “scramble”… may in reality be evolving into 
somewhat less of a free-for-all...  In broader compass, ‘although there are hundreds of 
NGOs, it is safe to say that 75 percent of their humanitarian spending is handled by fewer 
than fifteen large transnational organizations’”59 (Borel et al. 2004: 64; Walker and 
Pepper 2007: 1-5).  These organizations include CARE, CRS, Save the Children, WVI, 
Oxfam, MSF, Mercy Corps, and the International Rescue Committee (IRC).  These 
agencies also dominate the leadership of the main humanitarian networks.  Consider the 
SCHR, a Geneva-based grouping of the chief executives of nine agency/network heads.  
The SCHR comprises the elite of the elite – each organization listed above is a member, 
with the exception of MSF (a former member).  The SCHR is, in turn, a standing invitee 
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 Dezelay and Garth also emphasize the domination of fields by key institutions and inner circles of “grand 
old men” and younger parvenus, who together constituted a sort of “mafia” or elite “club” (1996: 9-10). 
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 The FIC’s “Humanitarian Agenda 2015” refers to “cozy relationships among a handful of northern 
donors and a de facto oligopoly of organizations” (Donini et al 2008: 30; Borel et al 2004 also use the term 
“oligopoly”).  See also (Stockton 2004: 4). 
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 Similarly, Stoddard reports that in 2000, one-quarter of the $2.5bn of US government funding for relief 
and development aid went to just four NGOs:  CARE, CRS, Save the Children, and World Vision 
(Stoddard 2002: 26).  Together with MSF and Oxfam International, these six major players combined for 
over $4 billion in overseas operating expenditures in 2008 (ALNAP 2010: 20). 
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to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), which brings together the major UN 
and non-UN humanitarian bodies.  The SCHR and its members thus occupy a position 
directly at the center of the humanitarian field.  It sees itself as a “vehicle for innovation” 
and “sector leader,” according to a HAP Board member (Int. 64). 
The SCHR and its members have been deeply involved in self-regulation.  As I 
find in Chapter 4, the SCHR’s early, strong support of Sphere helped ensure the Project’s 
success, and its recent exploration of certification has provided HAP a boost.  The 
SCHR’s member organizations – and their staff – have played important roles in the 
drafting of the major self-regulatory initiatives.  For instance, current or former Oxfam 
staff were among the founding figures for each of the four initiatives studied here. 
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, structuration leads us to examine the 
collective definition of the field.  In DiMaggio’s work on museums, this occurred, often 
incidentally, through grants and studies which reinforced awareness of collective 
enterprise.  In my research, codes of conduct and other self-regulatory initiatives appear 
as attempts to fix the meaning of humanitarianism; to adhere to these standards is to be a 
legitimate, mature humanitarian subjectivity.  For instance, the RC/NGO Code of 
Conduct had at its heart “an assumption that there is a shared set of core values” (Walker 
and Russ 2010: 15).  Institutional funding requirements further reinforce this by 
establishing criteria for eligibility.  Moreover, publications are increasingly assuming the 
existence of a “humanitarian community.”  Thus Walker and Russ write that with the 
advent of web-based communication tools, it is now possible to talk in meaningful ways 
about a “global humanitarian community” – “Email, interactive websites, webinars and 
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social networking tools such as LinkedIn and Facebook have allowed workers, dispersed 
across the globe, to interact with each other and form the beginnings of a truly global 
community” (Walker and Russ 2010: 14; also Walker 2006: 1). 
 
Section IV – Competing over self-regulation 
The surveying exercise conducted above has served two main functions.  First, it 
has allowed me, contingently, to identify core attributes of the humanitarian 
organizational field, including the institutional centers of gravity, the key players, and the 
nature of the flows of ideas and information.  Second, the analysis has underscored the 
recent transformations in humanitarianism – intensifying links among organizations, 
developing institutional structures, and increasingly shared professional values and 
practices – that, today, make it possible to talk of humanitarianism as a social order. 
In this final section, I push beyond taxonomy.  After all, what is most important is 
not whether or not humanitarianism is a field for the sake of labeling it as such – this is 
an academic question – but, instead, how understanding humanitarianism as a field 
captures the ongoing, and contested among its participants, evolution in the form and 
function of humanitarianism.  In focusing on the politics of fields – on the contestations 
and competitions among humanitarian actors over the content of their endeavor – I am 
explicitly responding to the criticism of scholars who charge that sociological 
institutionalism overemphasizes structure and continuity at the expense of agency and 
contestation (Finnemore 1996).  Indeed, one of my principal objectives in putting 
Bourdieu in conversation with Powell and DiMaggio has been to develop an 
understanding of organizational fields in general, and humanitarianism in specific, that 
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captures both the impact of social structures on agent constitution, while still accounting 
for the mutability of these structures and the very real actions of agents within them to act 
meaningfully.  Agents are not, after all, simply buffeted about within a field; they 
actively participate in the construction of their endeavor (Bourdieu 1998: 32; Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1992: 107-8). 
I have suggested that new institutionalism’s focus on structure and isomorphism 
can be attributed to scholarly focus; in other words, there is nothing in the concept of the 
“organizational field” that prevents us from developing an understanding of agency.60  At 
the same time, as Powell and DiMaggio acknowledge, this remains the least developed 
area of their approach (Powell and DiMaggio 1991: 30-3).  The question of when and 
how isomorphism and repetition give way to innovation – to new ideas and practices – is 
a critical question.  In this section, I explore two conditions for change.  Drawing on 
Pierre Bourdieu, I emphasize contestation among variously positioned actors over the 
makeup of fields; returning to new institutionalism, I highlight how exogenous shocks, 
including crises in legitimacy, can open space for change.  In humanitarianism, the 
development of self-regulatory initiatives has been characterized by fierce contestations 
on basic existential questions – what is humanitarianism, how should it function, what is 
its future – in the context of criticism of previously dominant organizational models. 
Though both new institutionalists and Bourdieu suggest that competition plays a 
role in shaping fields, only Bourdieu develops this in any meaningful way.
61
 For 
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 And, in fact, there is considerable isomorphism in humanitarianism – including practices on the ground, 
the framing of advertising appeals, and in organizational structures. 
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 New institutionalists suggest several conditions for change:  first, in developing fields, there are initially 
contests to determine the nature of the field; second, agents within fields can employ social skill (framing, 
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Bourdieu, competition and resistance are central to the creation, maintenance, and 
transformation of fields, for without resistance, a field becomes an apparatus – a 
totalizing structure (Bourdieu 1993: 88; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 102, 242-3).  This 
competition is not simply a matter of striving for business by offering better service.  
Competition also takes place in the symbolic realm and is fought in symbolic terms 
among moral entrepreneurs.  It has the effect of building careers by building the 
legitimacy and credibility of practices and institutions (Dezalay and Garth 1996: 33).  
Competition is waged over the relative value of capital – that which confers legitimacy 
on practices – in each field.  In humanitarianism, self-regulation, or self-organized 
attempts at collective action without direct intervention from the state, becomes a key 
arena for these field-level contests over rules, boundaries, and symbols.  It is through 
codes of conduct that humanitarian moral entrepreneurs attempt to cement conceptions of 
what humanitarianism is, who is a part, and how it should be conducted.
62
 
Codes are a means of conferring value on certain forms of capital and devaluing 
others.  For instance, the RC/NGO Code of Conduct (Chapter 3) promotes independence 
and volunteerism as core humanitarian values.  The symbolic value of being a nonprofit 
is thus cemented in a code, and, to the extent that this code is accepted in the field, it 
becomes a marker of humanitarian identity.  Thus, self-regulation is an opportunity for 
NGOs to set the “admission fee” for entry into the sector – the forms of specific capital 
                                                                                                                                                 
agenda setting) to induce cooperation in others; and third, exogenous shocks can block the reproduction of 
institutional patterns (Powell and DiMaggio 1991: 30; Fligstein 2001 ; Scott 1991).  To the extent that 
humanitarianism still is a developing field – the absence of field-wide professional associations and nascent 
academic training programs point in this direction – it is consistent that we should expect competition in 
humanitarianism.  In general, though, new institutionalism says more about stability than about change. 
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 In fact, it relates closely to what field scholars have observed about markers such as certifications, 
degrees, and external assessment:  when accepted as such, they are markers of social status and of 
legitimacy (Bourdieu 1998: 22; Meyer and Rowan 1991: 51). 
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that field members must possess (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 107-8).  In 
humanitarianism, these rival actors include militaries, governments, and for-profits.  To 
Stephen Hopgood’s question as to why is Wal-Mart not a humanitarian organization, 
then, one must respond that Wal-Mart’s economic capital can give it entrée into the field, 
but finances alone do not a humanitarian organization make (see Hopgood 2008).
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Competition within the field does not presuppose its dissolution; quite the 
contrary.  As Bourdieu states: 
[There is an] objective complicity which underlies all the antagonisms.  It tends to 
be forgotten that a fight presupposes agreement between the antagonists about 
what it is that is worth fighting about; those points of agreement are held at the 
level of what ‘goes without saying’, they are left in the state of doxa, in other 
words everything that makes the field itself, the game, the stakes, all the 
presuppositions that one tacitly and even unwittingly accepts by the mere fact of 
playing, of entering into the game.  Those who take part in the struggle help to 
reproduce the game by helping – more or less completely, depending on the field 
– to produce belief in the value of the stakes (Bourdieu 1993: 73-4; 1990: 68; 
Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 98). 
 
Contestation within the field sustains the field because it implies tacit acceptance of the 
grounds of the fight.  This is most apparent in Chapters 4 and 5, on the Sphere Project 
and HAP International, where arguments over standards, certification, and accountability 
are framed as fights over what constitutes “humanitarianism.”  In these cases, the contest 
is as much about fixing the meaning of humanitarianism as it is about the rules 
themselves.  When self-regulation proponents position themselves – as they often do – as 
carrying the mantle of Henri Dunant, father of contemporary humanitarianism, they are 
making a claim to be returning to the pure expression of humanitarianism.  Much as 
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Bourdieu predicted, challengers in a field frequently claim to be returning to the source, 
origin, spirit, and authentic essence of the game, in contrast to the degeneration that has 
occurred (Bourdieu 1993: 74). 
Focusing on competition also allows us to apprehend how expansion in a field, 
such as humanitarianism, leads to contestation between newcomers and veterans.  In 
Dezalay and Garth’s Dealing in Virtue, the key conflict in international commercial 
arbitration is between grand old men and technocrats.  In humanitarianism, too, a 
significant cleavage has emerged between traditionalists and reformers integrating new 
ideas into the sector.  As in the field of commercial arbitration, in humanitarianism, many 
of these new ideas stem from an Anglo-American model of business enterprise that 
confronts more traditional, grounded, contextual understandings of humanitarianism.  In 
the case of HAP International (Ch. 5) in particular, self-regulation has arisen in an 
environment characterized by calls for accountability, transparency, and professional, 
efficient service delivery.
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In each of the chapters that follow, the development and implementation of self-
regulatory initiatives has been characterized by core cleavages among humanitarians on 
essential aspects of code design.  In Chapter 3, I find salient divisions over the Code of 
Conduct between the International Committee of the Red Cross and NGOs, reformers 
and amateurs, and disaster and development NGOs.  In Chapter 4, on the Sphere Project, 
the central tension is between Anglo-American and French NGOs on the question of 
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 The recognition of an economic subtext is partly captured by Bourdieu’s notion of the “field of power,” 
which is a field of struggles for power among holders of different forms of power, and struggles to preserve 
or transform this balance of forces (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 76, fn. 16).  The field of power explains 
humanitarianism’s subordination to broader global trends – market logics.  Indeed, in capitalist societies, 
the economic field holds considerable sway (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 110). 
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universalism versus contextualism.  In Chapter 5, on HAP International, the tension 
between Anglo and French NGOs is joined by disagreements within HAP over the 
direction of the initiative and between HAP and Sphere on the approach to regulation 
(purity versus accommodation).  Finally, Chapter 6 presents the Code of Conduct on 
Images and Messages as a mechanism by which the development education community 
has provoked a discussion with fundraisers, and as a means for Ireland’s Dóchas to 
exercise field-level leadership in the domain of accountability.  In each of these chapters, 
the identity and practice of humanitarian relief is, in part, the outcome of contestations 
over self-regulation. 
I also take seriously the idea that crisis can create space for change.  Powell and 
DiMaggio note that exogenous shocks can block the reproduction of institutional patterns 
and induce change (Powell and DiMaggio 1991: 30).  They are certainly not the first 
scholars to note that crisis and disjuncture can create opportunities for change by 
disrupting the normal order of events (see Chapter 1).  Ideational entrepreneurs are able 
to use the space opened by crisis to advance new ideas about proper practice.  They also, 
often, drum up the sense of crisis.  (Crises do not simply occur; they must be presented 
and apprehended as such).  Now, bearing in mind the centrality of symbols and ideas in 
field constitution, it strikes me that the most significant crises will be those that impact on 
the ideational foundations of the field – those that precipitate questioning of taken-for-
granteds, accepted practices, and even identities, such that, as Christian Reus-Smit has 
theorized, actors or institutions must adapt (recalibrate their bases of legitimacy) or face 
disempowerment (Reus-Smit 2007). 
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Crisis already figures prominently in humanitarian identity.  As I have noted in 
Chapter 1, humanitarianism is essentially a crisis-driven occupation, as funding, 
organization, and sector expansion are highly correlated with the emergence of large 
scale humanitarian disasters – World War II and in Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Southeast 
Asia, to name just a few.  However, the preeminent crisis driving humanitarian self-
regulation, while related to events – in Ethiopia and Rwanda, notably – is more 
existential than tangible.  It derives from a set of trends, including those surveyed above:  
sector growth and expansion, increasing public pressures, and competition.  It is 
experienced in the field as a crisis of legitimacy. 
Legitimacy, which is the idea that the values pursued by organizations must be 
congruent with wider societal values, is that which embeds fields in wider social 
structures (Scott 1991: 169-70).  The humanitarian crisis of legitimacy is captured by the 
statement “doing good is no longer enough.”  As Walker and Russ have written, the 
evolution of humanitarian action from emergency response to service delivery, and thus 
closer collaboration with funding agencies: 
Brought out into the open a basic contradiction that aid agencies had lived with 
for decades: they had accepted donations and grants on the premise that the aid 
agencies’ commitment to compassion and to “doing the right thing” was sufficient 
justification to trust them. Yet the reality had always been that agencies were 
entrusted with other people’s money to carry out acts on behalf of a broad public, 
targeted at those who were suffering but essentially doing so for the common 
good. Such a system demands complex layers of accountability and the balancing 
of competing tensions (Walker and Russ 2010: 14-5). 
 
Similarly, in her analysis of the Sphere Project and the Code of Conduct, Margaret 
Buchanan-Smith observed that by the early 1990s, the days of unquestioning acceptance 
of the “good work” of humanitarian agencies was over (Buchanan-Smith 2003: 14).  In 
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Figure 3 
every initiative I study, self-regulatory advocates share a belief that old methods of 
operating no longer provide a sufficient basis for action.  In various ways, these figures 
have also drawn on the specter of crisis in support of their initiatives.  With the Code of 
Conduct, the massive growth of the sector is experienced first and foremost as a crisis of 
coherence; lack of coordination and pervasive amateurism threaten to deteriorate the 
esteem of the sector and contribute to negative outcomes.  With Sphere, HAP, and the 
Code of Conduct on Images and Messages, failures in Rwanda and a general atmosphere 
of retrenchment and critique are used to marshal support for extensive processes of 
collaboration, technical standardization, and re-assessment of core values.  Often linked, 
at other times in conflict, these initiatives have attempted to reshape humanitarianism 
from its roots in charity and good intentions to modern bases. 
 
 
The expected relationship of the crisis of legitimacy to humanitarian self-
regulation is modeled in Figure 3.  In the first stage, legitimacy challenges create 
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openings for the advancement of alternative models.  In Stage 2, ideational entrepreneurs, 
drawing on their experiences and expertise, as well as on humanitarian regulatory 
precedents and innovations from other fields, advance principled arguments for 
codification.  In the process, they confront opponents with different understandings of 
proper humanitarian practice.  The initiative that ultimately emerges in Stage 3 is a 
reflection of these contestations, as decisions on enforcement, specificity of standards, 
and issue area directly impact the initiative’s scope, strength, and effectiveness.  For 
example, Sphere’s decision to work only on areas of preexisting agreement initially 
limited its scope and strength, as issues like protection, gender, and accountability were 
not considered and enforcement was set to the side.  Two arrows lead from Stage 3.  The 
curved arrow illustrates the circularity of the regulatory process, as the newly emerged 
code becomes part of the larger regulatory fabric of the field, thus influencing future 
initiatives.  The second arrow points to field level changes, represented by Stage 4.  To 
the extent that the resulting initiative is taken up by the humanitarian community – and 
this varies by case – it can be said to have an impact on the field, helping define the 
meaning of humanitarianism, who is and is not a member, and how the game is played.  
The final dashed line, which leads from Stage 4 back to the NGO bubbles, represents the 
impact that self-regulation has on NGOs. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has accomplished several objectives relative to the case study 
chapters that follow.  It has served, first, as an elaboration of this dissertation’s theoretical 
basis – the organizational field – which I have developed through a joint reading of 
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Bourdieu and new institutionalism.  The idea of the field captures the extent to which 
humanitarianism is a social space, increasingly governed by sector-specific rules, 
knowledge, and structures, such that it is impossible to fully analyze a humanitarian 
agency outside of a broader understanding of that which is humanitarianism.  Thus, the 
field enables a deeper understanding of agency – it calls attention to the background 
knowledge and taken-for-granteds that humanitarian actors have internalized by virtue of 
being humanitarian.  Outside its specific application to humanitarianism, it is my 
expectation that field theory’s insights into questions of identity, boundary-drawing, and 
competition can be applied productively to other domains of endeavor, including 
nonprofits (environmental, human rights, labor) and for-profits (corporate social 
responsibility).  I outline a possible research agenda in the concluding chapter. 
In addition to theoretical elaboration, I have sought to apply the concept to 
humanitarianism.  In drawing on Powell and DiMaggio’s new institutionalism, I have 
used their analytic precision to highlight trends in the professionalization and 
structuration of humanitarianism and, in so doing, to identify various centers of power 
and pathways of influence that bear on our assessment of humanitarian governance.  
Viewing humanitarianism as an organizational field provides a basis for my work in 
subsequent chapters, where self-regulation appears as a means of contesting and 
reshaping this social space. 
Finally, I have attempted to address new institutionalism’s tendency towards 
structuralism by emphasizing the flux and contestation that are so evident in Bourdieuian 
field analysis.  I have identified two conditions by which fields evolve:  contestation over 
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power, ideas, and capital, and crisis, which provides space for the advancement of 
alternatives.  In humanitarianism, it is a crisis of legitimacy that undergirds self-
regulation. 
In concluding, I would like to more explicitly link the concept of the field – the 
humanitarian field – to the phenomenon of humanitarian self-regulation, which I analyze 
in specific detail in the following chapters.  I find four principal points of intersection 
between self-regulation and the field.  The first concerns boundaries.  For Bourdieu, and 
particularly for Dezalay and Garth, the question of who is and is not a part of the field is a 
constant area of negotiation.  One of the hallmarks of efforts to self-regulate is that, in 
establishing core principles and practices, humanitarians are explicitly defining what it is 
to be a humanitarian.  If, for instance, it is agreed that humanitarian actors are 
professional, then, by extension, amateur or impromptu displays of charitable sentiment 
are something other than humanitarianism.  (They are charity, perhaps).  How codes 
define humanitarianism is thus essential to their functioning. 
Second, fields are characterized by sets of knowledge that are specific to them.  I 
have provided numerous examples of surveys, studies, and databases created by 
humanitarians to guide future practice.  In several respects, most notably with the Sphere 
Project, producing knowledge is essential to the regulatory project.  Sphere comprises a 
collaborative movement and a detailed technical handbook of accepted – universal, is the 
claim – standards.  Contestations around Sphere, then, are fundamentally linked to the 
power to define truths and knowledge.  Similarly, in every initiative, the production of 
data – studies and reports – is essential to the selling of regulation. 
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Third, as Bourdieu makes clear, fields are like games in that they are implicitly 
and explicitly rule-governed.  The power to define the rules of the game is the power to 
define its stakes.  Self-regulation is, at its core, concerned with setting rules and 
establishing standards for appropriate practice.  In different ways, each code I analyze is 
making claims about how humanitarian actors should act:  impartially, independently, 
and humanely (the Code of Conduct), according to technical guidelines and informed by 
human rights (Sphere), professionally and accountably (HAP), and with respect for 
human dignity (the Code on Images). 
Finally, fields contain accepted authority, which is to say, in each field, certain 
forms of capital are particularly valuable.  As I demonstrate, self-regulation is, 
collectively, part of a project to transform humanitarian action from an amateur, 
charitable calling into a technically proficient profession.  This involves a shifting of the 
core humanitarian attributes, wherein efficient organization and training are now revalued 
at the expense, arguably, of passion and intentions.  Organizations and individuals fitting 
the new mold are, thus, relatively better positioned than their peers. 
In the following chapters, I focus on four specific initiatives, attempting to 
capture, through an overview of their history, successes, and debates, the ways in which 
these initiatives, individually and collectively, are remaking humanitarian action. 
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Ch. 3 – Defining Humanitarianism: The Code of Conduct 
 
 
 The first, and arguably the foundational, field-wide humanitarian self-regulatory 
initiative was the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief.
65
  Published 
in 1994, the Code of Conduct emerged out of a series of internal principled critiques of a 
humanitarian system that was, by the mid-1980s, undergoing tremendous growth in 
actors and funding.
66
  Driven by deep ambivalence over the expansion and evolution of 
the sector, a group of ideational entrepreneurs sought, for the first time, to compile 
humanitarianism’s core values in a single document.  The resulting Code, consisting of 
10 core principles and several annexes, set the scene for subsequent governance efforts 
and foreshadowed future debates over practices and principles. 
 This chapter charts the origins and analyzes the wider impact of the Code of 
Conduct on humanitarianism.  Following theory developed in previous chapters, I 
highlight self-regulation as a vehicle for advancing new interpretations of 
humanitarianism, while drawing attention to contestations among agents for positionality 
in the field – particularly those between veterans and newcomers to the field.  Far from 
being a neutral or natural outgrowth of a maturing sector – epiphenomenal to 
professionalization – , I demonstrate that the Code of Conduct was a contingent, political 
effort to define and demarcate the boundaries of humanitarianism. 
 Indeed, despite what I show to be an unimpressive record as an actual regulatory 
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 Between 1980 and 1990, the number of northern NGOs increased nearly two-fold while the growth in 
institutional funding was equally dramatic (Stoddard 2002). 
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instrument, the Code of Conduct nonetheless speaks to the role of self-regulation in the 
symbolic elaboration of humanitarianism.  The Code also demonstrates the potential for a 
voluntary, institution-less document (a weak “accountability club”) to shape collective 
norms and conceptions.  Since publication, the Code of Conduct has become the “most 
widely accepted set of humanitarian values” (Vaux 2001a: 6; IFRC 2003: 140) and 
“perhaps the ‘mother of all codes’ in the humanitarian system”  (Leader 1999: 1).  More 
than any other initiative, signing the Code has become a rite of passage for agencies 
entering the humanitarian field. 
 I begin by introducing the Code of Conduct, situating it in general trends (sector 
growth, new actors) and specific inflection points (crises in the Horn of Africa), while 
sourcing its emergence to principled action on the part of a small set of veteran ideational 
entrepreneurs.  Section II foregrounds the key debates and cleavages that appeared during 
the development of the initiative.  Compared to subsequent standards, the Code’s 
development was characterized by genuine harmony among established humanitarian 
actors; however, it carried real implications for new entrants to the field, particularly for 
NGOs with a background in development.  Sections III and IV assess the impact and 
deeper meaning of the Code.  I find that while the actual regulatory impact of the Code 
on the day-to-day practices of NGOs has been uneven, its impact on humanitarianism’s 
core concepts and principles has been more dramatic.  The Code’s significance is thus 
best understood in symbolic terms.  I highlight three impacts of the Code:  first, as a 
precedent for future regulation; second, in defining and expanding humanitarianism; and 
third, in helping cement an identity for the nascent humanitarian field. 
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Section I – Origins of the Code of Conduct 
The Code is a voluntary code of conduct that seeks to promote the independence, 
effectiveness, and impact of NGOs and the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement in 
disaster situations.  It encapsulates ten points of principle to which all humanitarian actors 
should adhere in disaster response work and includes annexes directed at host and donor 
governments and intergovernmental organizations (see Appendix II).  The ten principles 
include core Red Cross principles of humanity, impartiality, and independence, as well as 
values traditionally associated with development, such as attention to local capacities, 
culture and custom, and reducing future vulnerability.
67
  The Code is thus classified as a 
principles-based initiative, as distinct from standards-based initiatives like the Sphere 
Minimum Standards and HAP International.  For scholar Nicholas Leader, standards like 
the Code of Conduct are “rules for supping with the devil without getting eaten, or 
corrupted; for humanitarian agencies they are the ‘long spoon’ of the proverb” (Leader 
1998: 290).  The Code provides principled guidance in unprincipled situations. 
 As of April 2012, the Code has 492 signatory organizations, making it by far the 
most widely signed – if least stringent – self-regulatory initiative.68  The Code counts 
among its signatories all of the large humanitarian agencies and federations, such as 
Oxfam and World Vision International, with the partial exception of MSF, of which 
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 Neutrality is not specifically referenced, but aspects of this principle are encapsulated by Principle 3 – 
that “aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint” (IFRC and ICRC 1996 ; 
Slim 2006: 161).  Neutrality, Hilhorst writes, was included in “such an awkward and ambiguous way that it 
offers little guidance to NGOs working in conflict situations” (Hilhorst 2005: 356). 
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 For comparison, HAP International (Ch. 5) has 84 member agencies as of April 2012; People in Aid has 
181 members.  This is not a perfect comparison – HAP and PIA have stringent membership requirements – 
but it does provide some indication of the breadth of the Code’s reach, if not, perhaps, the depth of 
agencies’ commitments. 
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MSF-Belgium is the sole signatory.  Unlike Sphere, HAP, and, indeed, most all of the 
major initiatives to follow it, the Code is “free floating;” it lacks an institutional focal 
point.  Instead, the Code is “hosted” by the International Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), whose chief duty is to maintain the list of signatures.  As 
Dorothea Hilhorst explains, the IFRC “has no mandate to renew periodically signatories 
or to remove signatories that cease operating or do not qualify.  There are no minimal 
requirements for signatories” (Hilhorst 2005: 367).  Practically, this means that 
ownership of the Code is not clearly established, that the list of signatories is not 
necessarily up to date, that there is no forum to discuss signatories, and that there is no 
representation for the Code (Hilhorst 2004: 29; Int. 27, Int. 48). 
 Absent an institution, the Code of Conduct is voluntary and self-policing; there 
are no penalties for signatory organizations that fail to live up to its standards (IFRC 
2011).  Though a light compliance mechanism, such as a complaints mechanism, was 
originally envisioned, it never made the final draft.
69
   This was partly a reflection of the 
complexity of relief operations and the practical impossibility of monitoring compliance 
amidst unclear lines of authority (RRN 1994: 4; 1995).  The abstractness of a principles-
based code makes monitoring difficult as well (Leader 1998: 303).  It appears that the 
Code’s drafters believed that enforcement and monitoring would evolve with the field – a 
functionalist idea – and, for at least one of the Code’s founders, “HAP is the evolution of 
[the accountability mechanism]” (Int. 14).  In fact, HAP does indeed attempt to verify 
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 One of the drafters recalled that early versions “had much more teeth in it – they were much more 
strident.”  But the “language has got to be language that will pass, otherwise there’s no point.  So it gets 
watered down and, in a sense, becomes establishment if you want to get through the establishment channel” 
(Int. 14; also Int. 48).  This opposition to compliance mechanisms would carry through to Sphere and HAP. 
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compliance to agency commitments, including the Code of Conduct (Int. 11), though the 
relationship between HAP and the Code is fairly complex, as I discuss in Chapter 5.  
Surveys have found sector interest in a “light mechanism” for monitoring adherence, 
including such options as announcing the Code on signatory websites, providing 
complaint mechanisms, and making the Code part of training curricula (Hilhorst 2005: 
365-7; 2004: 36). 
Institutional frailties aside, there is little doubt that the Code of Conduct was a 
significant step in the development of contemporary humanitarianism, not least because it 
represented the first sector-wide effort to develop common understandings of core 
beliefs.  Its drafting reflects the flurry of international cooperation and optimism that 
prevailed in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War.  As Peter Walker, one of the 
Code’s drafters, put it, there was a “real feeling in the early years that humanitarian 
NGOs could and should act coherently and on a grander scale, that they should have a 
seat at the international policy table and that their actions in the field made a difference” 
(Walker 2005: 325; Leader 1998).  This was a positive project, not a reaction to external 
forces.  Indeed, unlike subsequent initiatives, the impetus for the Code came almost 
entirely from within the sector.  One of the framers recalled:  “I don’t remember us 
thinking of this in any sense as a defensive mechanism, as a rebuttal to, or, if we don’t do 
this, we’ll have it imposed on us.  Nothing like that.  It was just not in the thinking” (Int. 
14).  
 The Code evolved out of an essentially principled critique by veteran aid workers 
at large organizations over the quality of aid being provided in Sudan and in the Horn of 
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Africa in the mid to late 1980s.  For Oxfam and the ICRC, in particular, there was the 
perception that much of the work being done was of low quality and a mechanism was 
needed to raise standards (Leader 1999: 1).  Humanitarianism was growing – rapidly – 
and many in the field were shocked by the gulf in competence among agencies, as well as 
by the increase in competition among them.  As one of the Code’s drafters put it, “in 
Ethiopia, for the first time, we had aid agencies sort of falling over each other to do 
things… and we were all shocked about the manipulation of the media” (Int. 27). 
 For the Code’s framers, the proliferation of agencies was not, in and of itself, the 
concern, but it was certainly directly related to the problems they were witnessing; 
growth in the sector was exacerbating differences in quality and standards, and thus 
threatening the integrity of humanitarian action.  The ICRC’s Bruce Biber recalls that, 
“parallel to the growth of existing agencies, a host of new, mainly non-governmental 
organisations suddenly came into existence.  Although all claimed to be ‘humanitarian’, 
many launched operations in the field according to questionable, vague, or sometimes 
inexistent ethical standards.  As a result, the integrity of humanitarian action itself was 
threatened” (Biber 2004 ; see also Walker 2005 ; IFRC 1994: 23-4).  One of the Code’s 
drafters remembers being: 
Shocked by the variety of quality [in the Horn of Africa] – everything from 
individuals who quite clearly saw this as an adventure holiday – you know, to be 
given a bloody big Land Rover at the age of 21 and allowed to go play in the 
desert – and they would treat it as such, to organizations that were quite obviously 
just fronts for intelligence gathering…  The whole variety of stuff going on that 
you thought, ‘This is not what I had signed up for.’  And we talked about there 
needs to be some sort of standard, particularly on how people behave in 
somebody else’s country (Int. 14). 
 
For another key player, the French Red Cross, the spark was the Armenian earthquake in 
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1988.  This was the first time the Soviet Union had opened itself up for foreign aid, “and 
it was a free for all” (Int. 14).  Across the system, many of the developments discussed in 
Chapters 1 and 2 were beginning to manifest themselves:  there were increasing numbers 
of disasters, relief had become a business, the rollback of governments had left 
humanitarians as the sole agencies working with the poor and marginalized, and NGOs 
were facing new political pressures (RRN 1994: 3; IFRC 1996: 56-60). 
 Thus, in 1991, the French Red Cross sponsored a decision calling for a study of 
the possibility of developing a code of conduct for humanitarian aid in situations of 
natural and technological disasters.  Observing that media and public interest “translated 
into an appreciable increase in funds, but also prompted action by many agencies of 
varying levels of competence,” the Council of Delegates of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement asked the Federation, in consultation with the major relief agencies, 
to convene a group of experts to study the feasibility of a code (ICRC 1992: 39). 
After initially approaching the United Nations, which demurred, the International 
Federation of the Red Cross pushed the issue through the Steering Committee for 
Humanitarian Response (SCHR), a group consisting of some of the largest and most 
established international humanitarian agencies, including CARE, Caritas Internationalis, 
Catholic Relief Services, the IFRC, the Lutheran World Federation, Oxfam, Save the 
Children, and the World Council of Churches.  The SCHR endorsed the project and 
tasked Peter Walker (IFRC) and Tony Vaux (Oxfam) with drafting the Code (Walker 
2005: 326; RRN 1994: 2-3; Hilhorst 2005: 351).  In addition to the eight agencies (SCHR 
plus ICRC) copies were also disseminated to European NGOs through the EC-NGO 
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Liaison Committee, to US NGOs through InterAction, and to governments through 
diplomatic missions in Geneva and New York (RRN 1994: 2; IFRC 1994).  The Code 
was ultimately the product of a very small circle of individuals and organizations. 
 If the Code’s drafting channeled the optimism of the early 1990s, the conditions 
under which it was implemented and institutionalized reflected growing concerns among 
aid agencies over the politicization of humanitarianism by state parties.  The ICRC’s 
Bruce Biber sets the scene:  “At that time, many donors felt disillusioned by development 
assistance which, despite decades of investment, seemed to produce few tangible results.  
In comparison, humanitarian action became highly attractive, producing an immediate, 
visible, and (at least on the surface) positive impact” (Biber 2004).  As Peter Walker puts 
it, “the world was changing and the low profile humanitarian aid sideshow was being 
thrust into the foreign policy vacuum” (Walker 2005).   
Concerns with politicization explain why, in 1995, a decision was made to take 
the Code to the 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, which 
brought together 1,200 delegates from 143 governments, 166 Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies, the ICRC, the IFRC, and 68 UN and NGO observers.  Walker 
comments that this decision raised the Code from a parochial issue to one of international 
standing.  The code was “welcomed” and states and national societies were “invited to 
encourage NGOs” to abide by its principles.  However, though the Code’s proponents 
had hoped that states would endorse the Code, with states not involved in the Code’s 
drafting and humanitarianism increasingly on the foreign policy agenda, this was not to 
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happen
70
 (Walker 2005: 327; see also Walker 1995: 20; ICRC 1996; Int. 14). 
 
Section II – Defining humanitarianism 
 In Chapter 2, I theorized that one of self-regulation’s principal functions in the 
organizational field is that of defining proper practice.  The Code of Conduct was very 
consciously intended to define humanitarianism by codifying its key values.
71
  Reflecting 
on the discussions leading up to the Code, an ICRC veteran recalled that “there was a 
feeling at the time that what does ‘humanitarian’ mean, how do you define 
humanitarianism?  Everyone was using it left and right and it came to mean everything 
and nothing, so I think that’s what really inspired it at first, to really come to a common 
agreement among humanitarian agencies” (Int. 35).  It was not that humanitarian action 
was without principles; agencies all had internal guidelines, which were often quite 
practical, “but they just didn’t have these big principles up front” (Int. 27).  Moreover, 
“there was no common agreement on what constituted good relief aid…  The 
development of the code would define and regulate humanitarian aid delivered by these 
different agencies” (Hilhorst 2005: 352).  The Code was thus an effort to set, for the first 
time, “universal basic standards” governing NGO practices in disaster relief (IFRC 1994: 
24; Lancaster 1998). 
 Remarkably, in light of the contentiousness of subsequent regulatory attempts, the 
development of the Code of Conduct was characterized by genuine cohesion.  One of the 
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 From early on, there was the recognition by some that governments, donors, and UN agencies would be 
reluctant to sign on, given that they were not involved in the creation of the annexes and given that the 
annexes appeared “rather one-sided” (RRN 1994: 5). 
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 As stated in the preamble to the Code of Conduct, “if the humanitarian agencies do not jealously guard 
their professional standards they risk losing this unique people-to-people relationship and becoming just 
another deliverer of national or international governmental assistance” (IFRC 1994: 24). 
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drafters remarked that “there wasn’t any debate, really” about which principles to include 
(Int. 27).  Indeed, it is notable that contemporary initiatives, such as Thomas Weiss and 
Larry Minear’s “Providence Principles” (1993) and Jon Ebersole’s “Mohonk Criteria” 
(1993), contained principles that were broadly compatible with the Code
72
 (Walker 2005: 
325).  In general, as Nicholas Leader has noted, humanitarian codes of conduct exhibit a 
remarkable degree of agreement about the core principles of humanitarianism, including 
humanity, impartiality, independence, and some variant of neutrality (Leader 1998: 295).  
For Hilhorst, this demonstrates that the Code accurately reflected mainstream thinking on 
humanitarian aid at that time (Hilhorst 2005: 353). 
 The consensus in mainstream humanitarian opinion reflected the strong 
gravitational pull exerted by the ICRC on the developing organizational field.  The 
drafting of the Code presented the Red Cross with an opportunity to assert its values in a 
quickly developing field.  As an ICRC veteran noted, “it was one of the first times we 
saw the advantage of promoting our principles externally, within the sector” (Int. 36).  
Another recalled that the Code was seen as necessary to promote coherence in the sector 
(Int. 35).  The Red Cross desire for a code also stemmed from the early days of the 
League of Nations, when the ICRC was seen as nearly a full partner to the League.  Many 
in the Red Cross wanted the organization to come back to more of a partner arrangement 
with the UN, “hence the French idea of a code to cover them all” (Int. 14).  After the UN 
failed to express interest, focus shifted to a declaratory code.  Thus, very early on, 
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Providence Principles and the Mohonk Criteria (Int. 14); another counters that there “wasn’t anything” for 
models.  They didn’t see the Providence Principles until after the Code; “they didn’t influence the Code” 
(Int. 27).  If anything, this disagreement points to how novel the Code of Conduct truly was – if its framers 
looked anywhere, it was only at a limited set of initiatives because there were few available models. 
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proponents of self-regulation recognized its potential to alter hierarchies in the field. 
 The shadow of the Red Cross loomed large in an even more fundamental way:  as 
the biggest player in a developing field, the ICRC had long played a central role in 
defining values and practice.  This is reflected in how closely the Code of Conduct 
follows Jean Pictet’s seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross Red Crescent 
Movement, especially with regards to humanity, impartiality, and independence (Biber 
2004).  This was no coincidence; for the Code’s drafters, the Red Cross principles were 
absolutely central.  One described the Code as “really going back to those fundamental 
principles and saying what of these are applicable outside the Red Cross” (Int. 14).  
Nicholas Leader observes that NGOs and the UN have only given serious attention to 
developing principles since the 1980s, and they have been heavily influenced by the 
standards set by the Red Cross.
73
  Until the 1990s, Leader writes, the Red Cross had a 
monopoly on humanitarian principles; since then, work has been driven by NGOs, but 
“draws heavily on previous Red Cross formulations” (Leader 1998: 295).  This 
observation is confirmed by my research.  After the Code, the main humanitarian self-
regulatory initiatives – including Sphere, HAP, People In Aid, and Compas Qualité – 
have essentially been NGO driven initiatives. 
 The near absence of debate among mainstream humanitarians over the Code of 
Conduct should not blind us to the fundamental tension underlying the Code, which was 
not among mainstream organizations, but between these established organizations and the 
influx of newcomers attempting to gain access to the field.  As Bourdieu anticipated, in 
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the humanitarian field, as in other fields, a tension arises between the established 
orthodoxy and challengers, between those occupying privileged positions in the field and 
those attempting to gain entry.  With the Code, this tension was reflected in the concerns, 
noted earlier, about the prospect of amateur practice damaging the sector.  One of the 
people involved in drafting the Code suggested that the increase in competition for funds 
undoubtedly made large agencies amenable to a set of field-wide standards.  Following 
Ethiopia, and especially following Band Aid in 1984: 
The amounts of money just spiraled.  And a lot of new players came in.  I think 
you could almost describe it as having been a kind of club up to that point.  You 
can see that in the Disasters Emergency Committee:  in the 1980s, it was basically 
only five organizations – they were the club – was Oxfam, Save the Children, 
Christian Aid, CAFOD, and the British Red Cross.  And they regarded themselves 
as, you could almost say, the aristocracy.  Each of them had their own 
constituency...  So they weren’t, in a sense, competing; they could work together 
…  So they fitted together in a sense quite well, and up to ’85 I think did more or 
less run the aid field…  But after Ethiopia there was a huge expansion, and the 
business of internationalizing the aid agencies took place.  You had people like 
World Vision and CARE, from the USA, who then set up branches in the UK, and 
Concern from Ireland…  So they kind of challenged this kind of clique of the old 
British agencies (Int. 27). 
 
This same individual explained that while fear of competition was not a concern for the 
Code’s drafters, who were genuinely interested in promoting principled practice, it was 
undoubtedly an important consideration for the agencies they represented.  He likened the 
Code of Conduct to “a protective mechanism by the old school of agencies saying, ‘Oh, 
for goodness sake, we need some standards, there are all these new agencies arriving, we 
don’t trust them an inch’…  In the ‘80s, it was really fear about unknown organizations, 
so let’s sit down and see what we stand for” (Int. 27).  Similar claims were being made by 
78 
 
 
the IFRC at that time.
74
 
 The Code also reflected the emergence of a second tension in humanitarianism, 
which was the shift in the nature of organizations engaged in emergency relief.  Prior to 
the mid-1980s, emergency action was primarily the domain of the ICRC and MSF; other 
organizations were more fundamentally development-oriented.  With the expansion in 
funding and an increased prominence of emergency situations, NGOs that were 
traditionally development-focused began devoting more and more resources to relief 
operations.  Consequently, the Code reflects the fact that it is an instrument of 
organizations with very different mandates.  Article 8, for instance, which calls on 
organizations to work to ‘reduce future vulnerabilities,’ is at the center of debates 
between ‘minimalist’ (humanitarianism as emergency relief) and ‘maximalist’ 
(emergency relief supports development objectives) approaches (Hilhorst 2004: 7).  
These debates would intensify with the formation of the Sphere Project. 
 Readers will note that the concept of legitimacy, otherwise so central to this 
dissertation, has not yet figured in the Code narrative.  This is primarily because the 
legitimacy of humanitarian practice was not substantially at issue during the drafting 
stages.  However, the Code of Conduct certainly foreshadowed trends that would 
intensify with the drafting of the Sphere Standards.  The collapse of the Berlin Wall had 
already sent a shock through the system.  One of the drafters recalled an “explosion of 
community responses” that led to a lot of talk about how “all agencies have overhead 
costs and we didn’t trust them and we never hear anything back and you give them your 
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money and you don’t know what has happened; that was a source of skepticism about aid 
agencies that they felt they had to counter” (Int. 27).  A contemporary account of the 
Code published in the Relief and Rehabilitation Network Newsletter observed:  “It is hard 
to think of another industry or profession, controlling such enormous budgets and having 
such serious implications for both deliverers of aid and beneficiaries, which operates 
almost completely unregulated” (RRN 1995: 1).  In addition, in 1993, “the controversial 
and tragic events in Somalia threw many humanitarians into a quest for identity and 
legitimisation” (Hilhorst 2004: 5).  One humanitarian commentator has thus called the 
Code the most well known” and “universally acknowledged” effort to “preserve the 
reputation and the special status of humanitarianism” (Lancaster 1998). 
The question of accountability, too, was already being raised by leading figures.  
For Peter Walker, one of the Code’s functions was to clarify to whom and how agencies 
should be accountable.  As recent arrivals to the scene of a disaster, speaking ‘about’ the 
victims, the burden of proof is higher for them to demonstrate evidence and build strong 
relationships with the community.  Walker writes that the Code “is implicitly written for 
these sorts of agencies” (Walker 2005: 326; see also Slim 2002).  By 1995, accountability 
and regulation were reaching the top of the humanitarian agenda, propelled there by 
unparalleled numbers of agencies and rising costs of relief in an era of unprecedented 
scrutiny of aid budgets in the United States and European Union (RRN 1995: 1).  As 
stated by the IFRC in its preamble to the Code of Conduct: 
What few people outside the disaster-response system realise is that all of these 
[humanitarian] agencies, from the old to the new, from the multi-million dollar 
outfits to the one-man shows, have no accepted body of professional standards to 
guide their work.  There is still an assumption in many countries that disaster 
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relief is essentially “charitable” work and therefore anything that is done in the 
name of helping disaster victims is acceptable.  However, this is far from the 
truth.  Agencies, whether experienced or newly-created, can make mistakes, be 
misguided and sometimes deliberately misuse the trust that is placed in them 
(IFRC 1994: 21). 
 
Reflecting on the Code in 1998, Warren Lancaster observed that doing good was no 
longer enough in light of donor pressure for greater accountability, selectiveness by 
recipient communities, competition from NGOs and other actors, and internal voices for 
reform (Lancaster 1998).  These greater pressures prompted the Code drafters to take it to 
the 1995 International Red Cross Conference and seek the support of states and donors. 
 
Section III – Assessing the Code’s impact on practice 
 One of this dissertation’s underlying concerns is with assessing the capacity of 
voluntary self-regulatory initiatives to exert effects on humanitarian action, even in the 
absence of strict sanctioning mechanisms.  The four initiatives surveyed, of which the 
Code is the first, have in common their voluntary nature, but differ dramatically on key 
measures.  The Code of Conduct and the Code on Images (Ch. 6) are principles-based 
codes whereas HAP International (Ch. 5) and Sphere’s Minimum Standards are 
standards-based.  Principles-based codes are characterized by broader language; they are 
less enforceable because they reference abstract values.  Of all of the initiatives, the Code 
of Conduct is also the least institutionalized, lacking both a secretariat and compliance 
mechanisms.  This is a reflection of its novelty, as well as of the lack of political will, in 
the absence of a perception of crisis, to set up a more enduring structure. 
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Table 3 
 
Institution 
Yes No 
Sanctions 
Yes HAP ? 
No 
Code on Images 
Sphere Code of Conduct 
 
 
 One of the basic conclusions to be made about the Code of Conduct is that, by 
conventional metrics like compliance, it actually has not been tremendously successful.  
Though, for many humanitarians, it is cited as a guiding document, the few external 
evaluations conducted against the Code have found, at best, mixed compliance.  This 
section finds the Code to be considerably popular among practitioners, but also identifies 
issues with institutionalization and consistent application.  This cautionary assessment is 
instructive in two ways:  first, because the failures of the Code directly motivated the 
shape and strategies of future regulatory initiatives, notably Sphere and HAP; second, 
because the ideational impact of the Code is all the more striking in light of its weak 
institutional structure. Indeed, the Code is a powerful case, for if it can be demonstrated 
that a voluntary code, without even an institutional home, can have enduring effects on 
the humanitarian field, then it calls into question the disciplinary preeminence of 
questions of compliance or enforcement.  As I demonstrate in the next section, the Code’s 
primary impact is to be found elsewhere – in the normative fabric of the sector. 
 The Code of Conduct is the oldest and, by measure of signatories, largest self-
regulatory initiative; it counts among its 492 signatories most of the large humanitarian 
organizations and federations.  As Figure 4 shows, it has steadily gained signatories since 
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1994, despite not having an institutional focal point.
75
  As discussed earlier, this makes 
the Code the single most widely signed humanitarian self-regulatory instrument.
76
 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
However, the impressive number of signatories is not indicative of its direct 
regulatory impact.  As Dorothea Hilhorst put it, “despite some apparent successes and its 
broad level of acceptance, the code did not come to play a lively role” in its initial years; 
“while it had inspired other quality initiatives and tools, it had itself become dormant” 
(Hilhorst 2005: 352).  Tony Vaux found that “in the decade since the Code was devised 
little has been done to promote it and too often it is just a ‘badge’ acquired easily by 
declaration.  There is no process of scrutiny and even commercial security companies 
                                                 
75
 Non-humanitarian organizations were purged from the list prior to 2011. 
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 The presentation of the numbers alone is somewhat deceiving; Sphere is far larger in participation, but 
lacks a signatory list.  As a critic of the Code observed, “I’m guessing that there are 20,000 humanitarian 
organizations in the world, there are something like 3 or 4 million development organizations, so the 
number of organizations that have signed up to these universal principles is tiny” (Int. 29).  That said, the 
vast majority of the main players – the ones who most influence the field – have signed on, which is 
significant because the rules for and leadership of the field emanates out from its gravitational center. 
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have signed up to it” (Vaux 2001a: 6; ICVA 2004a).  The observation that anyone can 
sign up to the Code was mentioned in interviews as well; at one point, the list of 
signatories included a private security company
77
 (Int. 27, Int. 34, Int. 36).  Five years 
after the Code’s drafting, in 1999, a study of British agencies found that the NGO Code 
had “not been internalised by organisations and remains unused as a means of guiding 
and auditing their work” (qtd. in Leader 1999: 3).  Five years after this, on the 10 year 
anniversary of the Code, Dorothea Hilhorst’s wide-ranging survey of signatory 
organizations found varying levels of institutionalization, with the most progress in 
education; organizations had made the Code an explicit part of their introductory courses.  
Trócaire (Int. 17), Concern (Int. 25), and Catholic Relief Services (Int. 43, Int. 45) are all 
examples of organizations that have integrated the Code into their training materials.  
Other organizations had integrated the Code into their principles or strategic plans.  “The 
general view, though, is that the code is being utilised in an implicit manner, and as such, 
the degree to which it reaches the field is not sufficient” (Hilhorst 2005: 363; 2004: 32).  
Hilhorst also found that organizations rated their own compliance with the Code highly 
but were less optimistic about their humanitarian peers.
78
 
The most optimistic assessment is that the Code’s impact as a regulatory tool has 
been mixed.  In my interviews, both with practitioners and workers at other initiatives, I 
found assessments of the Code to range from disappointment – “it hasn’t had much 
effect” (Int. 27), observed one of the writers; “the Code of Conduct has become totally 
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 The security company in question was ArmorGroup, founded as Defense Systems Limited (Vaux 2001a: 
6; United States Department of State 2004). 
78
 On a scale of one to ten with ten indicating perfect compliance, respondents gave their own organization 
an average grade of 7.2 and other agencies a 6 (Hilhorst 2004: 13). 
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meaningless” (Int. 34), commented a HAP worker79 – to measured optimism – “it’s very 
useful for guidance” (Int. 45); “it provides clarity on what you’re about” (Int. 57).  As 
both Vaux (2001) and Hilhorst (2004, 2005) have found, adherence to the Code is quite 
uneven; while some agencies take its dictates quite seriously, others do not consciously 
use it.  At the ICRC, for instance, I was advised that the Code is “not one of our standard 
tools we use or train with,” though it had a lot of influence in its time; “aspects were 
institutionalized” (Int. 35).  Another ICRC staffer noted that the knowledge of the Code 
and other such instruments is uneven, highly linked to specific functional areas (Int. 36).  
On the other hand, it was immediately apparent that humanitarian staff at Trócaire 
(Ireland) took the Code very seriously, finding it “hugely valuable” on a personal and on 
a policy level (Int. 16, Int. 17).  The head of humanitarian response had the Code affixed 
to the wall of his office and referenced it by memory, line by line, during our interview.  
When Trócaire is developing various policies within the Caritas family, he explained, 
“you go, ‘Hold on a minute, where are the Code of Conduct principles here?’ and you 
bring it right back” (Int. 17).  At Concern, too, “the overall principle that drives [their] 
humanitarian approach is the Code of Conduct”80 (Int. 25). 
One of the difficulties assessing the Code’s impact on practice is that it has only 
rarely been used in external evaluations of humanitarian interventions.
81
  Tony Vaux’s 
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 Another sector veteran, now employed at HAP International, expressed disappointment in the Code:  
“it’s a really important tool that is in fact a nothing.  There’s nothing to it.  Everyone says they’re signed up 
to it but if you ask anyone, even the CEO who signed the document, which parts of the Code are most 
important to your organization, they can’t even tell you one.  ‘Oh, probably neutrality.’” (Int. 37) 
80
 This familiarity with the principles contrasts with a staffer at the ICRC who commented that neutrality – 
which is not specifically included in the Code – was one of its most important aspects (Int. 36).  I 
encountered this at Islamic Relief as well (Int. 28) and was told by a staffer at HAP that this is a common 
perception among their member organizations (Int. 37). 
81
 However, this does not mean that the Code has not been used for internal auditing and self-assessment. 
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DEC-commissioned evaluation of the Gujarat earthquake response in 2001, seven years 
after the Code’s publication, is actually one of the very first examples of the Code being 
used for purposes of external evaluation.  Vaux found mixed compliance, at best, with the 
Code.  Notably, the evaluation reported that “all DEC members are signatories to the 
Code but none used it actively during the emergency, and many field managers were 
unfamiliar with it” and that “some agencies were following the Code much more than 
others” (Vaux 2001b: 13).  Vaux adopted a 10 point scale to examine each of the ten 
principles of the Code, with 10 indicating perfect compliance.  In Gujarat, the agency 
average was 5.9/10.  Agencies rated highly on impartiality, abstention from politics, and 
accountability to donors – scores were in the 8 to 9 range – , but were substantially worse 
at involving beneficiaries (4/10) and reducing future vulnerabilities (3/10)(Vaux 2001b: 
14).  Vaux subsequently used the Code to conduct the DEC’s evaluation of the Indian 
Ocean Tsunami crisis response in December 2004.  This study also found mixed results, 
but was generally praiseworthy about the response, finding success among participant 
organizations in placing needs first (with Indonesia as a partial exception), in sensitivity 
to culture and custom, and in transparency and accountability, especially to donors.  At 
the same time, there were still significant gaps in involving beneficiaries in project 
management, building capacity, and reducing vulnerability (Vaux 2005).  The Code has 
also been referenced by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (Telford and Cosgrave 2007) 
and by an independent scholar to assess agencies’ impartiality in Kosovo (Porter 2000). 
 It should be noted that while the Code is numbered 1 to 10, there is actually no 
explicit hierarchy among its principles, with the possible exception of Principle 1 (the 
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humanitarian imperative comes first).  This distinguishes it from its source material – 
Jean Pictet’s seven Fundamental Principles – which separate primary (humanity, 
impartiality, independence, neutrality) from secondary principles so as to provide 
grounds for decision-making in complex situations.  This gives the Code additional 
flexibility in its application, but also makes meaningful assessment difficult as there is no 
standard for judging whether, for instance, sensitivity to faith and custom is 
commensurate with impartiality. 
This also helps explain why it has been so difficult to implement and follow the 
Code; as a principles-base code, it simply lacks specificity.  While, as Nicholas Leader 
suggests, the vagueness of the document may have allowed many agencies to sign up to 
it, it undoubtedly also explains why agencies that are party to the same Code often take 
vastly divergent positions
82
 (Leader 1998: 301-3; Hilhorst 2005: 355-62).  Other times, it 
may be difficult for certain organizations to comply, given their specific mandates.  For 
instance, some rights-based organizations find it difficult to incorporate the Code because 
of fear that it may conflict with their missions (Hilhorst 2004: 31).  One of the framers 
recalled this as an issue during the drafting stages:  agencies that appealed to specific 
communities, like faith-based organizations (FBOs), or had justice or rights-based 
mandates, had more difficulty with principles like impartiality (Int. 27).  Others have 
pointed to the lack of an institution after the founding figures moved on to other domains 
(Int. 27, 48, 57; Lancaster 1998).  (This was a lesson learned by Sphere).  And still others 
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 Leader writes that principles of humanitarian action are a mixture of two types of principles:  first, 
abstractions of a moral nature – absolute imperatives above and beyond discussion.  Second, rules based on 
judgment and experience, adopted by a community to guide its conduct.  There is a perpetual tension 
between these, and many disputes arise from misunderstandings about where the line is drawn (Leader 
1998: 293; see also Lancaster 1998). 
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have highlighted the lack of enforcement.  As a longtime aid worker commented, “one of 
the critiques is that it’s very well having a Code, everyone’s signed up to it, but it doesn’t 
mean anything.  By definition, a code has to be enforceable” (Int. 29).  Asked a Sphere 
staff member:  “How do you police it?” (Int. 31). 
 As far back as 1994, there was the recognition that, “to many observers, the 
absence of a body responsible for monitoring adherence to the Code and with the powers 
to encourage or even enforce such adherence represents the principle weakness of the 
Code” (RRN 1994: 3; Lancaster 1998).  The Relief and Rehabilitation Network (RRN) 
questioned in 1994 whether the Code would “significantly alter [NGOs’] actions during 
relief operations, given the Code’s ‘lack of teeth’,” and acknowledged the risk that 
signatories would use the Code in public relations material without adhering to its 
principles in practice
83
 (RRN 1994: 5).  Indeed, Hilhorst argues that the Code of Conduct 
is actually not regulatory at all because of its cautious language (such as ‘endeavor to’ 
instead of ‘shall’) and because its different articles can yield contradictory demands 
(Hilhorst 2005: 364). 
These mixed results, and the rarity with which the Code is used for external 
evaluation, are reflected in articles written over the past decade.  “Is the Code of Conduct 
still relevant?” asks the ICRC’s Bruce Biber (Biber 2004).  Is the Code a “dead letter or 
living document?” asks Dorothea Hilhorst (Hilhorst 2005).  Both reply in the affirmative, 
but their questions are indicative of the struggle to implement the principles in practice.  
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 Peter Walker writes that the Code has been used in two ways, though it should have been used in three.  
It has been used as a personal code, as a set of principles to guide aid worker behavior.  In this, it has had 
some success.  It has also served as a reference point or baseline that is now accepted as standard rhetoric, 
if not doctrine.  In hindsight, however, the Code drafters were naïve regarding the commitment of agencies 
to ‘walk their talk’; no compliance mechanisms were envisioned (Walker 2005: 327-8). 
88 
 
 
Though agencies continued to sign up to the Code, as a regulatory tool, it was dormant.  
However, after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and leading up to the ten year anniversary of 
the document’s unveiling, there was a revival of interest.  In 2004, ICVA and SCHR, 
simultaneously with a group of Dutch NGOs, conducted major efforts to survey and 
revitalize the Code.  ICVA and SCHR conducted four field visits with the goal of writing 
a commentary on the principles and annexes in time for the 10th anniversary 
commemorations
84; Dutch NGOs conducted research at NGO headquarters’ to assess the 
Code’s implementation, yielding, among other outputs, Hilhorst’s study (ICVA 2004b). 
 For many sector veterans, to reflect on the Code’s drafting and implementation is 
a bittersweet occasion.  For Peter Walker, one of the drafters, the humanitarian 
community missed a major opportunity to use the Code of Conduct to advocate for 
independence and funding from governments and the UN.  These principles were 
enshrined in the Code’s three annexes, but little was made of them (Walker 2005: 328).  
This sentiment was also expressed in interviews.  One of the drafters reflects: 
If I had to redo things, I would have said that we should have made a hell of a lot 
more of those annexes and agencies should have made a hell of a lot more of 
those annexes, because those annexes were as endorsed as the Code was at that 
international conference – it was one document.  We missed a political trick there.  
In a sense, it was an ego thing – the NGOs concentrated on their business and 
they didn’t concentrate on the bit that was about pushing governments (Int. 14; 
also Int. 35). 
 
Another recalls:  “The Code marked a point where we could have seen more collective 
action, we could have seen aid agencies coming together and saying ‘Now let’s come up 
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 The commentary was never distributed, owing to “differing views within ICVA between those who 
sought an intellectual guide versus those who wanted practical advice” (Int. 57).  This mirrored similar 
tensions during the Sphere process. 
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with a joint policy on disaster reduction or a joint policy on what we mean by 
consultation’” (Int. 27).  As a HAP staffer put it, “I think Sphere and HAP and ELRA and 
the Swiss are all trying to put their fingers in the dike from that early disappointment, 
because that was the moment we had that brilliant opportunity…” (Int. 37). 
 
Section IV – Beyond compliance 
 
As the preceding analysis suggests, for most NGOs, the Code of Conduct is not a 
document that they consult, on a day to day basis, in planning their interventions.
85
  Is it 
then a failure?  The Code clearly lacks the immediately visible impact of the Sphere 
Project or HAP International, but it also lacked the institutional backing and sense of 
urgency of these initiatives.  As one of the Code’s drafters reflected, ultimately “there 
wasn’t all that much head of steam even behind the Code of Conduct” (Int. 27). 
But that’s not the end of the story.  I would argue that the Code’s most substantial 
impact has not been on the regulatory, but the symbolic, level.  This was suggested in a 
conversation with another of the Code’s drafters, who, while expressing regret that more 
had not been done to give teeth to the Code, acknowledged that what was initially a 
fringe effort by two individuals has: 
[M]oved to become almost establishment – people don’t forget its genesis, it’s 
just as though it’s been there forever.  ‘Of course we signed up to the Code.’  It’s 
like human rights.  That’s good in the sense that the notion that this is an accepted 
part of the norm, I think is fine.  In reality, though, I think most agencies pay lip 
service to it…  It’s like any of these norms; it’s a step forward that it’s there and 
that people think it’s self-evident that this should be a norm (Int. 14). 
 
As a HAP staffer noted, “the Code of Conduct has had an impact on agencies.  When 
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agencies sign up to it, it’s treated a lot like signing up to the Universal Declaration by 
states, and agencies do adhere as much as possible to that, and sometimes they can use 
the exoneration clause a bit too often, but that does not mean that there’s not a 
commitment to doing something” (Int. 11). 
This is a pivotal insight.  Viewing the Code as a humanitarian norm enables us to 
account for the Code’s impact in a different way than if we view it simply as a set of cut 
and dried rules to be followed or violated, used or not used.  Norms, or standards of 
appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity, regulate through constitution.  To 
the extent that the Code has been internalized as essential humanitarian knowledge, it 
functions in the background, at the level of a taken-for-granted.  If we view the Code as a 
norm, we can then understand why Vaux found that agencies often do not use it 
consciously and why organizations may engage in divergent behaviors while still laying 
claim to be following the Code.  Approaching the Code as a norm thus directs us to look 
explicitly at the initiative’s place in the ideational fabric of the field. 
Indeed, while evaluations raise questions about the Code’s use in practice, 
surveys and interviews continue to show the Code to be held in the highest esteem across 
the sector.  The most extensive survey on the Code of Conduct, conducted by Dorothea 
Hilhorst in 2004, received responses from 105 signatory agencies and overwhelmingly 
found that the Code’s 10 articles are widely shared among humanitarians.  For instance, 
between 81% and 94% of respondents found each of the Code’s 10 articles “useful in 
practice” and only 20% to 32% stated that any specific article needed updates.86  Hilhorst 
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 Even the most controversial principle, Article 4 (‘we shall endeavor not to act as instruments of 
government foreign policy’), had 81% of respondents deeming it “useful in practice” and 86% calling it 
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also found the Code to be highly appreciated among humanitarians; on a 0 to 1 scale, 
with 1 signifying full approval, she gauged approval of the Code at .8.  In fact, among all 
instruments and guidelines, the Code of Conduct was cited as second in importance only 
to internal standards (Hilhorst 2005: 363; 2004: 35).  These results demonstrate that “the 
code continues to reflect the mainstream thinking of people involved with relief NGOs 
about what should constitute humanitarian aid” (Hilhorst 2005: 354; 2004). 
The qualitative section of Hilhorst’s survey is perhaps most revealing.  Among 
the responses given by practitioners, Hilhorst found that the Code was considered 
important as “a body of commonly shared principles,” as that which “defines the place of 
humanitarians next to government and military,” as “a common reference point for 
discussions between NGOs and stakeholders,” and as “a reference tool for discussions” 
within organizations (Hilhorst 2005: 363).  Hilhorst found strong agreement with the 
statement that the Code “makes clear what humanitarianism is” (Hilhorst 2004: 35).  The 
Code’s significance, then, is not as an iron law of humanitarian action.  Rather, its 
significance is that it defines humanitarianism and functions as a reference point for 
actors within the field. 
Breaking this down further, I would argue that the Code has been integrated into 
the structure of the field in three ways.  First, its principles – and its failures – have 
provided the grist for more recent self-regulatory initiatives.  The Code of Conduct has 
served as a stepping stone and powerful precedent for subsequent attempts to govern the 
humanitarian field.  Second, the Code has had the effect of defining and, in cases, 
expanding the traditional scope of humanitarian expansion.  As a boundary drawing 
                                                                                                                                                 
“fine as is;” only 32% felt that it needed “to be updated.”  For the full results, see (Hilhorst 2005, 2004).  
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exercise, the Code has had a significant impact.  Third, and related, the Code has come to 
serve as a marker of humanitarian identity, as a sort of “ticket for entry” into the field. 
First, as I predicted in Chapter 2, it is remarkable, the extent to which subsequent 
self-regulatory initiatives have been built on those that came before.  As the first, 
trailblazing initiative, the Code set an extremely influential precedent for future rule-
writing and institution-forming initiatives in the sector.  As early as 1994, the Relief and 
Rehabilation Network (RRN) speculated that the Code “may stimulate an inclusive and 
more comprehensive process involving governments, donor organisations, UN agencies 
and NGOs which, over time may results [sic] in a sort of Geneva Convention for 
Humanitarian Aid” (RRN 1994: 5).  As others have written, and as I analyze in greater 
detail in Chapter 4, this is precisely what happened with the Sphere Project.  In fact, the 
Code marks the beginning of a regulatory continuum that links the Code to Sphere and to 
HAP International.  Hugo Slim puts it thus:  “If the Code of Conduct asserts the moral 
imperative of humanitarian duty and the Sphere standards specify the content of some of 
that duty, then the Humanitarian Charter underwrites both with rights and responsibilities 
set out in law – international law – so acknowledging the idea of legal duties” (Slim 
2006: 163).  For Walker, too, the Code’s “biggest success has been to pave the way for 
the Sphere Project, its humanitarian charter and standards” (Walker 2005: 327).  As I was 
told in interviews, Sphere was intended to be “a practical expression of the Code of 
Conduct” (Int. 31, Int. 34) and, for at least one drafter, HAP is the realization of the 
Code’s enforcement mechanism (Int. 14). 
The Code has also directly influenced regional codes of conduct in Ethiopia 
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(1999), Botswana (2001), the DRC (1998), Cote d’Ivoire, Afghanistan, Somalia, and 
Colombia (Walker 2005: 328; RRN 1999: 13; Hilhorst 2004: 34).  It has been the model 
for a number of codes in cognate fields, such as the US International Society for 
Prosthetics and Orthotics Code of Conduct for International Non-Governmental 
Prosthetics, Orthotics, and Mobility Assistance.  And, as I discuss in Chapter 6, the Code 
of Conduct was also an important source of inspiration for the revised Code of Conduct 
on Images and Messages.  The RC/NGO Code is the first thread in what is today a 
growing tapestry of regulation. 
Second, the Code of Conduct supports the argument that self-regulation has 
served as a vehicle for advancing new conceptions of humanitarian identity.  Indeed, the 
Code has probably been most foundational in cementing the idea that there even is such a 
thing as a “humanitarian community.”  As Peter Walker recalls, “the underlying 
assumption, certainly within the agencies that initially drafted the Code of Conduct, was 
that there existed a relatively coherent international humanitarian NGO community just 
waiting to be stimulated into coherent action” (Walker 2005: 325). 
In the humanitarian mainstream, as Hilhorst has demonstrated, one can safely say 
that the Code of Conduct defines the core principles of the field.  One World Trust, a 
think tank focused on civil society self-regulation, finds that the Code “fulfills the role of 
defining the mission and parameters of NGO humanitarian action” (One World Trust 
2011).  This came out time and time again in interviews.  An ICRC veteran noted that the 
Code “helped to achieve a clear idea of what we mean by humanitarianism.  That’s a 
really important achievement” (Int. 36).  For a colleague, “the Code signifies being a 
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humanitarian” (Int. 35).  For various staff at signatory NGOs, the Code is held to be “the 
bedrock, really” (Int. 17), one of the essential “pillars” of humanitarianism (Int. 25), and 
“so foundational” (Int. 45, Int. 43).  In this, the Code can be seen as succeeding in its goal 
of establishing common standards for disaster relief (Biber 2004). 
 If the Code defines humanitarianism, one must recognize that it does so in a 
specific way.  After all, the Code does more than simply restate Jean Pictet’s seven 
Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross movement.  It also integrates development 
principles into humanitarianism – something that the ICRC’s Bruce Biber considered to 
be innovative at the time, but today reflects common practice (Biber 2004).  Peter Walker 
writes that the Code reflects prevailing views at the time that relief work was temporary 
and secondary to development work, which provided the “true path to the alleviation of 
suffering and the promotion of universal human rights” (Walker 2005: 324; IFRC 1996: 
56).  This was reflected in articles five, respecting culture and custom; six, building 
disaster relief on local capacities; seven, involving beneficiaries in the management of 
aid; and especially in eight, that relief strive to reduce future vulnerabilities.  As Nicholas 
Leader and David Chandler separately observe, the implication is that traditional 
principles have been transformed beyond the original goals of assistance and protection 
to include more long term, expansive aims (Leader 1998: 296; Chandler 2001: 682-3).  
Chandler relates this move to the increasing presence of human rights ideas in 
humanitarianism. 
 Nor did the Code simply add to the Red Cross principles.  In the case of 
neutrality, principles were nearly entirely dropped.  Walker reflects that at the time of 
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drafting, some of the NGOs that saw themselves as first and foremost development and 
justice-driven were clear that they could not sign on to a code that required them to be 
neutral.  Some agencies made no claim to neutrality, seeing their mission as devoted to 
justice or rights; neutrality was potentially an accommodation with conflict and 
injustice.
87
  Furthermore, the prevailing view was that development and humanitarianism, 
previously very different, were being combined and distorted (Walker 2005: 329).  At 
that time, the ICRC and MSF were the only ones operating directly in war zones.  It 
should be noted that the ICRC influenced the Code’s cautious language, partly to defend 
its prerogative in situations of conflict.  In the minds of the Red Cross representatives, 
this was “primarily a code for natural disasters, and natural disasters were not political, 
and therefore you didn’t need neutrality.  Of course, that’s naïve and it’s not like that.  
But that was more or less the starting point” (Int. 14).  Thus the Code, like the Providence 
Principles, substituted abstention from politics for neutrality (Leader 1998: 299; see also 
Chandler 2001: 694-6). 
 In retrospect, some of these changes – the rapprochement with development, the 
influence of rights language – foreshadowed debates over the nature of the humanitarian 
organizational field that would become especially profound during the drafting and 
implementation of the Sphere Standards.  The Code reflected the changing reality, which 
was that development organizations were increasingly involved in humanitarian relief, 
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 Oxfam, which played a major role in the drafting of the Code, made no claims to neutrality.  “They said 
that they’re not neutral – they’re on the side of poor people – and they’re impartial between the actual sides 
to a conflict, but they didn’t claim to the kind of strict Red Cross neutrality” (Int. 27).  A humanitarian 
staffer at Ireland’s Trócaire added that “if you look at the example of Darfur, if we were to strictly apply 
the principle of neutrality, there would have been no vocal opposition to what was happening in 2003-
2004” (Int. 16). 
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and humanitarianism was beginning to be influenced by longer-term, consequentialist 
ideas that would influence future efforts at regulation. 
If the Code was not controversial during its drafting, critiques leveled after 
publication speak to its significance in defining humanitarianism.  In an article reflecting 
on the 10
th
 anniversary of the Code, Peter Walker enumerates four main lines of critique.  
The first, that the Code enables states to impinge on agency independence, is more 
frequently directed at Sphere.  I save this discussion for Chapter 4.  The second critique, 
that the Code legitimizes illegitimate behavior in conflict zones, relates primarily to the 
omission of neutrality and the inattention to aid in conflict-affected zones, and is one that 
Walker freely acknowledges (Walker 2005: 329).  The other two criticisms – that the 
Code deregulates and distorts humanitarian action in conflict zones and that the Code is a 
Western document – are worth discussing at greater length, given that both critiques point 
to the gatekeeping function of codes. 
The critique that the Code has opened the door to the deregulation and distortion 
of humanitarian action in conflict zones is most readily associated with Nick Stockton, 
founder and former executive director of HAP International (Ch. 5).  Stockton argues that 
the Code of Conduct: 
[R]epresented an important step in re-writing the quasi-official rules of 
‘humanitarianism’, as these now appeared to allow peace-builders, human rights 
campaigners and all manner of development workers to shelter under the 
protective umbrella of International Humanitarian Law, the maintenance of which 
is the duty of states and ‘controlling authorities’ (Stockton, qtd. in Walker 2005: 
331).
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 Stockton’s main issue was that, to achieve consensus, the Code was hedged with qualifications and 
conditions, thus relaxing the rules of humanitarian action.  In general, as is apparent in Chapter 5, Stockton 
favored an orthodox approach over accommodation (Stockton 2005a).  Hilhorst contests the notion that the 
Code was a negotiated outcome; she argues that it represented a convergence of principles between 
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Similarly, David Chandler has charged that the Code hastened the integration of 
humanitarian actors into politico-military campaigns (Chandler 2001).  But these claims 
are not uncontested. The ICRC’s Bruce Biber views the Code as a means to reaffirm the 
validity of independent humanitarian action in the face of such threats (Biber 2004).  
Similar statements were expressed in interviews as well (Int. 16).  And Dorothea Hilhorst 
has found it “difficult to see how the Code of Conduct could deregulate the humanitarian 
relief work of all of these organisations, when it was not regulated in the first place” 
(Hilhorst 2005: 353).  Rather, what it does do is expand the meaning of humanitarian aid 
through the integration of development principles, thus devaluing the relative status of 
the ICRC’s Fundamental Principles. 
As for the criticism that the Code reflects its bases in large, Western 
organizations, this has been acknowledged with concern by both Walker and Vaux, the 
drafters, and by others in the field (Walker 2005 ; Vaux 2001a: 6; Lancaster 1998 ; Slim 
2006: 169).  As Hilhorst frames it, “the tendency to regard INGOs… as superior has also 
crept into the language of the Code of Conduct,” such as in Article 4, focused on 
independence – it appears not to take into account local/ national agencies (Hilhorst 
2005: 362).  This came out in interviews as well.  As a veteran of the British NGO sector 
put it, for small Western and large Islamic agencies: 
There’s a clique of large, western, multilateral organizations, and the clique works 
terribly well for everybody, and it’s a way of defining humanitarianism in a way 
that suits the clique.  The 1994 Code, for example, is seen as something that suits 
a Western idea of humanitarian need but not necessarily a broader Islamic one, 
and also very much suits a Western form of organization as opposed to the more 
                                                                                                                                                 
humanitarianism and development (Hilhorst 2005). 
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partnership based, local, private idea of Islamic ones (Int. 29). 
 
I heard similar comments at Islamic Relief, where senior staffer acknowledged that 
“some people are skeptical about it [the Code]; they question why it’s framed as it is; 
there is a perceived hidden agenda” (Int. 28).  This has precipitated efforts to “translate” 
the Code into the Islamic context.
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This criticism underscores the power and politics of codes of conduct.  Designing 
self-regulatory initiatives implies making consequential choices about what is and is not 
properly part of a domain of endeavor.  Indeed, the potential power of such a code was 
recognized early on.  The Relief and Rehabilitation Network (RRN) wondered in 1994 
how large agencies like CARE, MSF, and Médecins du Monde (MDM) would respond, 
given that they were not involved in the development of the Code.  “Such agencies,” it 
reflected, “have been placed in a potentially awkward situation by the appearance of the 
Code, for if they do not feel comfortable with the wording of one or more of the ten 
principles their choice lies between ‘joining in’ or ‘staying out’” (RRN 1994: 5).  As the 
first field-wide self-regulatory initiative, the Code of Conduct had tremendous influence 
on the definition and nature of humanitarianism. 
 The third major point to make about the Code’s impact on the field is that it has 
come to serve as a marker of identity for actors in the sector.  This is part of why the 
debates highlighted above are of such vital importance:  he who writes the code defines 
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 In the UK, for instance, the Humanitarian Forum is working to identify ways to rapproche Eastern and 
Western values and to ‘root’ the Code in Islamic principles.  Similar work by the IHH Humanitarian Relief 
Foundation has yielded a code of conduct for Muslim humanitarian organizations rooted in Islam, including 
specific passages from the Koran (See Humanitarian Forum 2011).  These initiatives are attempting to 
show that “there isn’t anything contradictory between the 1994 Code and what Islamic organizations are 
doing” (Int. 29). 
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the terrain.  As I outlined above, the Code has become an accepted part of the 
humanitarian identity.  One World Trust comments that “the Code has become an 
accepted norm; today, being a signatory to the Code is expected of most humanitarian 
NGOs” (One World Trust 2011).  The example of Plan International serves as a case in 
point.  One of the world’s largest development organizations, Plan has, in recent years, 
come to see itself increasingly as humanitarian.  (This is representative of the broader 
convergence of development and the Code that necessitated the Code in the first place).  
As part of this shift, they brought in one of the Code’s drafters to help guide the 
organization through the Code of Conduct and to reinforce its humanitarian credentials 
(Int. 27).  Today, Plan International is a signatory to the Code.  Thus, Dorothea Hilhorst 
observes, “even though there is no threshold to sign up to the Code, there is nonetheless a 
status attached to it” (Hilhorst 2005). 
 In some ways, signing the Code facilitates organizations’ actions on the ground.  
Hugo Slim writes that the Code “began a moral shift toward the categorical insistence on 
humanitarian aid and protection that affirmed it as a supreme duty as much as a right.  In 
doing so, they also began to identify themselves and others as particular duty bearers” 
(Slim 2006: 162; Leader 1998: 299).  The act of claiming responsibility is also an act of 
claiming authority.  In Chapter 4, I make a similar claim about the Sphere Project.  As a 
general proposition, codes provide a basis, or platform, for organizations to claim 
authority vis-à-vis other actors, including donors and states.  In the Code, this authority 
derives from the claimed moral imperative to provide humanitarian assistance and the 
reference to a set of defined humanitarian values. 
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 In addition to conferring credibility, signing the Code can also have real material 
consequences for organizations.  This illustrates Bourdieu’s proposition that contestations 
over the rules of the game have implications on status and positionality in the field.  
ECHO, the European Union humanitarian funding arm, requires agencies to be 
signatories of the Code.  For SIDA, Sweden’s funding agency, the Code is not a 
requirement, but it is strongly and explicitly recommended (Hilhorst 2004: 31).  Signing 
the Code is mandatory for membership in the Disasters Emergency Committee (UK) and 
the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) and is strongly 
recommended by InterAction (US) and ICVA (Walker 2005 ; Leader 1999: 3; ICVA 
2011).  As an aid veteran explained, “it’s kind of a ticket – if you don’t sign up to the 
Code then you don’t qualify for certain things” (Int. 34).  In this way, widely held ideas 
can have material consequences.  Thus, in a very real way, signing the Code is part of 
paying the entry fee into humanitarianism. 
 To a certain extent, the Code also helps to protect the field’s borders against 
unnecessary intrusion from without – not just by imposing tariffs on would-be entrants, 
but also by creating certain obstacles to state intervention.  On the ground, the Code helps 
to protect the space of humanitarian inviolability in disaster zones.  For Trócaire, for 
instance, the Code provides a “much needed shield, both in a corporate sense, but also at 
a field practitioner level, particularly if you look at our work on the ground in a place like 
Somalia, where the humanitarian Code of Conduct is absolutely vital” (Int. 16).  The flip 
side of this is that the Code can also be used to deflect attention from what some perceive 
as necessary sectoral reforms.  As one of the founding figures noted:  “I think basically 
101 
 
 
it’s a kind of fig leaf that the agencies use.  Whenever I talk to chief executives of the 
agencies they say ‘Oh yes, we signed up to the Red Cross Code because it looks good and 
we get into the DEC” (Int. 27).  A similar point was made by an ICRC staffer who 
suggested that “a lot of people claim they work by the standards to make their action 
legitimate, and I’m not sure whether all those who claim they work by those standards 
actually do work by them” (Int. 36).  Walker himself has acknowledged that the Code has 
been used almost as a certificate of authenticity and competence.  Its very cautious 
language – “whenever possible,” “notwithstanding,” and “endeavor” – invited 
deregulation (Walker 2005: 332).  Hilhorst noted that such ambiguity reflects “real 
differences within the humanitarian NGO community about the distance maintained from 
government policy” and that this language provides room for maneuver for agencies with 
different approaches (Hilhorst 2005: 357). 
 
Conclusions 
In the final accounting, one should not overstate the Code of Conduct’s regulatory 
impact on day-to-day operations in organizations.  It is clear that, at best, the Code is one 
of many documents that organizations take into consideration in planning operations.  At 
the same time, it is equally apparent that the Code, as the first wide-ranging self-
regulatory initiative, has had a genuine impact on the fabric of humanitarianism.  In a 
very real way, signing the Code of Conduct has become a condition for entry into the 
field.  Debates about compliance aside, it is also evident that, for a large number of 
practitioners, the principles outlined in the Code encapsulate the core of humanitarian 
identity.  And, as subsequent chapters demonstrate, the precedent set by the Code 
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provided an ideational foundation for future quality and accountability initiatives, most 
notably for the Sphere Project. 
It is worth reflecting, in closing, on the very particular role played by the Code of 
Conduct in the constitution of humanitarianism as an organizational field.  Whereas 
Sphere, HAP International, and the Code of Conduct on Images and Messages in many 
ways take the field as a given, the Code of Conduct was, at least in part, field 
foundational.  That is to say, the drafting of the Code of Conduct was one in a set of 
events that called the humanitarian organizational field into being, specifically by 
clarifying its shared identity and demarcating its boundaries. 
In Chapter 2, I highlighted the tremendous growth of the humanitarian sector in 
the mid to late 1980s.  From an arena dominated by the ICRC and otherwise composed of 
small, amateur organizations, by the late 1980s, these players were increasing in size and 
number, flows of information and personnel were intensifying, and public attention was 
growing.  The Code was a response to these changes and a realization of them.  It started 
with the belief that there was such a thing as a “humanitarian community” that simply 
needed to be called into being, and it reflected both the enduring influence of the ICRC 
on the community and also the growing strength of large northern NGOs.  (Recall the 
early importance of NGO networks like the SCHR in the Code’s development).  Though 
the document that emerged lacked institutional support, it has nevertheless served as a 
focal point for subsequent efforts at rule-making and has gained a large measure of 
acceptance.  If the field has moved on to initiatives like Sphere, it is nonetheless true that 
these initiatives have been constructed on a foundation created by the Code of Conduct.  
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Ch. 4 – Good Intentions are Not Enough: The Sphere Project 
 
 
 The Code of Conduct signaled a high water mark in the golden era of 
humanitarianism, when rising aid budgets and post-Cold War optimism opened new 
avenues for action and intervention.
90
  This period of expansion came to a halt in 1994, 
with optimism becoming one of the many casualties of a Rwandan genocide that claimed 
as many as one million lives and forever altered the face of international peacekeeping 
operations.  More than any other event, Rwanda, and the response to it, crystallized the 
notion that good intentions could lead to bad outcomes and that humanitarians must 
advance further down the dual paths of regulation and reform. 
 Rwanda was a seminal event in a field that has historically been defined by major 
crises.  The genocide itself was followed by the large scale trans-border movement of 
850,000 refugees into the Goma, DRC area in the space of just five days in July 1994.  
While the humanitarian response to these events was unprecedented – 170 agencies 
registered to operate in the region and funding was $1.4 billion (IFRC 1997: 11-2) – 
humanitarians were also, in many ways, severely overmatched.  Approximately 50,000 
refugees died in the first month of the crisis from disease and violence, refugee camps 
were militarized, and the sector found itself unable to predict the mass movement of 
peoples.  Thus, despite some impressive results, post-intervention evaluations concluded 
that there were areas where “performance of the system was less impressive and the 
performance of some agencies was poor,” citing unprofessional and irresponsible 
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 For a number of commentators, the late 1980s and early 1990s were something of a humanitarian 
“golden era,” a period of straightforward crises with considerable space for independent operations (Rieff 
2002: 102; Vaux 2003: 43; cf. Magone et al. 2011). 
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behavior that wasted resources and “may also have contributed to an unnecessary loss of 
life” (RRN 1996: 10, 23; Eriksson 1996). 
 The most important post-intervention study was undoubtedly the Joint Evaluation 
of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR), an international process “unsurpassed in 
terms of its scope and scale, and arguably its impact” (Borton 2004).  Together with the 
genocide, the JEEAR stimulated considerable soul searching by the humanitarian sector 
and placed self-regulation front and center on the agenda (Shenoy et al. 2007 ; RRN 
1996: 23).  Rwanda, one of the Sphere drafters reflected, “was just cathartic.  I think 
everybody who was involved in it has images in their mind which just haunt them every 
day.  Images of the savagery that you saw, and images of our failure as individuals to 
really do enough” (Int. 15).  Four initiatives emerged in the aftermath of the Rwandan 
genocide:  ALNAP in 1996, the Sphere Project and the People In Aid Code in 1997, and 
the Humanitarian Ombudsman Project (later HAP) in 1999. 
 This chapter focuses on the Sphere Project, the largest of the post-Rwanda 
regulatory projects.  Sphere has received considerable attention since its founding – it has 
been called “the most ambitious attempt to improve performance and accountability 
across the humanitarian aid sector” (Buchanan-Smith 2002: 43) and a phenomenon 
“unique in the humanitarian world” (Walker and Purdin 2004: 110).  Previous studies 
have drawn a direct causal link between the JEEAR and Sphere, portraying the initiative 
as a response by the sector to donor pressures and the threat of external regulation.  My 
approach is different.  While acknowledging Rwanda’s singular impact on the drafting 
process, I place Sphere in broader trends, as an outgrowth of the standard-setting process 
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begun with the Code of Conduct.  Rwanda was a focal point; it crystallized concerns 
about sector growth, standards, and politicization that were first expressed with the Code.  
Thus, while Sphere was marked by Rwanda, it was more than a simple response to donor 
criticism, and its ambitions went beyond technical guidance. 
As in previous chapters, my focus is on self-regulation’s function in the 
humanitarian order.  I argue that, in the face of specific criticisms over Rwanda and a 
more generalized crisis of legitimacy in humanitarianism, aid workers used Sphere to 
cement a new conception of humanitarianism, one rooted in technical acumen, human 
rights, and professional norms.  This represented a fundamental shift from the 
volunteerism, amateurism, and good deeds by which humanitarian action was previously 
legitimized.  Thus, what was ostensibly a technical project was also fundamentally about 
generating a new kind of humanitarian practitioner, and the fierce contestations that 
ensued over Sphere reflected differing understandings of the bounds and nature of the 
humanitarian field. 
 This chapter unfolds in six sections.  Section I introduces the Sphere Project, 
identifying its institutional characteristics and mapping its evolution from a limited 
duration project into a permanent institution.  Section II looks at the Project’s origins.  
While acknowledging the importance of post-Rwanda donor pressure, I find that Sphere 
initially evolved out of a desire by leading humanitarians to advance the project of 
professionalization and standardization begun with the Code of Conduct.  Rwanda played 
a powerful supporting role by focusing attention on the issue of standards, bringing key 
players together in the JEEAR process, and crystallizing an almost existential feeling of 
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crisis.  Sphere, I argue in Sections III and IV, was not a neutral project to set technical 
standards.  Rather, it was contingent and political – it was a vehicle for shifting the bases 
of humanitarian action – and its creation was the subject of contestations between 
contrasting visions of humanitarianism, particularly between Sphere proponents and a 
group of largely French agencies.  Sections V and VI assess the impact of Sphere on the 
humanitarian field.  I find the Project and its standards to be widely used in practice, but 
also suggest that a full accounting of its use is difficult, and perhaps beside the point.  
Sphere’s greatest significance has been in drafting the rules of the humanitarian “game.”  
In concluding, I return to the question of accountability, raised by Sphere and continued 
with HAP International. 
 
Section I – Introducing Sphere 
Launched on July 1, 1997 by humanitarian NGOs and the Red Cross/ Red 
Crescent movement, the Sphere Project represents the first attempt to create globally 
applicable minimum standards for the provision of disaster relief (Gostelow 1999 ; 
Walker and Purdin 2004).  Sphere is based on the belief that, “first, that all possible steps 
should be taken to alleviate human suffering arising out of calamity and conflict, and 
second, that those affected by disaster have a right to life with dignity and therefore a 
right to assistance (Sphere Project 2004a: 5).  For most in the field, Sphere is 
synonymous with its handbook, the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in 
Humanitarian Response, which seeks to compile the combined knowledge of the sector 
in the area of disaster relief.  This knowledge is grouped thematically according to 
minimum standards, such as “Nutrition” or “Clothing and Bedding.”  Minimum standards 
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are intended to be universally applicable; they are supported by key actions, key 
indicators, and guidance notes, which are often context specific.  For instance, safe and 
equitable access to a sufficient quantity of water is a minimum standard; a key indicator 
notes that average water use by a household is 15 liters per person per day (Sphere 
Project 2011c: 97). 
The majority of the 393 page handbook is devoted to minimum standards.  The 
premise is that the handbook is a reference guide for best practices in an emergency 
response situation.  The handbook is prefaced the Humanitarian Charter, which enshrines 
agencies’ ethical obligations and is based in international law, human rights, and the 
RC/NGO Code of Conduct.  The Code is included as Appendix II. 
Unlike the Code of Conduct, Sphere was specifically created with an institutional 
focal point, housed at the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) in Geneva.  It 
consists of a Head Office and Board and is supported by a voluntary network of trainers 
and agencies.  The six staff at the Sphere Office disseminate information through the 
newsletter, website, and promotional materials; facilitate training through coordination 
and materials; and support translations and field deployments (Sphere Project 2010a).  
Though the Office lacks the ability for strong oversight – it is reliant on what people 
report back to it – the fact of having a focal point is seen by many as a crucial 
determinant to Sphere’s success as it keeps the Project alive and provides cohesion, 
continuity, and a sense of legitimacy (Int. 31, Int. 32, Int. 43, Int. 45).  An NGO 
representative put it thus:  “Sphere would peter out if there was no external impetus.  If 
there is no central point it will become everyone’s responsibility and then it won’t 
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happen.  You need to have ‘the person from Sphere’ to be available” (Sphere Project 
2004b: 41).  The Project is overseen by a Board, composed of 18 agencies and alliances, 
including some of the largest organizations in the world.
91
  The Sphere Board meets 
twice a year and is responsible for financial resources, strategic direction, and overall 
priorities (Sphere Project 2009b). 
In general, the institutional arrangements reflect priorities expressed in the 
Project’s 2004 consultations:  Sphere is independent of any one organization or donor, it 
is governed by a wide-ranging management committee, it has a central office with 
regional and national focal points, and funding comes from a mix of sources (Sphere 
Project 2004b: 10-11; 2004e ; 2004d; Int. 28). 
Unlike other initiatives I study, Sphere has neither signatories nor members.  
Consequently, there are neither membership nor reporting requirements; agencies that 
implement Sphere are making a voluntary commitment to increasing the quality of 
assistance and improving their accountability to donors and affected populations.  
However, enforcement has been an enduring subject of debate.  Though a compliance 
mechanism was initially envisioned, no consensus was reached, for reasons enumerated 
in Section V
92
 (Sphere Project 1997).  Thus, writes Peter Raynard, “one could argue that 
Sphere in itself is not an accountability mechanism but is rather a quality mechanism.  
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 The board, as of February 2012, includes Action by Churches Together (ACT) Alliance, Aktion 
Deutschland Hilft (ADH), CARE International, Caritas Internationalis, InterAction, International Council 
of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), 
International Medical Corps,  Dan Church Aid / Lutheran World Federation (LWF),  Office Africain pour 
le Développement et la Coopération, OXFAM International,  Plan International, Policy Action Group on 
Emergency Response (PAGER), RedR International, Save the Children Alliance, Sphere India, The 
Salvation Army, and World Vision International (WVI)(Sphere Project 2011f). 
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 If there is one upside to the absence of a compliance mechanism, it is that it has encouraged broad buy-in 
and local ownership (Int. 31, Int. 32). 
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This is because it has as yet no inherent mechanisms for reporting performance by the 
agencies, of monitoring compliance of performance, or of imposing sanctions for lack of 
compliance” (Raynard 2000: 13).  Sphere is hardly unique in this:  the Tsunami 
Evaluation Coalition noted that not one of the quality codes introduced post-Rwanda had 
any real enforcement mechanism (Shenoy et al. 2007). 
The Sphere Project has not remained static since its launch in 1997.  It was 
recognized early on that the handbook must be constantly updated to remain relevant as a 
“living document” (Sphere Project 2002 ; 2004b: 6, 26).  With each handbook revision, 
Sphere has widened its scope.  One of the early figures explains:  “What we had hoped 
was that we would start with the easy step and then when we got buy-in, the next round 
would be ‘Let’s build protection into this.’  In a sense that did happen” (Int. 15, Int. 31).  
The 2004 edition expanded to include food security and process standards.  Though the 
initial goal of the revision was consolidation, not expansion, rewrites ended up being 
more substantial than anticipated (Sphere Project 2004a ; 2007b: 4).  This was repeated in 
the most recent revisions, which began in May 2009; “the revision process revealed that a 
number of issues needed particular attention and significant changes” (Sphere Project 
2010e ; 2010b: 6).  Thus, the new handbook now includes emerging issues like risk 
reduction, climate change, and urban settings.  It increases attention to protection and 
education, both contested issues when Sphere was initially created.
93
  Finally, it 
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 Protection was identified as a “gap” during the drafting stages (Sphere Project 1998, 1999 ; Darcy 2004: 
115; see especially Young et al. 2004: 144).  As for education, prior to 2011, there was robust discussion 
over whether it should be included, but no consensus that it was essential to relief operations.  As a 
compromise, the Sphere team inaugurated the idea of ‘companion standards.’  These standards would be 
explicitly linked to the Charter and handbook, follow a Sphere-like consultation and field testing process, 
and use a compatible content, structure, and terminology.  In October 2008, the Inter-Agency Network for 
Education in Emergencies (INEE) Minimum Standards were accepted as the first Companion Standards to 
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reinforces linkages between Sphere and other Q&A initiatives (Sphere Project 2010c: 5; 
2010e; Int. 32). 
The fact that the Sphere office even exists must be seen as another evolution.  
Project staff note that Sphere was started as temporary; “the expectation was that it would 
all be institutionalized in a few years and there would be no need for the office” (Int. 31).  
Early documents also emphasized its limited duration.  In 2000, for instance, Sean 
Lowrie, Sphere’s Training Manager, commented that “the philosophy of the final phase is 
not to create a self-perpetuating bureaucracy, but methodically to reduce activities, with 
the goal that the handbook will become sustainably integrated into the humanitarian 
system” (Lowrie 2000: 13; Sphere Project 2001a, 2000a).  Consequently, the Project was 
organized in limited duration phases.  Phase I (1997-1998) yielded the preliminary 
Sphere handbook and Charter.  Phase II (1998-2000) focused on dissemination, debate, 
and implementation.  Phase III (2000-2003) featured a piloting program by 20 agencies, 
the development of a training program, and further dissemination. 
However, institutions have a way of enduring.  The Sphere Project Management 
Committee extended Stage III until 2004 to provide time for promotion and to finish 
country level piloting.  Following the extension, Sphere engaged in a widespread 
consultation process which found overwhelming support for the continuation of Sphere 
as long as necessary (Sphere Project 2004b: 9-14).  A Sphere staff member relates, “I 
think the organizations really understood that you need to have this central point, a focal 
point, as it were” (Int. 31).  On April 1, 2005, the Project became a permanent institution 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Sphere Handbook (Sphere Project and INEE 2009: 5-8; Sphere Project 2010c: 7-8; Walker and Purdin 
2004: 108-9; Int. 15, 31, 33). 
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and the Sphere Management Committee evolved into the Sphere Board (Int. 31, Int. 32).  
Thus, the Sphere Project is, in fact, no longer a project in the sense that it is no longer 
bound by limited duration phases. 
 
Section II – Origins: From the Code to Rwanda 
Sphere is generally portrayed as a direct response to public pressure following 
operations in Rwanda – specifically, as a response to the 1996 Joint Evaluation of 
Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR) and the increasing threat of regulation by 
state parties.  Rwanda is seen as a “turning point” for humanitarian organizations as it 
“increased the impetus to improve accountability within the humanitarian system as a 
whole” (Salama et al. 2001: 531; Van Dyke and Waldman 2004: 7).  This narrative is 
fairly consistent with the Accountability Club understanding of self-regulation:  facing 
pressure from principals (donors) to clean up their act, NGOs have strategically invested 
in quality initiatives to signal good practices (Gugerty and Prakash 2010). 
It is apparent that, following Rwanda, the aid atmosphere had started to shift; 
NGO claims to be doing good deeds were no longer sacrosanct and the threat of 
regulation was real.  I certainly learned in conversations with donors that they now 
actively promote standards and initiatives with “teeth” (Int. 55, Int. 56).  However, as 
Maryam Deloffre has noted, Sphere was not simply a strategic response to donor 
pressure; principled aims figured centrally in the drafting of the initiative (Deloffre 
2010).  I do not want to argue that Rwanda was not critical to the thinking of Sphere’s 
drafters.  However, I would caution against a simple cause and effect explanation for 
Sphere.  As I demonstrate in this section, Sphere was the product of a group of ideational 
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entrepreneurs pushing forward with a technical elaboration of the Code of Conduct.  
Rwanda’s significance was three-fold:  First, the experience of working on the JEEAR 
provided the template for a large scale, collaborative learning project and joined the team 
members together in a common mission.  Second, it gave increased incentive for 
cooperation – Rwanda furnished the political will that was absent from the Code.  Third, 
Rwanda, as an event, crystallized a set of impressions first voiced in the Code of 
Conduct:  the field was in crisis, a victim of its own successful growth; there was a 
desperate need for standards.  Rwanda was experienced as a crisis of legitimacy. 
The Joint Evaluation of Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR) 
was proposed by Denmark’s development cooperation agency, Danida, in September 
1994, just two months after the end of the genocide.  A broad-based process led by a 38-
member Steering Committee and supported by 52 researchers, it culminated in five 
reports published in March 1996, the third and longest of which addressed aid agencies 
(Borton 2004 ; RRN 1996 ; Eriksson 1996).  Though the report found that the key 
failings in the international community’s response “lay within the political, diplomatic 
and military domains rather than the humanitarian domain” (RRN 1996: 3), the 
evaluation of NGOs was strongly worded.  The most direct recommendation to NGOs, 
number 11, called for, first, self-managed regulation by which members would be 
monitored in their compliance with codes and standards, and, second, an international 
accreditation system (RRN 1996: 23-4; Shenoy et al. 2007).  It concluded that “the 
Rwanda experience indicates that it will not be enough to rely on voluntary adoption 
alone” (Eriksson 1996). 
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However, important as the joint donor evaluation was, Sphere’s drafters have 
always perceived Sphere as an essentially internally-driven initiative (Int. 15, 31, 43; 
Lowrie 2000: 13; Walker and Purdin 2004: 104).  The “Standards Project,” as it was then 
called, was first proposed by Peter Walker (IFRC) and Nick Stockton (Oxfam) in 
February 1996, prior to the publication of the JEEAR reports.  One of the Project’s 
impetuses was the perception that the professionalization process begun by the Code of 
Conduct had stalled.  As I noted in Chapter 3, the Code lacked an institutional focal point 
and measures to promote compliance.  It was also felt that organizations needed practical 
guidance on the Code and that more needed to be done to delineate state responsibilities 
in crisis situations.  Sphere thus emerged out of the Steering Committee for Humanitarian 
Response’s (SCHR) desire for a “practical expression of the Code of Conduct” (Int. 31) 
and a “technical elaboration of the code of conduct” (Walker and Purdin 2004 ; Sphere 
Project 2007b: 6; 1998). 
The first goal of the Sphere Project upon its launch was “to develop a 
humanitarian charter for people affected by disaster, in a style similar to the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement and NGO Code of Conduct” (Sphere Project 1997).  The 
Project thus draws an explicit line from the Code of Conduct to the Humanitarian 
Charter, and from the Charter to the Minimum Standards (Sphere Project 2010a).  The 
perception of integral links between Sphere and the Code is shared among NGO staff, 
who describe Sphere as “building on the fundamental principles that are articulated in the 
Code of Conduct” (Int. 17) and, “if anything, the Humanitarian Charter is just the Code 
restated” (Int. 25).  This is a clear example of the potential for codes of conduct to create 
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momentum for subsequent initiatives. 
Like each of the cases I study, Sphere also demonstrates the importance of a core 
group of ideational entrepreneurs in advancing self-regulation.  In the initial stages, the 
Project owed its success to the persistence of seven individuals representing seven of the 
largest aid agencies.
94
  Among them, Peter Walker was a key figure in the Code of 
Conduct and Nick Stockton would later lead HAP International.  Walker, Stockton, and 
their five co-collaborators had lengthy backgrounds in the sector and “understood and 
trusted each other, even if they did not always share the same views” (Walker and Purdin 
2004: 103).  That these people held positions of influence at major organizations was all 
the more crucial to their success.  The first management committee, composed of 20 
people from SCHR, InterAction, and later ICVA, VOICE, and the ICRC – the major 
networks of the humanitarian order – “became a close-knit group who all felt they had a 
personal stake in making the Sphere process work…  It was a coming together of like 
minds to tackle a common problem” (Walker and Purdin 2004: 106-7; Int. 15).  Staff at 
the Sphere Project reflected that “you had the right people in the right place at the right 
time.  Try to repeat it now?  It probably wouldn’t fly, because the dynamics are totally 
different” (Int. 31; also Int. 32). 
And so it was that, in February 1996, Stockton and Walker drafted a proposal to 
the SCHR called “Towards Quality and Accountability Standards in Humanitarian 
Relief.”  This became the Standards Project, later called Sphere (Walker and Purdin 
2004: 103).  The alliance of SCHR and InterAction was seen as critical as it gave Sphere 
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 Nick Stockton (Oxfam), Peter Hawkins (SCF), Peter Walker (IFRC), Miriam Lutz (ACT), Rebecca 
Larson (LWF), Karel Zelenka (Caritas Internationalis), and Graham Miller Ralph Hazleton (CARE 
International) formulated the first plans for the standards project and drove the process. 
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a foothold in the NGO centers of New York City and Washington, DC (Int. 32, Int. 15).  
Sphere was, and continues to be, a process unique in its breadth and consultativeness; one 
of the initial goals was that the Project achieve a high degree of ownership across the 
community (Sphere Project 1997, 2000a ; Freih 2000: 7; Gostelow 1999: 318).  It 
intentionally began with those who wanted to be a part of it and not those who should be 
a part.  One of the central figures called it a “coalition of the willing,” joking that 
“Rumsfeld stole it [the expression]!” (Int. 15). 
 
Figure 5 
Consider the handbook:  the first edition (2001) was the result of the efforts of 
641 individuals from 228 organizations (Sphere Project 1998 ; Walker and Purdin 2004: 
108).  With the second edition (2004), thousands of individuals in 80 countries 
representing more than 400 agencies participated in the process.  With the 2010 edition, 
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more than 650 experts from 300 organizations were involved (Sphere Project 2011b).  
The impact of the process is clearly apparent in interviews, as nearly to a person NGO 
staff spoke favorably of the “process,” “breadth of input,” “consensus,” and “respect” 
engendered (Int. 16, Int. 17, Int. 25, Int. 28).  Buy-in was also intended in funding 
arrangements – contributions initially came from 20 OECD countries, with USAID and 
ECHO as the largest donors (Walker and Purdin 2004: 107). 
None of this is intended to minimize the impact of Rwanda on the sector and on 
Sphere, but it does help to situate Sphere as part of a professionalizing project that dated 
to the Code of Conduct.  Rwanda played a pivotal role in the Project’s success.  First, the 
JEEAR provided a powerful example (and an experience) of a large scale, collaborative 
process.  Many Sphere drafters were involved in the Rwanda evaluation, sharing the 
experience of working together in a broad-reaching project (Walker and Purdin 2004: 
104).  “The Rwanda situation gave opportunity to all of these people to sit together and 
say, ‘Hey look, we’ve been talking about this for a long time.’  So it gave that forum” 
(Int. 31).  Sphere ultimately borrowed key aspects of the JEEAR approach, including the 
management committee concept and teams of researchers. 
Second, as accountability club scholars suggest, the evaluation gave the Project a 
strong boost, in part by raising the specter of external regulation of NGOs.  NGOs turned 
to the development of professional standards for reasons that include increasing public 
and donor scrutiny and their own growing dissatisfaction with their performance (Borton 
2004 ; Van Dyke and Waldman 2004: 21; Walker and Purdin 2004; Int. 34).  The 
shortcomings of agencies were more under the public spotlight than ever and agencies 
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increasingly realized that perceived wrongdoing by one agency could affect the 
reputation of the entire community (Buchanan-Smith 2002: 40; Sphere Project 1998 ; 
Freih 2000: 6).  The fallout from Rwanda helped create a sense of urgency within in the 
NGO community.  As one of the framers recounted: 
We basically said, ‘Look, if we don’t do something we’re going to have these 
major donors supplying standards and saying ‘you must comply to these 
standards’ or we’re going to have other people’s standards applied on us.’  And, 
actually, if we do this right, it’s a real opportunity for NGOs to – we could already 
see this trend of instrumentalization...  This is a chance to kick back (Int. 15; also 
Int. 27). 
 
Van Dyke and Waldman confirm this in their independent analysis of Sphere:  “there was 
a general consensus among those interviewed that this perceived pressure from the 
donors made it more urgent for the NGOs to develop their own set of standards – they 
preferred to regulate themselves rather than have regulation imposed” (2004: 21).  This 
impulse – to self-regulate in order to stave off external regulation – is noted in other 
accounts as well.
95
  However, as Nick Stockton has stated quite clearly, “the major 
donors have never driven Sphere” and Sphere’s governance has “deliberately excluded” 
the representatives of all bilateral and multilateral agencies (Stockton 2004: 3). 
Third, as I outline below, Rwanda crystallized for many in the field the perception 
that humanitarianism was in crisis amidst growth, competition, and increased 
politicization.  Sphere is fundamentally a response to a crisis of legitimacy in 
humanitarianism, namely the belief that good intentions are no longer sufficient as a basis 
for action and the realization that relief assistance can have both a positive and negative 
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 Several interviewees called Sphere a “response by NGOs to regulate themselves before they were 
regulated by donors” (Int. 33, Int. 15).  See also (Buchanan-Smith 2002: 45; Walker and Purdin 2004: 101; 
Gostelow 1999: 317). 
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impact on affected populations (Sphere Project 2004a: 12, 35).  The environment within 
which humanitarianism was embedded had shifted; the belief was that humanitarianism 
itself was at risk of being seen as illegitimate.  The IFRC writes: 
Increasingly, in the late 1990s, agencies working in emergencies have been 
battered by accusations of poor performance, and depicted as competitive 
corporate entities driven more by funding than humanitarian imperatives.  Aid 
stood accused of fuelling conflict.  Charity’s role was challenged.  The problem 
was less one of compassion fatigue as of compassion discredited (IFRC 1999 ; 
also IFRC 1996). 
 
As a Geneva-based sector veteran reflected, “the lack of legitimacy of the sector was an 
issue” (Int. 34; also Int. 45, Int. 53).  By 1997, this perceived crisis was evoked by the 
IFRC’s World Disasters Report, which referenced the “crisis in confidence” and “moral 
crisis” experienced by the sector (IFRC 1997: 9).  With Sphere, agencies started to focus, 
not just on motivations, but also on end results; the Sphere handbook places strong 
emphasis on the “do-no-harm” principle (Sphere Project 2010e). 
 
Section III – A New humanitarian order 
 
The Sphere Project was more than a simple reaction to donor criticism; it was also 
more than a technical “how to” guide.  Sphere’s technical guide, I find, was a vehicle for 
shifting the bases of legitimate humanitarian action, especially from understandings of 
the endeavor as volunteeristic and rooted in charity and good deeds. 
Sphere emerged out of a belief that good intentions were not sufficient as a basis 
for humanitarian action.  Training materials explain that “practices that have been carried 
out in the past are no longer enough” (Sphere Project 2008c: 10).  In the words of the first 
Training Manager, Sphere signifies that “the humanitarian community has matured since 
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the days of the stereotypical ‘aid cowboy’.  References to analysis, capacity-building and 
participation throughout the handbook reinforce this depth and maturity” (Lowrie 2000: 
12).  Notes George Weber, former Director General of the IFRC, “by offering assistance 
in an organised and pre-planned manner, which goes beyond the spontaneous compassion 
of the individual, we in effect accept the responsibility to disaster victims to behave and 
act in a professional manner” (Sphere Project 1998 ; also IFRC 1996: 7).  Sphere 
signified a re-casting of humanitarianism in two ways:  first, through the framework, 
based on a reformulating of humanitarianism as a professional, regulated, and technically 
proficient endeavor; second, in its ethical sources and justifications, derived from human 
rights and international law. 
First, as I have noted in earlier chapters, self-regulatory initiatives appear in a 
historical moment in which humanitarianism is shifting from an identity based in 
volunteerism and “doing good” to rule-guided professionalism.  Sphere’s Salama, 
Buzard, and Spiegel describe the move to develop standards for humanitarian response, 
of which Sphere is a major part, as “another positive step in making the humanitarian 
sector more professional and more effective” (Salama et al. 2001: 531; Int. 15).  Sphere is 
also described by itself and its proponents as rooted in professional trends (Sphere Project 
2001a ; 2008c: 5).  As George Weber, then Director General of the IFRC, noted in 1998:  
“This is new.  We have never had such a benchmark before” (Sphere Project 1998). 
The importance of professionalism and standards came out repeatedly in my 
interviews.  Sphere Project staff called the Rwanda evaluation “a shake to the system as a 
whole, and it put in evidence that there was a gap in professionalization” (Int. 32).  
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Another Sphere veteran described the Project as a “framework for professionalizing the 
sector” (Int. 33), and a veteran American practitioner emphasized the shift, led in part by 
Sphere, from old guard amateurism to new guard standards (Int. 43).  NGO staff 
commented similarly.  An Irish aid worker called it “an enormously useful framework for 
professionalizing our humanitarian response and moving away from the notion that good 
intentions are enough”96 (Int. 16) and a colleague spoke of the “general acceptance in the 
sector that we need to be professional” (Int. 17). 
Indeed, the Sphere handbook demonstrates just how much the humanitarian 
enterprise has shifted from ad hoc actions and [sought to] become rationalized and 
measurable.  Sphere’s claim is that without the qualitative and quantitative indicators, 
tools to measure impact, Sphere’s universal standards “would be little more than 
statements of good intent, difficult to put into practice” (Sphere Project 2004a: 8; 2001a).  
In the 2011 handbook, chapters on health action and water are especially data and 
measurement heavy.  They reflect a preoccupation with data, evaluation, and 
measurement, manifested in the idea that actions should be “based on the principle of 
evidence-based practice” (Sphere Project 2011c: 310). 
It is highly symbolic that a team of Sphere trainers and the Project office helped 
commemorate the 150th anniversary of the Red Cross Red Crescent movement at the site 
of the Battle of Solferino (Sphere Project 2010d: 13; 2010b: 17).  The act of 
commemorating the birth of modern humanitarianism by putting on a series of exercises 
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 He continues:  “That’s not to say that an amateuristic approach was necessarily a bad thing, but I would 
firmly believe that the professionalization of the sector can only be a good thing, particularly with regard to 
accountability, ensuring that funds are used, or that we get the most out of funds that we have, and ensuring 
that we reach the widest number of people in the most appropriate way” (Int. 16).  In other words, the 
amateur approach was not necessarily failing; the professional approach was seen as more acceptable. 
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with Sphere technical standards and key indicators is indicative of the shift in 
humanitarianism from Dunant’s simple moral compulsion to technique and 
professionalism. 
Second, Sphere was the first major initiative to openly advocate for a rights-based 
approach to humanitarian assistance.
97
  This reflected the concern that basic human rights 
of those in crisis and conflict are frequently not upheld (Sphere Project 2001a ; Walker 
and Purdin 2004: 105).  As one of the key figures noted, “we always thought about it in 
terms of entitlements – what should victims be entitled to expect in terms of competence 
from agencies?” (Int. 15)  Columbia University’s independent evaluation noted that this 
was an “important revision of the traditional basis of relief,” in that assistance is 
reformulated as an obligation, not as an act of kindness.  “Only assistance that allows 
those affected by disasters to re-establish a ‘life with dignity’ is acceptable; good-hearted 
generosity and charitable contributions may be necessary, but they are not necessarily 
sufficient” (Van Dyke and Waldman 2004: 4).  Thus, the evaluation continues, “to many 
of the framers of the Project, the adoption of a rights-based approach to humanitarian 
assistance represents a fundamental and drastic revision of the philosophy underlying 
emergency relief that prevailed prior to 1994” (Van Dyke and Waldman 2004: 7).  
Training materials underscore this philosophical shift by devoting entire segments to 
human rights and international law (Sphere Project 2008c: 8, 80-131).  In part, this was a 
system-wide acknowledgement that most humanitarian organizations are already doing 
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 Sphere claims that the rights based approach had “never been so explicitly stipulated” (Sphere Project 
1998).  International human rights law and refugee law deeply influenced the Project; the handbook itself 
was actually designed in consultation with HR specialists (Sphere Project 2003a, 2011c).  The Sphere 
Project describes itself as “putting rights into practice in disaster response” (Sphere Project 2010a, 2008c ; 
Young et al. 2004). 
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‘rights based’ work in their projects; indeed, Sphere’s 2004 consultations found 
significant support for this approach (Sphere Project 2004b: 10; 2008c: 125). 
The handbook is heavily influenced by human rights, from the Charter to the 
Standards.  Every chapter begins with a discussion linking the chapter theme to 
international law.  For instance, Chapter 2 of the 2011 handbook, on Water, Sanitation 
and Hygiene Promotion, asserts that “everyone has the right to water and sanitation” and 
that the right to water is “inextricably related to other human rights,” including the right 
to health, housing, and adequate food (83).  It notes that the standards in the chapter are 
not a full realization of the rights in question but contribute to their “progressive 
realisation” globally.  The handbook emphasizes its bases in international law, which is a 
claim to regulatory legitimacy. 
Thus, far from being a mere technical guide – a collection of uncontroversial 
humanitarian knowledge, as it were – Sphere represented an attempt to enact an altered 
humanitarian identity.  In the Sphere vision, humanitarianism has broken from its 
amateuristic, charitable past to embrace rules, professional standards, and human rights.  
Put differently, the technical guidelines are a vehicle for a constitutive project, for re-
defining humanitarianism.  This ambition is illustrated in the Project’s own publications 
over the years, including: 
 That Sphere has “the task to define a principled and practical framework for 
humanitarian action” (Sphere Project 1998); 
 That the Minimum Standards are “relevant to everyone with a legitimate claim to 
assistance in disaster situations” (Sphere Project 1999); 
 That “Sphere needs to continue to transform itself from a project into the core of 
civil society” (Sphere Project 2009d: 4); 
 And that the sector “adopt Sphere as its collective heritage” (Sphere Project 
2010c: 8). 
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In other words, Sphere’s intent has been to define the practice of humanitarianism itself.  
Thus, James Darcy writes that though Sphere provides some basis for judging agency 
performance, its “more important function is arguably to provide a basis for defining a 
common agenda and a set of criteria for gauging collective performance” (Darcy 2004: 
120).  It is a technical project, but a constitutive one as well. 
I have argued in previous chapters that self-regulation’s power arises from its 
potential to define the rules and the accepted knowledge of the humanitarian game.  
Indeed, Sphere seeks to become the very language of humanitarianism.  The Project and 
its proponents repeatedly claim that the handbook has “established a common 
language,… and thereby, has established a coherence and commonality of purpose, which 
transcends individual institutional, organisational, or national interests” (Sphere Project 
2001b ; Freih 2000: 7; Lowrie 2000: 11; Gostelow 1999: 322).  Says one NGO worker, 
Sphere “transcends language and communication barriers and facilitates working in 
multi-cultural environments” (Sphere Project 2009b: 5; Int. 45). 
The claim to represent humanitarian consensus and speak to universal standards is 
part and parcel of this.
98
  Sphere’s standards are described as “qualitative in nature, and 
are meant to be universal and applicable in any operating environment” (Sphere Project 
2004a: 8; Lowrie 2000: 12).  This was the ambition from the beginning.  In Phase II, 
Sphere stated:  “The Sphere Project believes that just as the human rights that underlie 
the standards are understood to be universal, so do the minimum standards themselves 
aspire to be universally applicable” and the Project sought to push agencies “towards 
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 Sphere claims to represent the “collective will and shared experience of a broad array of humanitarian 
actors” (Sphere Project 2011d, 1998). 
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using universal norms” (Sphere Project 1999).  So strong is the claim that the training 
materials even challenge participants to find minimum standards that are “NOT 
universal” in their handbooks (Sphere Project 2008c: 14). 
 
Section IV – Contesting Sphere 
 
If, post-Rwanda, the perception was generally shared across the field that 
something needed to be done to improve humanitarian response, it was by no means a 
foregone conclusion that the output would resemble the Sphere Project.  This section 
highlights the contingency of Sphere – the argument that it represents one possible 
articulation of humanitarian action – and explores the criticisms leveled by a set of 
largely francophone NGOs that objected both to specific aspects and to the Project’s 
broader philosophical framework.  What ensued was a battle over the meaning and 
direction of the field, waged through self-regulation. 
It is important that we recognize from the outset that differences over Sphere did 
not derive from an entirely different reading of the environment.  French agencies 
recognized that, to quote Diderot, “Il ne suffit pas de faire le bien, il faut le bien faire” 
(qtd. in Dufour et al. 2004: 124; also Int. 52); in other words, they too recognized that 
good intentions were not enough.  The experience of Rwanda was as apparent for them as 
for the Sphere drafters, but the objectives for reform were felt differently.  Nor would it 
be accurate to reduce the debates to a battle between amateurs and professionals, with 
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Groupe URD, and other French agencies cast in the 
role of amateurs.  As a HAP staffer assured me, MSF is quite professional and 
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accountable in its own way (Int. 11).  Rather, the debate was rooted in broader 
philosophical understandings about the nature and provision of humanitarian assistance. 
MSF participated in Phase I of Sphere, which compiled technical information, out 
of “our responsibility to transmit our technical experience” and with “a view to ensuring 
that these standards would be in line with our practices” (SanJuan 2003 ; Tong 2004 ; 
Sphere Project 1998).  However, it did so with clear reservations, and did not hesitate to 
defend its interests.  Most memorably, in 1998, the major French agencies sent a letter – 
the so-called “French letter” – threatening to derail the Project if language on 
accreditation remained in the handbook.
99
  Four years later, on October 11, 2002, MSF 
withdrew fully from Sphere (SanJuan 2003). 
MSF and Groupe URD were not the only groups concerned by Sphere, but they 
were certainly the most vocal.  Their concerns were not generally about the contents of 
the standards – French agencies had helped develop these – but about the philosophy 
behind Sphere, the broader significance of having technical guidelines, and the risks of 
political actors hijacking the standards.
100
 
The most widely and consistently voiced objection was that Sphere 
overemphasized technical proficiency to the detriment of humanitarian principles.  
MSF’s James Orbinski warned of the “risk that humanitarian action may simply become 
a technical and purely professional pursuit;” for MSF, humanitarian action is both 
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 This was recalled by key Sphere figures, who explained that “it actually got to the point where we had a 
letter from MSF saying if you leave those pages in – and InterAction saying – we will leave the coalition 
and we won’t fly.  This was brinksmanship, this was literally two days before the press release.  We said 
better 90% than nothing, so we took that stuff out” (Int. 15, 33; see also Walker and Purdin 2004: 109; 
Buchanan-Smith 2003).  A member of Groupe URD had a slightly different recollection:  a draft was 
presented that had never been seen before (Int. 52). 
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 (On the debates, see Hirsch 2008 ; Gostelow 1999: 319-21; Dufour et al. 2004: 126; Walker and Purdin 
2004: 106; Van Brabant 2000 ; Grünewald et al. 1999 ; Grünewald and de Geoffroy 2000). 
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medical action and temoignage, “and depends vitally on volunteerism and proximity” 
(qtd. in Sphere Project 1998).  Fiona Terry, another MSF veteran, noted that technical 
standards can shield individuals from attention to difficult ethical issues (Terry 2000: 20).  
As an MSF-France veteran put it, “the issue in Rwanda was not 2 liters of water; it was 
politics” (Int. 47; also Int. 52).  Others were concerned that the Humanitarian Charter was 
marginalized and principles neglected,
101
 that agencies emphasizing immeasurables like 
solidarity and compassion would be left out of funding, and there was no place for non-
action (Dufour et al. 2004: 127-8; SanJuan 2003 ; Hirsch 2008: 30; Tong 2004: 182). 
For the opponents of Sphere, the Standards were also seen as prescriptive and 
inattentive to context.
102
  One of the perceived shortcomings was that “main measures 
apply only to ideal situations in relief camps” and that standards impede adaptation in 
more complex situations, as such decisions require experience and professional acumen 
(Griekspoor and Collins 2001: 740-2; Dufour et al. 2004: 133).  In the words of an MSF-
Belgium staffer, MSF prefers a medical perspective to crises:  “diagnoses vary from 
situation to situation; every context is different” (Int. 58).  MSF thus has an “allergic 
reaction to this [Sphere’s] dogmatic framework.”  Similarly, for Groupe URD:  “We 
believe that there is no one-size-fits-all standards, there is no universal standards – that 
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 James Darcy, who led drafting of the Charter, has written that this line of critique rests on the 
presumption that the Charter is an afterthought.  Yet, he writes, “Sphere is clearly intended as more than a 
manual of good humanitarian practice” (Darcy 2004: 112-3; also Int. 57).  At the same time, there is 
evidence that, often, technique may trump values.  For instance, in Pakistan during the 2005 earthquake 
response, a UN official reported that “the colonels started stealing our lingo and quoting IASC policies and 
Sphere standards” but understood Sphere “as practical guidelines and standards, and not as humanitarian 
principles” (Sphere Project 2008a: 2).  Moreover, the 2004 Sphere external evaluation found that only 
14.1% of respondents used the words “rights” (or variants) to discuss Sphere’s purpose; most mentioned 
standards and indicators (Van Dyke and Waldman 2004: 32; also Int. 43). 
102
 Sphere repeatedly emphasizes that the handbook is not a ‘how to’ manual and that much depends on 
context (Sphere Project 2004a: 7; 2001a: 19; 1997).  Still, a Sphere proponent conceded that “Sphere has a 
tendency to be one-size-fits-all – there’s your minimum standards; attain them or you fail” (Int. 25). 
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doesn’t work…  I don’t use the same references if I’m in a cold, wet climate as if I’m in a 
dry, hot climate” (Int. 52).  Moreover, without a hierarchy of principles, the handbook 
fails to provide guidance on what to do in sub-optimal situations, meaning that almost 
any action could be justified (Terry 2000: 20; Tong 2004: 182-3). 
In addition, these agencies questioned the relationship of international law with 
Sphere.  Groupe URD’s Dufour et al suggested that the legal foundations of the Charter 
were weak and inconsistent and others feared that Sphere’s interpretation of international 
law had shifted ultimate responsibility to act from states to NGOs, and from NGOs to 
affected populations (Dufour et al. 2004: 127-8; Griekspoor and Collins 2001: 740; also 
Int. 47).  As Terry put it: 
It is not the NGOs that deliver Gatorade athlete’s drinks to Goma, drive a truck 
full of blankets to Bosnia, or even accept an armed escort to deliver food in Sierra 
Leone that pose the greatest problems to humanitarian operations today.  Rather, 
it is the indifference of powerful states to the plight of civilian populations in 
areas deemed outside their sphere of interest…  From Sphere, through the codes 
of conduct and finally to the Ombudsman, the onus of responsibility for assisting 
vulnerable people shifts from states to humanitarian organisations, and finally to 
the victims themselves (Terry 2000: 21). 
 
In fact, the French agencies feared that Sphere actually gave states a tool for the co-
option or control of legitimate humanitarian action (Terry 2000: 21; SanJuan 2003 ; Tong 
2004: 183; Grünewald et al. 1999).  As I note below, this has happened, to an extent, with 
funding requirements. 
Finally, critics charged that Sphere was created by Northern NGOs and “reflects 
the logic of certain industrialised countries…  The standards risk weakening aid agencies 
from the South and East in their capacity to find original responses to crises” (Dufour et 
al. 2004: 126).  Sphere’s priorities drive from a particular culture with specific values and 
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practices, essentially exemplifying “the concerns, priorities and values of technical 
professionals” ( : 136). 
Taken together, these critiques reflect deeper concerns over “the very foundation 
of Sphere’s approach” (Dufour et al. 2004: 127) and a certain ambivalence with rule-
making and codification, in general.
103
  As Groupe URD’s Dufour and her co-authors 
ask, are we seeing “professionalism at the cost of humanitarianism?” (Dufour et al. 2004: 
137).  These critiques imply a recognition of the social and normative aspects of Sphere:  
in defining practice, Sphere would, at least in part, define humanitarianism. 
What is the alternative to humanitarianism à la Sphere?  For MSF-UK’s Jacqui 
Tong, MSF’s objections derive from the different “philosophical underpinnings, different 
political and cultural origins and typologies of NGOs” (Tong 2004: 177).  Tong rejects 
the notion that all humanitarian organizations are the same and explains that MSF comes 
out of a Dunantist tradition that prioritizes independence from government, politics, and 
religion.  On the other hand, organizations that are Wilsonian and multi-mandated are 
amenable to work with governments and “inherently more willing and able to embrace 
the Sphere Project as it articulates rights that must be considered with project 
implementation and it incorporates aspects of developmental orthodoxy” (Tong 2004: 
179-80).  MSF and URD’s arguments “reflect the views of part of the humanitarian 
community which is equally rooted in the field and strongly inspired by the ideal of Henri 
Dunant” (Dufour et al. 2004: 125; see also Stoddard 2002 ; Barnett 2009).  This 
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 For Terry, of MSF-France, once principles are written down as rules, “they are no longer a tool of 
reflection, but become ends in themselves” (Terry 2000: 20).  Similarly, SanJuan feared that the Sphere 
Standards would come to “constitute a bible of pre-established norms to be respected at any price and in all 
circumstances” (SanJuan 2003). 
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exemplifies Bourdieu’s argument that competitors in a field often lay claim to 
representing its source and authentic nature (Bourdieu 1993: 74). 
This contest was not just rhetorical, confined to practitioner publications.  It also 
had real material consequences because it implied a shift in the relative values of 
particular types of capital – from conviction and contextualism to professionalism and 
rule-following.  Today, Sphere is very much accepted and expected by institutional 
donors, so there are significant costs to not signing on.  For instance, detailed use of the 
Sphere Project or Sphere-like standards is required in project proposals, such as for 
OFDA, DFID, and ECHO.  ECHO staffers confirmed that Sphere plays a significant role 
for the funding agency in proposal assessment and discussion and that it is held in high 
esteem.  Every ECHO expert has Sphere training (Int. 49, Int. 55, Int. 56).  The Disasters 
Emergency Committee (UK) also requires that its grantees adhere to the Sphere 
Standards and the Charter (Van Dyke and Waldman 2004: 54).  Sphere Project staff note 
that donors now “expect you to refer to Sphere and to unpack it, to be able to defend why 
you’re doing it, and when they’re doing their monitoring, when they’re doing their 
evaluation, they clearly take it up”104 (Int. 31). 
Sphere’s French opponents recognized the stakes:   Groupe URD’s 2000 annual 
report describes URD’s mobilisation against Sphere, the creation of the Projet Qualité 
initiative as a “political instrument” (“outil ‘politique’”) against Sphere, and the uphill 
battle against a Sphere Project that had “used our logistical weakness to lobby at the 
United Nations” (Groupe URD 2001: 6, 11).  A key URD figure recalled:  “It was a bit of 
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 At the same time, the Sphere Project has been very strong to push back from donors insisting that 
agencies use Sphere, which is why a lot of them specify ‘Sphere-like’ standards (Int. 33). 
130 
 
 
a lutte [struggle].  It was a lutte between two philosophical approaches and two scientific 
approaches” (Int. 52).  Indeed, URD’s own quality initiative, Projet Qualité, was created 
“in direct opposition to Sphere and the Ombudsman project” and emphasizes context and 
learning rather than accountability (Van Brabant 2000 ; Grünewald et al. 1999 ; Groupe 
URD 2001).  Since 2004, French agencies have largely operated outside of Sphere.
105
 
As a key Sphere figure recounted, “the debates were about positioning” (Int. 57).  
He suggested, as did others, that there was a good deal of “talking past each other” during 
this stage (Int. 57, Int. 15, Int. 53).  However, this does not mean that the critiques were 
without merit.  It is worth noting that the charge of Sphere’s “northern-ness” – which 
suggests that there is more than one possible humanitarian identity – has dogged the 
initiative from the beginning.  Sphere undoubtedly is a Northern initiative launched by 
the major NGOs, and there are certainly examples of it being imposed on Southern NGOs 
through partnership arrangements.  Sphere Project staff have acknowledged that the 
global governance of Sphere is a “stumbling block” because it is still regarded as being 
big Western organizations (Int. 31).  A former Sphere staffer called the board a “club of 
rich organizations who could afford to pay and afford to use the project in their 
organizations…  The board has become too insular, in my opinion” (Int. 33).  A British 
sector veteran suggested that: 
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 Sphere Project staff report engagement outside of MSF-France, noting that “other MSFs are more 
receptive until they come to the point of, how to say it – then they’re brought in line by MSF…  But again, 
I think with a lot of the MSFs and Médecins du Monde and others, they are facing Sphere every day in their 
day to day work, so informally it’s being used” (Int. 31, Int. 33).  Veterans of MSF-France and Belgium 
agreed:  “Of course we use it – it’s a useful tool” (Int. 47, Int. 58).  That said, the disparity between Anglo 
and French use of Sphere is reflected in handbook figures:  of the first 30,000 copies sold or distributed of 
the 2011 Handbook, 17,600 copies were in English compared to 2,800 in French; of handbook downloads, 
89% were in English compared to 4% in French (Int. 63). 
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[Sphere] has been used to some extent by big organizations with huge resources 
to crowd out small organizations…  It has done this partly by simply saying that 
there are these standards and frightening donors with the idea that if they go 
directly to some local organization, ‘Oh, these people won’t know what to do and 
won’t keep up to standard.’  So I think they kind of recreated the whole club 
thing.  There’s only a small group of really large organizations with these big 
resources…  Sphere, the trouble is, the rules apply to everyone – they were made 
up by a club, but then the rules apply to everyone else…  I suppose it also created 
a certain unfairness in that the big INGOs like Oxfam and so on would ultimately 
always use this argument that Sphere is a sort of ideal and if we didn’t reach it’s 
because the EU didn’t give us enough money.  Whereas if the local organizations 
didn’t provide 20 liters they’d be saying, well, this is because you’re incompetent 
[laughs] (Int. 27). 
 
Similar sentiments came up in other interviews as well.
106
  One can thus understand the 
initial fear by some that Sphere was an effort by the large NGOs to marginalize Southern 
NGOs or punish small and new NGOs “since many of them are (held) responsible for 
making a mess of the Great Lakes in ‘94” (Sphere Project 1998). 
 At the same time, from the beginning, Sphere has made a concerted effort to 
engage with Southern agencies and recognized the need to “demonstrate that the need for 
standards is universal, not just Anglo Saxon” (Sphere Project 2004b: 54; 2000a ; 2001a: 
18).  Even today one of the strategic objectives is to strengthen the diversity and regional 
balance of the Sphere governance and implementation (Sphere Project 1997, 2011d).  
Eight of the twenty initial pilot agencies were from the South and the pilot phase 
demonstrated, according to Sphere staff, that smaller organizations were actually better 
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 One Irish aid worker, asked about cartelization and Sphere, remarked:  “I think in sudden onset 
emergencies it’s not necessarily a bad thing.  I’ll be perfectly honest.  Because I think in a situation like the 
response to the tsunami or the response to Haiti, you need big, professionalized humanitarian agencies that 
are speaking to each other.  What you do not need are a plethora of smaller organizations heading off on the 
wrong foot…  I’ll be pretty blunt on that” (Int. 16).  Another staffer noted that in early responses, you need 
agencies acting according to predetermined standards; you don’t need inexperienced actors “arriving in 
Haiti having never been there before, not speaking the language, knowing nothing about it, with sixteen 
trucks of blankets, you know, and it’s baking hot.  And that happens” (Int. 17).  A former Sphere staffer 
added that the non-inclusion of the UN from the beginning opened it up to criticism that it was a cartel (Int. 
33; see also Smith 2005). 
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able to institutionalize Sphere Standards because it was easier to get everyone on board 
(Int. 32, Int. 31).  Active Sphere groups exist in Honduras, El Salvador, Bolivia, 
Indonesia, India, Pakistan, and Kenya and engage in trainings and spread of the Standards 
(Sphere Project 2010b: 5, 12).  A Catholic Relief Services veteran explained that, in her 
experience, “Sphere has actually empowered partner agencies,” by demystifying 
humanitarian assistance (Int. 43). 
Still, the charge of Northern-centrism is a point worth pursuing.  It suggests that, 
in real ways, control of Sphere, and hence over an important metric of humanitarian 
identity, has been in the hands of a group of large Northern NGOs and that simply adding 
Southern representation to a pre-constituted initiative does more to legitimize its mission 
than to challenge it.  Institutions are not neutral.  Moreover, large INGOs exercise 
considerable power when they incorporate the Sphere Standards into their partnership 
agreements with implementing organizations, as done by ActionAid International (Sphere 
Project 2007b: 6), Trócaire (Int. 16, Int. 17), and Concern (Int. 25), among many others.  
For Concern, for instance, Sphere is “predictive, and it’s prescribed.  If you’re going to 
work with Concern, if you’re going to be a true partner of Concern, and responding to 
emergencies is part of the mandate or brief, then Sphere would form part of the training” 
(Int. 25).  It is thus no accident that, early on, “despite the Sphere project’s cooperative, 
collaborative and consultative mission, to many in India and South Asia as a whole it 
remains an ‘outside’, ‘Western’ and ‘top-down’ idea” (Bhatt 2000: 15). 
 
Section V – Assessing the Project’s impact 
 
Compared to the Code of Conduct, which has only rarely been used in project 
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evaluations, Sphere’s clear technical indicators have lent themselves quite readily to post-
operations analysis.  Despite this, the question of Sphere’s practical impact has been 
difficult to resolve.  One reason is that most studies have been conducted by Sphere or by 
agencies as self-assessments.  The most extensive independent evaluation, conducted by 
Columbia University’s Van Dyke and Waldman in 2004,107 found it difficult to attribute 
characteristics of humanitarian assistance to the Sphere Project alone, given the nature of 
the sector.  As I discussed in Chapter 1, this is hardly unique to Sphere; the multivariate 
nature of humanitarian response often prevents a full accounting of impact.  Moreover, as 
the Columbia University study explains, the lack of before and after data makes a time 
based comparison impossible. 
Consequently, though I provide some compelling evidence of effectiveness, my 
focus is mostly on the extent to which Sphere – and the Sphere ethic – has been adopted 
by actors in the humanitarian field.  I find that Sphere has had a deep, if perhaps uneven, 
impact.  Figures on training, handbook distribution, and website access testify to its wide 
reach; interviews and document analysis confirms its popularity.  And, though concerns 
about compliance endure, I cite evidence of widespread adoption and institutionalization.  
As Van Dyke and Waldman found, “one of the most remarkable achievements of the 
Sphere Project is the degree to which it has penetrated and influenced humanitarian 
practice” (Van Dyke and Waldman 2004: 38-9).  Indeed, one of Sphere’s most 
fundamental impacts has been in defining the rules, practices, and governance of the 
humanitarian field. 
One indication of Sphere’s impact on the sector is undeniably the number of 
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 The study was based on 550 responses, 80 in-depth interviews, and two case studies. 
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actors and organizations actively involved in the Project.  The 2004 handbook revisions 
involved the active participation of over 400 agencies in 80 countries (Sphere Project 
2004a).  The 2011 revisions were equally consultative, with one of the Sphere Project 
staff joking that they were “a victim of our own success” inasmuch as everyone wanted 
to participate (Int. 31).  In the words of one of the initial figures, Sphere has “taken on a 
life of its own” (Int. 15); another called it a “self-moving project” (Int. 28).  The demand 
for training is a case in point:  with the handbook launch, Sphere anticipated holding two, 
perhaps three, trainings of trainers (ToTs) during Phase III (2000-3).  By January 2003, it 
had held seven ToTs and demand far outpaced supply
108
 (Sphere Project 2000a, 2001b).  
By mid-2007, 15 ToTs had been organized (Sphere Project 2007b: 16). 
Although ToTs are generally organized by the Sphere Office, the vast majority of 
all training in Sphere is conducted by other actors, particularly by NGOs and the Red 
Cross Red Crescent Movement.  In 2009, for instance, just 1% of all events were 
conducted by the Sphere Project (Sphere Project 2010d: 6).  This speaks to the enormous 
buy-in by the humanitarian community.  In 2005 alone, at least 439 training events were 
held, reaching over 5434 people (Sphere Project 2005).  In 2008, 423 Sphere training and 
learning activities took place in at least 73 countries on 5 continents with over 11,000 
participants (Sphere Project 2009c).  In 2009, 448 training events, including 7 ToTs, took 
place in 76 countries over 4 continents with over 9,000 participants (Sphere Project 
2010d: 4).  In 2010, 339 Sphere learning activities took place, on all five continents, 
reaching roughly 8,500 people (Sphere Project 2011e).  Trainings are critical for 
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 Over 120 applications were received for 30 participant slots in the first ToT (Sphere Project 2000a).  For 
subsequent ToTs, applications came in at 5x the available space (Sphere Project 2001b). 
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informing on the deeper sources of the handbook:  “After attending a training course, 
many reported that they ‘finally get it’.  What they get is, in fact, an appreciation for the 
rights-based approach and the particular concepts of humanitarian assistance that underlie 
the Sphere Project” (Van Dyke and Waldman 2004: 29).  Training, then, is also 
socialization into the Sphere way of thinking.
109
 
Sphere’s reach is also highlighted by the distribution of its handbook, the 
Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Relief.  Again, demand 
has far exceeded expectations.  The first English language print run (14,000 texts) in 
2000 was expected to last through the end of the year; after one year, 20,000 handbooks 
had been sold (Sphere Project 2000b, 2001b).  By November 2003, 33,000 copies of the 
first handbook had been sold, making it “undoubtedly the most popular and probably the 
widest distributed, basic text in humanitarian assistance” (Van Dyke and Waldman 2004: 
25; Sphere Project 2003b).  In fact, the Sphere handbook has been Oxfam Publishing’s 
highest ever seller (Sphere Project 2008b: 2).  More recently, between April and 
December 2011, almost 30,000 copies of the 2011 Handbook were sold, distributed, or 
reprinted; during this period, roughly 20,000 copies were also downloaded from the 
Sphere website
110
 (Int. 63).  In 2004, in Columbia University’s Sphere evaluation, 88% of 
the 550+ respondents reported having a handbook available to them and Sphere’s 2004 
consultations found that the handbook was widely regarded as the Project’s most valuable 
product (Van Dyke and Waldman 2004: 25; Sphere Project 2004b: 5).  Since the first 
edition, the Handbook has been translated into 43 different languages (Sphere Project 
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 A key figure recounted:  “Sphere became real through the training.  There was a huge appetite” (Int. 57). 
110
 The entire 2004 guide had been downloaded more than 51,000 times; individual chapters ranged from 
21,000 to nearly 28,000 downloads (as of 9 February 2011). 
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2011b), with the majority of these translations conducted spontaneously by NGOs. 
Finally, the Sphere website has continued to be a popular resource.  It debuted in 
1998 with a first month total of 114 hits; 10 months later, the monthly number had 
increased to over 10,000 (Sphere Project 1999).   During 2011, the site averaged 45,329 
monthly page views (Int. 63).  Though large gaps in data collection prevent a full analysis 
of trends, it is clear that the Sphere website has remained a popular portal for the 
community.
111
  This speaks to the linkage function played by Sphere in the field; one of 
the hallmarks of a mature organizational field is a high density of inter-organizational 
linkages and a steady flow of information. 
As these figures suggest, Sphere has been enormously popular in the sector.  In 
fact, the 2004 consultations found next to no support for halting the Project.
112
  
Unfortunately, since Sphere is not a membership organization, it is not possible to 
provide similar figures on institutionalization.  Such data as exists is more suggestive 
than definitive.  For instance, the 2004 Sphere evaluations found that nearly 2/3 of survey 
respondents had attended interagency meetings at which the Sphere standards and 
indicators were promoted.  Nearly two-thirds also reported changing their programming 
process in direct response to Sphere (Van Dyke and Waldman 2004: 24, 45).  Sphere 
reports that a number of agencies, including Lutheran World Federation, WVI, CARE, 
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 A Sphere Project staffer reported serious difficulties with the pre-2011 website (Int. 63), which is 
reflected in the lack of consistent website data over the years.  Consequently, it is impossible to draw grand 
conclusions from the data.  For instance, it is unclear whether the 232,000 hits Sphere reported in May 
2004, in the midst of Handbook revisions, was a high water mark or simply reflected different methodology 
(Sphere Project 2004c).  There is also no way of knowing whether “hit count” refers to page views or 
unique visitors. 
112
 Consultations in 2004 found overwhelming support for the continuation of the project in some form.  In 
fact, only 3 of over 400 participants (.75%) expressed a negative opinion towards Sphere (Sphere Project 
2004b: 5). 
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CRS, the British Red Cross, and Concern Universal, have taken major steps to 
institutionalize Sphere (Sphere Project 2010b: 7).  For instance, World Vision includes 
Sphere as a fixed component in all humanitarian staff trainings, uses its standards in 
response design and monitoring, and has even developed a Sphere Standards “pocket 
guide” (Sphere Project 2010b: 11; 2007b: 5, 10).  UN agencies also increasingly refer to 
the Sphere Standards and use them in project planning, implementation, and monitoring 
(Sphere Project 2010b: 8). 
I found evidence of institutionalization during my research visits to agency 
headquarters.  At Ireland’s Trócaire, a branch of Caritas, staffers were unreserved in their 
praise of Sphere; one called it an initiative that “goes far beyond the notion of cheap talk; 
I see the existence, the acceptance of, and the live nature of Sphere Standards as 
something that’s central to the work we do” (Int. 16).  At Concern, too, Sphere is 
absolutely “one of the key humanitarian codes” they follow; “it is embedded in the 
organization” (Int. 25).  Everyone who comes through Dublin is given an induction 
which includes Sphere; trainings are periodically carried out at the regional and country 
level, and standards are transmitted through partners.  “Sphere is a natural part of how we 
carry out emergency response…  [It] is part of our makeup now, part of our training, part 
of our culture…  Sphere is something that we have bought into completely as an 
organization and believe in” (Int. 25).  At the American Red Cross, Sphere is “so natural, 
so institutionalized, that it has become a part of the organization” (Int. 53).  Sphere is also 
“in the core” of Islamic Relief’s work (Int. 28).  Indeed, at the headquarters in 
Birmingham, I found that most humanitarian response staff had copies of the handbook 
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on their desks or easy access to an electronic copy.  As one of them commented, “it is 
like the Koran” (Int. 28).  Five departments have adopted Sphere into their working 
papers and standards and indicators are incorporated into assessment, proposal, and 
project evaluation phases (Sphere Project 2007a ; 2007b: 11). 
Now, the fact that tens of thousands of humanitarians have access to the handbook 
says little about whether it is used, staff at HAP pointed out.
113
  Sphere acknowledges 
that “many agencies claim to work ‘to Sphere standards’, by which they mean little more 
than observing the quantitative indicators in the Sphere Handbook. This poor adoption of 
Sphere has been exacerbated over the past decade by the entry of many new actors into 
the humanitarian arena” (Sphere Project 2011a).  A former Sphere Project staffer noted 
that “I don’t think you’d find anywhere in the world where you’d meet them [the 
standards]” (Int. 33).  This observation is borne out repeatedly by project evaluations.  
From CARE in Aceh to Fida in Uganda to MSF in Sudan to IDP camps in Pakistan, time 
and time again, analyses find that Sphere is, at best, partly met, even if most reports are 
positive in tone (see Smith 2005 ; Githinji-Ayieko 2008 ; Griekspoor and Collins 2001 ; 
Qayum et al. 2010).  Other studies have reported shortcomings elsewhere, such as in 
shelter and settlement planning (Sipus 2010), coordination among agencies and with 
governments (HAP and Project 2007), community participation (Sphere Project 2004b: 5; 
Van Dyke and Waldman 2004: 48), institutionalization at the field level (Sphere Project 
2004b: 9), and accountability (Buchanan-Smith 2002: 44; Raynard 2000). 
The reasons for this are complex.  One explanation is turnover:  one survey found 
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 “So you keep saying you’re signed up to Sphere, whatever signing up means; you’ve got copies of the 
handbook.  How do you make sure it’s used and it doesn’t just sit around?” (Int. 37, 36) 
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that 27 ToT grads out of 83 respondents had changed organizations since the time of their 
course (Sphere Project 2009c: 16; 2010d: 27).  Church World Service also reported that 
efforts were slowed in Pakistan as Sphere-supportive managers had left the organization 
(Wooster 2008: iii; also Int. 25, Int. 31, Int. 32, Int. 33, Int. 43).  Another explanation is 
capacity and the scope of field operations.  Several reports found that local staffers were 
not trained in Sphere prior to the onset of a crisis (Smith 2005 ; Sphere Project 2007a ; 
Hirsch 2008: 43).  These lags are often attributed to time or funding constraints (Sphere 
Project 1999 ; 2009d: 4; 2010d: 27; Van Dyke and Waldman 2004: 52-53; Wooster 2008: 
iii; Int. 31, Int. 32).  Moreover, it is often hard to determine compliance, given that many 
indicators, such as the question of levels of service between host and displaced 
populations, are not easily determined (Shenoy et al. 2007). 
A main reason has also undoubtedly been the inability of Sphere to integrate 
compliance mechanisms.  Sphere defines compliance as “the reflective and practical 
application of Sphere guiding principles (Humanitarian Charter), common standards and 
relevant technical standards, in a co-ordinated, sensitive and flexible manner, taking into 
consideration the context in which humanitarian assistance is delivered” (Shenoy et al. 
2007 ; Githinji-Ayieko 2008: 6).  However, though compliance mechanisms have been 
on the agenda since Sphere’s inception in 1997, when the Project “recognized that the 
creation of a handbook would not in itself lead to greater adherence to the Humanitarian 
Charter and Minimum Standards” (Freih 2000: 4), the fact that none have emerged says 
as much about the difficulties of gathering consensus across the large field as it does 
about the limits of self-managed regulation. 
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In 1997, Sphere envisioned a “system for responding to complaints of non-
compliance” and conducted research into compliance mechanisms in Phase II of the 
project (Sphere Project 1997, 1999, 1998); a follow-up paper was drafted in 2007 
(Shenoy et al. 2007).  The studies found room for joint, peer-based assessments and 
evaluations and recommended collaborative assessments and NGO accreditation (Freih 
2000).  However, by the Phase III proposals, there was a reduction in compliance talk 
(Sphere Project 2000a), and the 2004 independent evaluation concluded that despite calls 
for an NGO regulatory body, this was “unlikely to become the norm”114 (Van Dyke and 
Waldman 2004: 8).  Why was this? 
First and foremost, there was a lack of common ground on compliance from the 
earliest stages, as evidenced by comments documented at the Sphere Conference in 1998 
(Sphere Project 1998 ; Van Dyke and Waldman 2004: 22).  This was reflected in the 
consultations over the future of HAP International as well, which concluded that 
“consensus does not exist within the humanitarian community” regarding what standards 
to police and how to do so (Doane 2000: 19).  Freih, in a Sphere-commissioned 
compliance study, found neither the Sphere Management Committee nor the 
humanitarian community at large willing to engage in creating a complaint-handling 
mechanism specifically for Sphere
115
 (Freih 2000: 12).  Despite occasional calls for a 
mechanism, such as by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, it appears that mandatory 
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 This may have been part of a wider trend.  Peter Raynard recounts that accountability was very much on 
the agenda in the UK voluntary sector in the mid-1990s.  “However, by the end of the decade the debate 
had turned into one about ‘quality’ – accountability had strangely dropped from view” (Raynard 2000: 4). 
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 Around this time, Sean Lowrie, Phase II training manager, noted that the Project office had “no interest” 
in monitoring compliance (Lowrie 2000: 12).  Disclosure and monitoring raised concerns among agencies 
that they would be penalized for their transparency by an uninformed public and a sensationalist media 
(Freih 2000: 9). 
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compliance is off the table (Q&A Meeting Report 2007). 
Monitoring for compliance has remained decentralized and ad hoc.
116
  
Additionally, in the views of many in the field, responsibility for compliance has now 
shifted to HAP International.  This view found considerable support in interviews with 
Sphere, HAP, and NGO staff (Int. 11, Int. 15, Int. 16, Int. 26, Int. 27, Int. 36) and is 
discussed in greater detail elsewhere in my research.  As a former Sphere staffer put it, 
“there’s a very direct link between HAP and Sphere” as HAP took up the dropped 
discussion of an accountability mechanism (Int. 33).  In practice, a number of agencies 
are already using HAP as a means of pushing forward Sphere, as is the case at Concern 
and, in the likely future, Trócaire (Int. 16, Int. 26). 
Lack of accord aside, questions remain about whether Sphere is even enforceable, 
given that “the information contained in the handbook is not prescriptive.  It can be 
applied flexibly to other situations…” (Sphere Project 2004a: 6; Wooster 2008: iv).  We 
must also recognize that there are no strict timeframes and that agencies’ ability to 
achieve the Minimum Standards depends on numerous factors, many of which are out of 
their control, such as political situations and funding (see Sphere Project 2004a: 13-4). 
In practice, many agencies use Sphere.  Van Dyke and Waldman find:  “Among 
the strongest evidence of the success of Sphere is the high proportion of survey 
respondents who reported using the Handbook in the course of their humanitarian work.  
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 For instance, CARE has developed the Sphere Review Process for reviewing compliance (Smith 2005 ; 
Sphere Project 2009b ; 2007b: 17).  World Vision has recently organized Sphere review events in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Philippines, Zimbabwe, and Gaza (Sphere Project 2010d: 13).  In 
the UK, the DEC members are required to conduct external evaluations eight months after an appeal 
launch.  In the United States, Sphere standards and the Charter are included in InterAction’s PVO 
guidelines and agencies in disaster response must self-certify annually that they are in compliance with the 
PVO standard (Freih 2000: 10-4). 
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Incredibly, (although as has been pointed out, selection bias may affect this result), only 
forty-two of four hundred thirty-four (42/434, 9.7%) reported not using the Sphere 
Project guidelines” (Van Dyke and Waldman 2004: 32).  At the same time, even the most 
committed agencies advocate flexibility in approach and interpretation.  Concern, for 
instance, takes a ‘considerational approach’ to Sphere, seeing it as “aspirational,” and 
“something you aim for.”  In certain environments, the indicators are far out of reach, “so 
in those types of circumstances, we’re not even going to aim to meet the Sphere 
Standards – it’s not realizable.  So it’s getting that balance between what is realistic and 
what is fulfilling the key Sphere aspirations”117 (Int. 25).  Similar remarks were made by 
personnel at Islamic Relief (Int. 28) and have been reported in project evaluations 
(Sphere Project 2007b: 8-9; Van Dyke and Waldman 2004: 44).  Sphere also accepts that 
context needs to be taken into account (Int. 31). 
Though it is difficult to demonstrate systematic impact, there are still strong 
perceptions that Sphere has resulted in improvement.  The external evaluation in 2004 
found “overwhelming agreement that… the Sphere Project has had a positive impact on 
the quality of humanitarian aid” with only 4 out of 434 survey respondents responding 
that the impact was negative (Van Dyke and Waldman 2004: 43).  Interview subjects felt 
that Sphere “has had a much broader and deeper uptake than any other guideline” (Int. 
43, Int. 28) and that “inevitably it has had an impact, but we’re not able to demonstrate 
that” (Int. 17, Int. 50). 
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 At the same time, Concern believes strongly in Sphere; the humanitarian staffer I talked to was firm that 
“we are not flexible about Sphere – we’re flexible about the application of it” (Int. 25).  In this situation, to 
call Sphere aspirational does not mean that the organization stops working towards the goal. 
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Section VI – Sphere as language, rulebook 
 
The preceding analysis has demonstrated two things:  first, that Sphere enjoys 
enormous popularity across the humanitarian field – with exceptions noted; second, that 
while Sphere is widely used by organizations, full compliance with its technical 
guidelines is difficult to measure, perhaps impossible to achieve, and probably beside the 
point.  In many ways, full compliance has never even been a Sphere objective.
118
  The 
Project aims for continual improvement of practice, of course, but, as I have outlined, its 
goals are emphatically normative as well.  Thus, when Sphere outlines its 
accomplishments, it focuses attention on its ideational objectives.  For instance, it has 
“argued for the universal right of all disaster-affected people to humanitarian assistance,” 
achieved “consensus on key technical indicators,” and gained “agreement on core 
principles and actions” (Sphere Project 2008c: 55).  This underscores my argument that 
self-regulation is a vehicle for normative projects. 
In this final section, I return to themes developed earlier on Sphere’s function in 
humanitarianism’s symbolic and regulatory order.  Specifically, I look at Sphere as 
constituting a humanitarian language and rulebook and as a focal point for additional 
efforts at regulation.  To the extent that Sphere is widely used across the field, it can be 
said to fulfill these objectives. 
First, the widespread use of the Sphere handbook gives credence to Sphere’s 
claim to have created “a common language in which people can engage in issues of 
common concern in the humanitarian field” and achieved “a remarkable consensus” on 
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 The Project has “consciously opted for the Handbook not to be prescriptive or compliance-oriented, in 
order to encourage the broadest possible ownership of the Handbook” (Sphere Project 2011c: 8). 
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technical standards (Sphere Project 2004b: 53; 2008c: 11; 2004a: 6).  The wide-ranging 
consultations in 2004 found that the Sphere handbook has had real success in providing a 
common reference point and ‘language’ to facilitate coordination; it is a “common 
framework for the sector” (Sphere Project 2004b: 5, 26; Freih 2000; Int. 43, Int. 45).  I 
have already indicated that, according to the Sphere external evaluation, 90% of 
humanitarians report using Sphere.  This same study found that the Sphere Handbook has 
become “one of the few standard texts available to those seeking to learn about and to 
implement humanitarian interventions,” concluding that “the discourse surrounding 
humanitarian assistance has been profoundly influenced by its assistance” (Van Dyke and 
Waldman 2004: 57).  Moreover, in 2009, the InterAgency Standing Committee identified 
the Sphere standards as “the de facto standards in humanitarian response” (Sphere Project 
2011a).  This success is exemplified by the fact that by 2004, less than six years after its 
launch, the handbook was referenced by several hundred publications (Van Dyke and 
Waldman 2004: 57).  Is there any other set of guidelines that boasts such widespread use?  
Sphere is, in many ways, the rulebook for the humanitarian game.
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Sphere has also had a meaningful impact on humanitarian identity.  Sphere 
evolved out of a concern that the sector was growing, with too many organizations and 
not enough professionalism.
120
  It was hoped that its common standards would “prevent 
rogue NGOs from surviving” (Van Dyke and Waldman 2004: 44).  Sphere’s deeper 
impact thus lies in the attempt, and substantial realization, of  “chang[ing] the profession 
of emergency relief from one steeped in the principles of voluntarism and charity to one 
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 One sector veteran called it a form of “network power…  Setting standards, setting the rules of the game 
is a form of control, power, or imperialism” (Int. 34). 
120
 (Buchanan-Smith 2002: 45). 
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that includes, as part of its foundation, important elements derived from the disciplines of 
legal obligation and scientific rigor” (Ibid: 8-9).  One of the main innovations of Sphere 
has been its grounding of humanitarian practice in human rights.  In part influenced by 
the Sphere Project, many NGOs have adopted a rights-based approach – in principle, if 
not entirely in practice.
121
  Another innovation has been its support for technical 
proficiency and professionalism.  As a former Sphere staffer noted: 
The ideal situation is that a smaller organization can prove themselves to be more 
professional than the competition by demonstrating their ability to understand and 
want to use the standards, and thereby convince the donors.  The standards are a 
benchmark of professionalization and a way to demonstrate that this is what is 
considered to be internationally necessary to provide our service, and this is what 
we therefore need to be able to do that
122
 (Int. 33). 
 
As I found at Islamic Relief, Sphere demonstrates that the organization is a “legitimate” 
actor, something especially important for an agency that staffers note occupies a space 
between the West and the Arab world (Int. 28, Int. 30; Thaut et al. 2012). 
Finally, Sphere, like the Code of Conduct, has become a central thread in the 
field’s regulatory web.  The Sphere process, approach, structure, and terminology have 
been emulated by numerous other initiatives.  For instance, the Code of Good Practice for 
HIV/AIDS Project was influenced by Sphere’s worldwide consultation; Sphere has 
inspired the People First Impact Approach; is included in the Australian Council for 
International Development’s Code of Conduct; and was an inspiration for the Code of 
Conduct for NGOs in Ethiopia (Sphere Project 2003b, 2010b ; 2009e: 28; Freih 2000: 
note 26).  Sphere is also increasingly incorporated into other guides and manuals, such as 
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 Which underscores the importance of rights as legitimizing principles. 
122
 A WVI regional relief coordinator claims that “an agency that uses Sphere, and is perceived by others to 
faithfully try to apply its guidelines and norms, is one that more and more people will look to for providing 
assistance – a ‘go to NGO’ if I could put it that way” (Sphere Project 2009b: 3). 
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the UN nutrition Cluster capacity building initiative, Episurveyor, a mobile phone data 
collection system, and, together with People In Aid and HAP, the Emergency Capacity 
Building Project (Sphere Project 2009c: 9; 2010b: 18; 2009e: 19). 
In addition, Sphere has become the focal point in a network of standards called 
“companion standards,” which build on and support the Sphere standards.  The INEE 
Minimum Standards for Education in Emergencies, Chronic Crises and Early Recovery 
became Sphere’s first companion standards in October 2008.  INEE was influenced by 
Sphere’s experience and “built on and improved the Sphere process” with local 
consultations at the school level and national and regional consultations (Int. 33, Int. 46).  
Sphere and INEE now have a formal relationship, similar icons, and cross-referenced 
handbooks.  They have also formalized training linkages and strengthened advocacy, 
promotion, and communication (Sphere Project and INEE 2009: 8-9).  The 
companionship process has continued with the Livestock Emergency Guidelines and 
Standards (LEGS) Project and the Minimum Standards for Economic Recovery after 
Crisis of the Small Enterprise Education and Promotion (SEEP) Network (Sphere Project 
2010b ; 2010c: 7-8).   
The 2011 handbook signifies the increasing coherence of the web, including 
increased reference to education, as per the companionship agreement with the INEE 
Minimum Standards, and the addition of aid worker performance as one of six core 
standards, thus linking Sphere to People In Aid and HAP benchmark 2 (Sphere Project 
2010e).  Moreover, Sphere and eight other humanitarian quality and accountability 
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initiatives
123
 meet regularly and “have a shared vision regarding the ethical responsibility 
of humanitarian agencies to respect the dignity of people affected by disasters and to 
provide quality assistance” (Sphere Project 2009b: 10; 2009e: 19).  HAP and Sphere, 
especially, have demonstrated a firm commitment to working together, as evidenced by 
joint deployments, including in Pakistan (2005) and Myanmar (2008)(Sphere Project 
2010b ; 2009a: 3-5; HAP and Project 2007 ; Lloyd 2008).  A HAP staffer emphasized 
that “there is a lot of coordination between ourselves and Sphere” and that the initiatives 
share many members
124
 (Int. 11).  Though there are still significant differences between 
the initiatives and gaps in cooperation, such as will be explored in Chapter 5, it is a 
significant development that they are working together to articulate a joint vision. 
Sphere is used in development programs as well, though this was not the original 
intention (Van Dyke and Waldman 2004: 47).  Now, “the position from the board and the 
Sphere Project has been, well, the standards are not for development work, but in practice 
they are used” (Int. 32).  Given the ‘vacuum’ of standards on the development side, 
Sphere is often the most readily available document for guidance.  This trend may only 
increase with the companion arrangement between INEE and Sphere as it moves thinking 
beyond immediate response to include risk reduction and reconstruction (Sphere Project 
and INEE 2009: 9).  Sphere’s use in development is an example of how innovations in 
one field may diffuse into cognate fields. 
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 ALNAP, Coordination SUD, ECB, INEE, Groupe URD, HAP International, and People in Aid.  The 
Q&A group has created a dialogue among initiatives, but remains unclear on its objectives (Int. 46, Int. 52). 
124
 The HAP Standard and the INEE Minimum Standards were reviewed at the same time as the Sphere 
Handbook.  Reciprocal engagement by staff in the revision processes was intended to increase 
complementarity and reduce overlap.  There is also mutual representation in the respective revision 
structures between HAP and Sphere (Sphere Project 2011a ; 2009a: 2). 
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Sphere has also become a platform for engaging with donors.  One of the 
functions of self-regulation is that it provides a set of easily referenced standards for use 
in advocating for more resources; in fact, Sphere was intended as an advocacy tool 
(Sphere Project 2008c: 62; 1998 ; Freih 2000: 6).  Advocacy remains very much on the 
agenda in the 2010-2012 Sphere Program Summary (Sphere Project 2010c: 15-16).  
While it is difficult to assess in any systematic way how widespread or successful NGOs 
have been in lobbying with Sphere, in interviews, the topic came up, usually unprompted.  
Trócaire, for instance, finds the principles “an enormously useful tool to advocate around 
because we have a structure there to pin our arguments on” (Int. 16).  For CRS, too, 
Sphere is “something we can grab onto to have a conversation with donors” (Int. 45).  
The 2004 Project Evaluation found that 23.3% of respondents reported that using Sphere 
had increased funding compared to only 2.8% citing decreased funding (Van Dyke and 
Waldman 2004: 56).  Sphere materials cite examples of successful lobbying for more 
camp space, Sphere integration in government response plans, and awareness of 
humanitarian principles (Sphere Project 2001a: 13; 2009e: 10; 2010d: 18; 2009b). 
 
Conclusions 
Sphere, like the Code of Conduct before it, was an attempt by a group of 
humanitarian practitioners to develop standards for proper humanitarian conduct.  
Though deeply influenced by the humanitarian response to Rwanda, I have demonstrated 
that Sphere was not simply a reaction to increasing donor pressures.  The Rwanda 
experience focused the field’s attention on the issue of self-regulation; it furnished 
political will for what was, in many ways, an effort to forge ahead with a standards-
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setting process begun with the Code of Conduct.  These standards were part of an 
ambitious attempt to create a process and consensus behind reconfiguring humanitarian 
action as rights-based and technically focused.  Self-regulation, then, was a means for 
creating changes in the organization of the humanitarian field, for shifting the basis of 
action from amateurism and volunteerism to technique and professionalism.  The 
contestations of the Sphere Project by a set of French agencies underlines just how 
contingent and political the codification process is. 
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Chapter 5 – HAP International and the Accountable Humanitarian 
 
One of the most dramatic recent developments in global humanitarianism has 
been the increase in discourses and practices related to accountability – the holding to 
account of one party by another.  In humanitarianism, the “accountability revolution” has 
been propelled by events like the Rwandan genocide, donor and public concerns over the 
use of funds, the influence of corporate accountability techniques, and trends towards 
professionalization.  As a result, humanitarian NGOs today are often extremely 
accountable to the large institutional donors that fund their missions (Bendell 2006 ; 
Lawday 2006).  However, an increase in donor, or “upward,” accountability has only 
rarely translated into an increase in accountability to the populations that receive aid.
125
  
Consequently, the accountability revolution is only partially realized. 
As some in the field now recognize, the “accountability gap” – the attention to 
financial accountability and simultaneous inattention to the voices of beneficiaries – is 
characteristic of a profound power disequilibrium between large northern NGOs and the 
often destitute populations they serve.  As a staffer at the Humanitarian Accountability 
Partnership (HAP) International framed it, “many of the worst excesses in relief 
operations relate to the abuse of power” (Int. 36).  For proponents of beneficiary (or 
“downward”) accountability, then, being responsive to local populations is inextricably 
linked to fulfilling core values like humanity and empowerment.  This chapter addresses 
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 As Andrew Lawday writes, “there was indeed an accountability revolution after Rwanda, but it was a 
revolution in accountability to donors, not to beneficiaries.  The sector became professionalised, results-
based management replaced good intentions and codes and charters were introduced.  None of this, 
however, led to meaningful changes in accountability to beneficiaries” (Lawday 2006 ; see also HAP 
2006c: 16). 
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debates over humanitarian accountability through an analysis of HAP International, the 
most prominent voice for beneficiary accountability, and its predecessor, the 
Humanitarian Ombudsman (HO) Project. 
I find that HAP International, while offering a genuinely transformative approach 
to accountability, has nonetheless struggled until recently to gain a significant following 
outside of its core group of supporters.  Compared to the Sphere Project, which also came 
out of Rwanda and with which it shared key figures, HAP’s early existence has been 
fraught.  While Sphere has evolved into the largest humanitarian self-regulatory 
initiative, HAP’s membership numbers have lagged far behind expectations and the 
initiative has been subject to sharp criticism from various directions.  Like Sphere, this 
includes opposition from French agencies, but, unlike Sphere, also includes wariness 
from established Anglo organizations (even, at times, from Sphere itself) and numerous 
internal divisions.  As a Board member put it, HAP’s existence has been “turbulent” (Int. 
64).  Given the similar circumstances from which HAP and Sphere emerged, how do we 
account for these different trajectories? 
One explanation is that HAP is a certification initiative with third party 
verification.  Thus, unlike Sphere, it imposes real reputational costs on its members.  Of 
the three types of self-regulatory initiatives – including principles-based codes, such as 
the Red Cross Code of Conduct, and technical standards, such as the Sphere Project – 
certification initiatives are the most stringently enforced (Lloyd and de las Casas 2006 ; 
Davis 2007).  This means that HAP most closely resembles a “strong accountability club” 
with the high bar it sets for membership.  Recall that, for accountability club scholars, 
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strong clubs tend to be smaller in size, precisely because they impose costs on non-
compliance (Bowman 2010 ; Tschirhart 2010).  Indeed, I find that certification has been 
extremely controversial among HAP members and the humanitarian community, for 
reasons which include fear of sanctions, but also include different perspectives on how 
best to achieve accountability, on the direction of the initiative, and on the feasibility of 
regulation in crisis response situations.  Fear of enforcement is only part of the story.
126
 
To understand the turbulent existence of HAP requires an in-depth tracing of the 
ideas that motivated its creation and the context in which it emerged.  Though HAP is a 
strong club, its history does not match the expectations of rationalist approaches like the 
accountability club framework, which understands self-regulation as a strategic response 
to external pressure from principals (donors and the public) and predicts competition 
among initiatives over market share and members.  Even in the case of HAP, where 
external pressure for accountability has been quite prominent, I find that the single most 
salient variable is identity:  ideational entrepreneurs created the Ombudsman, then HAP, 
in response to a crisis of legitimacy post-Rwanda; the decision to pursue certification 
reflected the beliefs and experiences of its founders, who preferred a strict, pure approach 
to one that compromised on core principles to achieve mass membership. 
 With HAP International, the motivations for, and subsequent contestations over, 
self-regulation derive primarily from different understandings of the proper practice of 
humanitarian action.  I highlight two major themes.  First, from HAP’s roots in the 
                                                 
126
 People In Aid (PIA), another post-Rwanda Q&A initiative, also promotes certification, but has a 
considerably wider reach.  As a HAP Board member noted, it has also not been plagued by as many 
internal divisions (Int. 64).  PIA’s membership, as of April 2012, was 181, compared to HAP’s 84 
members. 
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Ombudsman Project to the present, the humanitarian community has been deeply divided 
over the question of accountability.  Despite general acceptance that organizations must 
be more accountable to the populations they serve, there has never been consensus on 
how this is to be achieved.  I identify important disjunctures between HAP and the 
Ombudsman over matters of approach and between HAP and French agencies over basic 
questions of regulation.  For HAP, accountability has become synonymous with 
certification; for others, this link is not so apparent.  Second, HAP’s role in the 
humanitarian field has been contested, in part because of HAP’s own combative 
approach.  HAP and Sphere have had an ambivalent relationship, owing to their different 
approaches to humanitarian reform, and HAP itself has been riven by divisions among its 
Secretariat, Board, and membership.  These tensions relate to HAP’s own organizational 
identity – specifically, a deep belief that the humanitarian system must change – and 
related questions of personality and leadership. 
 These themes are explored in each of this chapter’s six sections.  The first section 
provides an overview of HAP International’s governance and approach to accountability, 
with emphasis on the certification process.  The second section details the origins of the 
initiative in the aftermath of Rwanda:  born as the Humanitarian Ombudsman Project in 
1997, the initiative evolved out of a deeply principled critique of the failures of the 
humanitarian system in Rwanda.  In Sections III and IV, I discuss the Project’s difficult 
birth and portray the transition from the Ombudsman to HAP as a turning point in the 
approach to beneficiary accountability.  I consider HAP’s committed advocacy of 
certification in the absence of systematic evidence of effectiveness and against the desires 
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of some of its largest members, relating this strategy to the initiative’s guiding principles.  
Sections V and VI assess the role of HAP International in the humanitarian field by 
analyzing its relationship with other humanitarian players, including MSF and the Sphere 
Project, and exploring the identity of the initiative.  In concluding, I assess HAP’s impact 
on the field and the increasing acceptance of beneficiary accountability. 
 
Section I – HAP International and certification 
Founded in Geneva in 2003, the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) 
International is the most current instantiation of a post-Rwanda project to explore 
accountability mechanisms in humanitarianism.  HAP seeks to increase accountability to 
beneficiaries through organizational change, namely through the promotion of a quality 
management framework and certification in the HAP Standard.  HAP has the distinction 
of being the only major humanitarian initiative focused explicitly on accountability and, 
with People In Aid (PIA), is one of only two field-wide initiatives promoting third party 
certification. 
HAP’s vision for the field is captured by the HAP 2010 Standard in 
Accountability and Quality Management.  The Standard’s six benchmarks are intended to 
promote a culture of accountability within organizations and the inclusion of 
beneficiaries at all stages of the program cycle.  The benchmarks are:  1. Establishing and 
delivering on commitments; 2. Staff competency; 3. Sharing information; 4. 
Participation; 5. Handling complaints; and 6. Learning and continual improvement (HAP 
2010d, 2007c).  These benchmarks are directly and explicitly targeted at intra-
organizational processes.  Thus, the HAP approach is immediately distinct from an 
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initiative like the Sphere Project, which sets response standards but leaves it to individual 
agencies to determine how these standards are to be achieved. 
In practice, the HAP approach can be boiled down to three words:  “talk to us.”  
HAP’s argument is that “humanitarian programmes will be delivered more effectively; 
saving more lives; and improving the quality of more people’s lives; if their intended 
beneficiaries participate in all stages of the programme cycle” (HAP 2010f: 7).  For 
instance, during the Cyclone Nargis response in 2007-8, CARE-Bangladesh established 
complaints boxes, receiving over 3,000 complaints.  Local leaders commented that it was 
“the first time that they had seen an international organisation pay attention to complaints 
made by beneficiaries and take appropriate action.  They added that this improved 
transparency and their confidence in working with CARE-B” (qtd. in HAP 2009c: 51; see 
also HAP 2011e: 120).  As this example demonstrates, beneficiary feedback – both 
positive (consultation) and negative (complaints) – is central to achieving accountability 
and deeply enshrined in the Standard. 
The Standard was the product of an extensive, Sphere-like process of inclusion, 
global coverage, and voluntary participation (HAP 2008c: 228-9).  The 2010 Standard 
included 1900 individuals in 56 countries; it built on the work of the original 2007 
Standard, which was developed by 232 individuals representing agencies, donors, and 
disaster survivors (HAP 2011b: 9).  Though the two editions are largely compatible, this 
chapter predominantly references the HAP 2010 Standard.  Relative to the 2007 edition, 
the 2010 Standard is wider in scope:  it covers development and advocacy, as well as 
humanitarianism; it has sections on financial accountability and sexual exploitation; it 
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increases coherence with other Q&A systems; and it includes standards for working with 
partners (HAP 2011e: 16; 2010b: 12). 
Institutionally, HAP comprises three bodies, plus committees and working groups 
(HAP 2008d).  The General Assembly (GA), the largest body, includes full and associate 
member organizations and Board members.  The GA has few allotted functions beyond 
reviewing HAP’s operations and principles and electing Board members.127  The Board is 
composed of elected representatives of full members, 12 in all, of which one third must 
be independent.  The Board meets twice a year and takes responsibility for HAP’s 
strategic direction, including reviewing the budget and membership applications.
128
  
Finally, the Executive, or Secretariat, is headed by a Board-appointed Executive Director.  
The Secretariat is responsible for developing and maintaining the principles of 
accountability through research, consultation, and collaboration; training and support; 
monitoring and advocacy of accountability; monitoring and reporting on implementation 
of HAP’s principles; and assisting members as they address concerns or complaints.  
HAP’s Secretariat is similar to the Sphere Project Office in its material support role.129  
The Secretariat is the public face of the initiative and oversees day-to-day operations. 
As of April 2012, HAP has 84 member agencies, including 66 full members, of 
which 13 are HAP certified.  There are three categories of members.  Full members are 
those humanitarian organizations whose core activities include operational relief and 
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 As was noted at the first Board meeting:  “It is difficult at this stage to identify a meaningful role for the 
General Assembly.  It elects the Board members, but somehow it is cut from the center of discussion” 
(HAP 2003b: 3). 
128
 The finding of independent board members and ensuring broad geographical representation has been a 
perpetual difficulty for HAP (HAP 2004a: 3; 2004c, 2005, 2007b, 2008b, 2010a). 
129
 For instance, in Haiti in 2010, a joint HAP and Sphere team delivered 15 training workshops for 260 
staff from 39 organizations (HAP 2011e: 16).  HAP also maintains a website, which averaged up to 16,700 
visitors per month, on average, in 2010 (HAP 2011b: 29). 
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humanitarian assistance, are legally recognized as non-profit, and meet requirements for 
financial accountability.  HAP’s 66 full members include some of the largest and best-
known international NGOs, such as Oxfam GB, World Vision International, and Save the 
Children UK, as well as many smaller NGOs.  In fact, two thirds of these members are 
Southern NGOs (Int. 64).  Associate members do not meet eligibility requirements to be a 
full member but act in ways consistent with and supportive of the vision, purposes, and 
objectives of HAP.  These comprise non-operational organizations and networks, 
including the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC), Transparency International 
(Germany), and People In Aid (PIA).  Regardless of type, all members commit to “being 
accountable for their actions and decisions in so far as these affect their humanitarian 
work, and in accordance with the principles for humanitarian action” (HAP 2007c: 8).  
This includes a commitment to self-monitoring and self-reporting, following up 
complaints, monitoring by HAP International, and peer review, as agreed (HAP 2008d). 
Certified members are those full members that have been assessed for compliance 
with the HAP Standard by an independent audit.  To achieve certification, an 
organization must meet the 6 benchmarks and 19 requirements in the HAP Standard, 
including developing an accountability framework (accountability and quality 
commitments specified by the organization), a Quality Management System (processes 
used by the organization to achieve commitments), and Quality of Service (defined by 
stakeholders, including disaster survivors).  The total process, from membership to 
certification, including field and office visits, takes around 9 months
130
 (Int. 11).  
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 The first stage is the decision, at which point HAP ensures that the agency is on board.  Next is 
preparation, during which an agency prepares its Humanitarian Accountability Framework and its 
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Certification covers a three-year period subject to compliance verification and mid-term 
monitoring.  Although only 13 of 66 full members have achieved certification, another 16 
full members, as well as a number of non-members, have undertaken a benchmark 
analysis.
131
  Certified members tend to be smaller to mid-sized and include such agencies 
as Concern (Ireland), Mercy Malaysia, and DanChurchAid (Denmark).  The HAP 
Secretariat currently conducts certification; its vision is to accredit other bodies to do the 
certification (Int. 10). 
HAP is thus part of a select group of Q&A initiatives that have the power to 
sanction their members, including by revoking membership for non-compliance.  
However, as one London-based practitioner noted, this aspect is still “a bit aspirational” 
(Int. 29).  This is because HAP has never had to sanction a member, though HAP staff 
recalled one case that had precipitated such discussions (Int. 10, Int. 36, Int. 37).  As I 
discuss in Section IV, HAP’s identity has internalized the belief that it is the most 
rigorous humanitarian Q&A initiative.  One staffer reflected:  “I think that it’s the best 
show that the industry has come up with to really make significant change that could 
stick because of the system that we’ve set up” (Int. 37).  Certification, I was told 
repeatedly, is what makes HAP “fresh” and “unique” (Int. 11, Int. 36). 
Despite – or, perhaps, because of – the freshness of its approach, HAP has faced 
consistent obstacles to its development, which I explore in subsequent sections.  HAP has 
                                                                                                                                                 
Humanitarian Quality Management System.  This is followed by the Baseline Analysis, including a visit by 
HAP to the head office and field site and a report, and a subsequent period of Improvement, during which 
HAP provides consultation and support as the organization addresses corrective actions that arose in the 
baseline.  The final stage is the Audit of the head office and field site, which culminates in Certification 
(Munn 2008). 
131
 In 2008, both UNHCR and HelpAge International, neither members at the time, completed baseline 
analyses (HAP 2009c: 164). 
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written of the “challenging years convincing the sector of its value” (HAP 2010b: 36).   
For instance, membership growth, while steady, initially proceeded much slower than 
anticipated (Int. 36, Int. 37).  This is seen quite clearly in the pace of certification.  HAP’s 
2007-2009 Strategic Plan envisioned 36 agencies certified by the end of 2009, with all 
members as of 2005 achieving certification.  However, by December 2009, only 7 had 
completed certification (HAP 2010b: 35) and, as of April 2012, there were still only 13 
certified members.  While the pace of certification remains slow, membership has 
increased more rapidly since 2008, with 40% growth between 2008 and 2009 and similar 
levels since (HAP 2009a ; 2010e: 18; 2012).  Secretariat staff felt that this growth has 
helped “validate” HAP’s approach (Int. 11) and that the organization’s influence “has 
grown exponentially” (Int. 37).  HAP’s growth is charted in Figure 6. 
Figure 6 
 
 
Funding has been another constant issue; as recently as 2011, HAP acknowledged 
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budget actually shrank between 2009 and 2010 – from CHF 2,306,963 to CHF 1,999,976 
– and an independent evaluation of the initiative found that funding and staffing issues 
had caused repeated delays and necessitated the scaling back of plans and budgets 
(Salkeld 2009: 5).  In 2007, HAP had a 23% funding shortage; in 2008, only 52% of the 
proposed budget was raised; and in 2009, issues were again cited (HAP 2008e: 62; 
2009c: 5; 2011b: 16). 
It should also be noted that while HAP’s budgetary fragilities are not unique in a 
sector reliant on government funding cycles
132
 and on the whims of private donors, 
HAP’s situation is highly relevant to my findings in Section IV, where I observe that 
HAP has pursued the objective of certification against the desires of its largest, best 
networked and funded members.  Contrary to rationalist expectations, HAP has not 
subordinated its mission to funding considerations, even when this would, arguably, 
safeguard its future vitality. 
 
Section II – Accountability:  A contested proposition 
Although HAP International is less than a decade old, its history dates to the 
aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, to the publication of the Joint Evaluation on 
Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR).  In HAP’s words, following Rwanda and 
subsequent crises, “many agencies learned that good intentions were no guarantee of 
quality” (HAP 2006c: 8; Callamard 2006: 183).  Its founding figures recalled a sense of 
                                                 
132
 Institutional donors provide the largest portion of HAP’s funding.  In recent years, funding has come 
from DFID (UK), DANIDA (Denmark), Irish Aid, the Norwegian MFA, SIDA (Sweden), Buitenlandse 
Zaken (Netherlands), and the Ford Foundation.  Perhaps not coincidentally, these are also four of the most 
effective and accountable state donors, according to DARA’s 2010 Humanitarian Response Index (DARA 
2010: 9).  In 2010, Denmark was ranked #1, followed by Ireland (#2), Norway (#4), and Sweden (#5). 
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“shock” (Int. 61); people in the sector had a “deep sense of almost shame and guilt that 
they didn’t do the right thing.  The core of the feeling was a belief that they wanted to do 
better” (Int. 62).  Even today, Rwanda remains very much a part of HAP’s identity (Int. 
10, Int. 64).  As I discussed in Chapter 4, four major initiatives emerged after Rwanda:  
the Sphere Project, People In Aid, ALNAP, and the Humanitarian Ombudsman Project.  
It was the Ombudsman that was rechristened the Humanitarian Accountability Project in 
2001 and, two years later, became HAP International. 
The story of HAP International’s birth is the story of the humanitarian 
community’s search for answers following the experience of working in the refugee 
camps of eastern Zaire (today the DRC).  The post-intervention period was marked by 
extreme doubts, questioning, and recriminations.  While there was acceptance that 
humanitarian reform was needed, there was little consensus on how this was to be 
achieved, and the outcome of this process was in no way predetermined; the HAP that 
exists today – the initiative that seeks internal reform of agencies and promotes 
certification – was the outcome of a highly contingent, contested process, one in which 
ideologies, positioning, and personalities played a large part.  Consequently, as I noted in 
Chapter 2, while the contemporary context has been favorable to humanitarian self-
regulation, the initiatives themselves are very much a product of norm entrepreneurship 
and contestation. 
Rwanda was also the point at which public criticism of NGO activity, previously 
muted in tone, became much more prominent.  In the newspapers and among the public, 
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there is ever-greater willingness to criticize aid agencies.
133
  This is the point emphasized 
by the accountability club approach:  self-regulation is a calculated, strategic response to 
pressure from donors and the public.  In one sense, this is quite true; external pressure has 
helped motivate the emphasis on accountability.  In the words of a senior HAP staffer, 
“critiques are a hugely driving fear and force in the industry, who rely on public 
perception” (Int. 37; also Int. 10, Int. 11, Int. 34).  MSF-Holland’s Austen Davis notes 
that “donors are increasingly demanding more of a business model for aid provision, to 
extract efficiency and utility from limited resources” (Davis 2007: 4).  I found HAP 
staffers and members attentive to these pressures.
134
  Indeed, for members like CAFOD 
(UK), the donor environment has provided significant incentive to join HAP (Int. 54). 
However, while public criticism of NGOs is clearly a feature of the environment, 
there is basically universal agreement among the Ombudsman/HAP’s key figures that 
donor pressure has not driven beneficiary accountability.  One of the founders of the 
Ombudsman characterized their motivations as “two thirds internal, one third external” 
(Int. 61).  Another reflected:  “In my mind, it was primarily the internal motivations.  
There was the argument that if we don’t create standards, states will impose them, but I 
remember thinking at the time that they won’t – they won’t bother” (Int. 60).  It was a 
“hollow threat,” said another (Int. 61).  This point is underscored in a recent article by 
ALNAP’s Paul Knox-Clarke and John Mitchell; Mitchell was one of the Ombudsman’s 
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 In the few months preceding to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, major US newspapers published more 
than 30 articles highlighting ethical failures of charitable organizations, including executive salaries, 
administrative expenses, conflicts of interest, and transparency (Bendell 2006: ix-x; HAP 2003a). 
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 For example, at the 8th Board meeting, one member commented that “it is up to HAP’s member 
agencies to do it [regulate] their own way or face somebody else’s way… [certification] could be imposed 
on HAP members in a shape and form that they do not like” (HAP 2006b: 2). 
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founders.  The rationale for the commitment to accountability, they write, was informed, 
first, by a moral argument based in humanitarian principles and the rights-based 
approach, and, second, by a belief that accountability would yield better results, 
performance, and impact (Knox-Clarke and Mitchell 2011: 3). 
Among donors, I certainly found strong interest in accountability, but, as ECHO 
staffers put it, there is “neither the political will nor the consensus” among institutional 
donors to impose strong standards (Int. 55; also Int. 56, Int. 64).  Indeed, as I note later, 
much of HAP’s progress with institutional donors is attributable to HAP and its 
members’ lobbying, not vice-versa.  Moreover, HAP’s vision of beneficiary 
accountability is fundamentally a challenge to prevailing donor-centric accountability 
practices. 
To the extent that there are external pressures for humanitarian reform, they 
operate at a more abstract level.  These pressures are experienced as a crisis of legitimacy 
in the field, as a shake to the system:  good intentions are not enough.  Lloyd and de las 
Casas put it thus: 
The political environment in which NGOs operate has changed irrevocably over 
the past decade.  Good intentions and values used to provide a sufficient basis for 
NGO legitimacy, but there is now increasing pressure on NGOs to provide 
evidence that they are having a positive impact and are effectively representing 
those they claim to support (Lloyd and de las Casas 2006). 
 
“Why,” HAP Executive Director Nicholas Stockton asked in 2005, “does the 
humanitarian endeavour continue to behave as if our own good intentions alone are 
enough…?” (Stockton 2005b).  This sentiment appears in other HAP publications as well 
(e.g. Callamard 2006 ; Davidson 2002: 5).  A HAP staffer explained that “it’s not about 
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saying ‘I want to be a good person’…  It’s a profession” (Int. 10; also Int. 36).  Even 
Austen Davis, a prominent critic of accountability efforts, agrees that “we cannot afford 
to go in armed only with good intentions” (Davis 2003).  In this way, it is possible to 
account for an environment that was permissive of regulation, while simultaneously 
denying the inevitability of any particular regulatory outcome.   
 Following Rwanda, there was general consensus in the humanitarian field that 
more needed to be done to ensure accountability.  As the Ombudsman Project noted in its 
feasibility study, there were few structures in the humanitarian system designed to 
encourage humanitarians to be accountable to the claimants of assistance (Ombudsman 
Project 1998b).  However, as I found in my study of the Sphere Project, the shared belief 
that something had to be done post-Rwanda was not matched by consensus on the 
mechanisms to accomplish this.  As one of the key Ombudsman figures explained, 
“everyone’s heart was damaged by Rwanda.  But what you do about it is a different 
question.  There’s a lot of horrible stuff that goes on in humanitarian responses.  It puts 
you to tears.  But where do you draw the regulatory line?  It’s a constant debate and there 
are never clear answers” (Int. 62).  In the case of accountability, there has not even been 
agreement on the definition of the concept, much less how it is to be achieved. 
 Though accountability is widely accepted as positive and necessary, the concept is 
peculiarly complex by virtue of the highly unstable environments within which aid 
workers operate (Davis 2007: 1; 2003 ; Hilhorst 2002).  Organizations are accountable to 
different sets of stakeholders, including institutional donors, governments, supporters, 
and beneficiaries, and the types of accountability required varies according to the 
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audience (Lloyd and de las Casas 2006).  Consequently, the concept of accountability is 
“chameleon-like” for its different meanings in different contexts (Everett and Friesen 
2010: 469).  No wonder, as HAP has recently acknowledged, the humanitarian sector 
lacks a widely shared vision of what an ‘accountable’ system would look like (HAP 
2011e: 56). 
As a general proposition, accountability involves a relationship and a response.  
Jem Bendell writes that accountability concerns a relationship between A and B, where A 
is accountable to B if they must explain their actions to B, and could be adversely 
affected by B if B does not like the account (Bendell 2006: 1).  HAP’s own definition 
bears a strong family resemblance to this, but with a twist:  it contains an “explicit and 
unusual” mention of power (Everett and Friesen 2010: 475).  For HAP, accountability is 
“the means through which power is used responsibly.  It is a process of taking into 
account the views of, and being held accountable by, different stakeholders, and 
primarily the people affected by authority or power” (HAP 2010d: 1).  As the initiative 
states in The Guide to the HAP Standard, “inequality between provider and receiver 
means that the act of giving is often exercised without the consent of the person in need” 
and relief often occurs in a “state of virtual judicial impunity” (HAP 2008c: 3-4). 
Accountability, then, is the legitimate use of power (HAP 2006c: 8).  For HAP, 
people are the best judges of their own welfare; to do relief work without first consulting 
the affected population is to “treat people as if they were the objects of veterinary work 
rather than the subjects of humanitarian action” (HAP 2011c ; 2008c: 67).  HAP’s 
longtime executive director, Nick Stockton, framed it as a question of medical ethics:  “I 
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fear the principle of informed consent is all too often the first victim of our widely 
observed cultural arrogance and our unchecked economic power relative to the intended 
beneficiaries of our work” (Stockton 2004: 4).  As a HAP staffer put it, “the aim of HAP 
was to say, ‘Well, what about the beneficiary?  Who is listening to the beneficiary?’” (Int. 
10). 
What must be emphasized, particularly before delving into the obstacles that HAP 
has encountered, is just how novel HAP’s understanding of accountability is.  Prior to 
HAP, the humanitarian accountability revolution was top-heavy; advances in donor 
reporting and financial accountability – upward accountability – far outpaced 
developments in accountability to beneficiaries – downward accountability.  Indeed, a 
survey of NGO self-regulation in 2006 found that 35 codes of conduct and certification 
schemes were dominated by one way of looking at accountability, namely that 
accountability entails setting internal standards to ensure compliance with reporting 
requirements, laws, and regulations” (Lloyd and de las Casas 2006 ; Bendell 2006).  HAP 
has sought to promote an alternative to the “technical and self-referential reading of 
accountability” that has dominated the field (Callamard 2006: 184-5). 
For HAP, as for the Ombudsman, the campaign for beneficiary accountability has 
been a fundamental challenge to the prevailing humanitarian system and an attempt to 
call attention to, and inverse some of, the essential power hierarchies of relief operations.  
As HAP noted in its 2010-2012 Strategy: 
Some commentators on the sector believe that popular trust in aid agencies has 
declined in the last twenty years.  To counter this, the sector has placed a new 
emphasis on speed and efficiency in the visible delivery of goods and services.  
While the motives are commendable, the growth in pre-packaged and pre-
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positioned relief supplies increases the risk that programmes are supply rather 
than demand driven, and less responsive to the requirements of affected 
communities (HAP 2010f: 6). 
 
The point to be recognized here is that HAP, while recognizing the post-Rwanda 
perception of crisis in humanitarianism, has used this juncture to advocate for a different 
model of action.  Despite talk on the part of some commentators of resource motivations 
in the design and promotion of self-regulation, the beneficiary accountability movement 
has, from the start, made strongly principled arguments for reform rooted in a desire to 
“shift the power” (Int. 10, Int. 36). 
It bears recognizing that, like any intersubjectively-held concept, accountability is 
essentially contestable.  The fight over beneficiary accountability is thus the fight to 
cement a conception of accountability within the field and to define the mechanisms by 
which accountability is to be achieved. 
 
Section III – On the search for a method:  Tracing HAP’s development 
Even more tendentious than the debates over the meaning of accountability have 
been debates over how best to achieve it.  The JEEAR had identified weak accountability 
as an issue in the Rwanda response and called for self-managed regulation with 
compliance monitoring.  Specifically, it recommended that the international community: 
Identify a respected, independent organization or network of organizations to act 
on behalf of beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance and member states to 
perform the functions described in option (ii) above (Eriksson 1996: 61). 
 
The word “ombudsman” was mentioned – once; the recommendation was that an 
ombudsman be established in the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs.  However, it 
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was the NGO community, not the UN, which picked up on this recommendation.  
Initially, the idea for humanitarian accountability was explored within the Sphere Project, 
but, for reasons noted in Chapter 4, discussions of beneficiary accountability “generated 
considerable controversy” (HAP 2011c) and a separate interagency project was set up.  
As I outlined in Chapter 4, Sphere only worked on issues of consensus.  Participants 
recalled that there were clear, even personal, divergences in Sphere between Peter Walker 
and Nick Stockton over sanctioning, leading to an early, definite split between the 
initiatives (Int. 62, Int. 64).  This initial split would characterize the early HAP-Sphere 
relationship, which I discuss in greater detail in Section VI. 
The Humanitarian Ombudsman (HO) Project, which preceded HAP, was born at 
the World Disasters Forum in London in June 1997.  As an early draft of the Project 
Proposal framed it:  “Instinctually, it was thought that an Ombudsman was the best way 
forward to increase accountability to beneficiaries, while facilitating improved 
performance by agencies” (Ombudsman Project 1998a).  One of the key figures recalled 
that people thought the concept sounded good, but no one knew what it was (Int. 61).  
Research found that “Ombudsman” is an old Swedish word used to describe someone  
who “represents or protects the interests of another” (Mitchell and Doane 1999: 115).  
The ombudsman traditionally “acts on behalf of the public to ensure that executive and 
judicial authorities live up to their responsibilities by both complying with and enforcing 
the law” (Christoplos 1999: 128).  Its role is to democratize public administration 
(Ombudsman Project 1998b: 10; Beyani 1999). 
Because there was little consensus on how an ombudsman would function, a 
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feasibility study was conducted during 1998.  The study concluded that it was possible, in 
principle, to develop a humanitarian ombudsman, and recommended a pilot project 
(Ombudsman Project 1998b ; Mitchell and Doane 1999).  At the 1998 World Disaster’s 
Forum, the decision was made to conduct consultations leading to a pilot project.  The 
Project was coordinated by the British Red Cross, based in London, and guided by the 11 
leading British agencies and networks.
135
 
 
Figure 7 
 
From May to August 1999, the Ombudsman held consultations in Costa Rica, 
Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and Sierra Leone.  During August 1999, research was conducted in 
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 The Ombudsman Steering Committee consisted of Action Aid, the British Red Cross Society, the 
British Refugee Council, CARE-UK, DFID, Merlin, ODI, Oxfam GB, RedR, Save the Children UK, and 
World Vision UK. 
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Kosovo with the goal of developing a possible model for an Ombudsman.  This research 
found clear need for and interest in a mechanism for holding humanitarians to account, 
but different perspectives on its shape and scope.  For instance, the consultations in 
Central America and Rwanda found strong support for including host governments in the 
Ombudsman mechanism; this option was opposed in Sri Lanka (Doane 1999).  This 
research also raised fears of bureaucracy and found concerns that complaints would serve 
a negative function (Apthorpe and Mayhew 1999). The Kosovo study recommended an 
Ombudsman with a main office in the capital supported by two or more roving teams.  In 
a deployment, the Ombudsman would follow four steps: 
1. Triggers for Action – After a complaint or action request is received, the HO 
determines whether the situation is within its remit.  It then contacts the 
agency in question and initiates an investigation; 
2. Assess the Situation – The HO conducts field visits and communicates with all 
stakeholders, analyzes the situation against codes of practice, and determines 
if actions appeared fair and reasonable in the circumstances; 
3. Facilitation and Outcome – The HO facilitates discussion and counsels 
agencies to find their own solutions; it attempts to reach consensus, then 
determines the appropriate remedy; 
4. Distil Lessons – The HO provides formal feedback to agencies and 
beneficiaries; develops recommendations for best practice; prepares an official 
report; and follows up recommendations (Doane 1999: 9). 
 
The feasibility study was clear that the Ombudsman would be “underpinned by the 
principle of flexibility” (Ombudsman Project 1998b: 3).  There was also consensus that 
the Ombudsman would address the application of the Code of Conduct and the Sphere 
Standards (Doane 1999). 
The Ombudsman struggled with diverging visions on its Steering Committee, as 
is acknowledged in a number of archival documents (Ombudsman Project 1998c, 1999b). 
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However, as the Phase II report noted, “although there was some divergence of opinions 
regarding the eventual role of a Humanitarian Ombudsman, the major potential functions 
agreed to include: for an Ombudsman to be a proactive listener to local populations; 
handle complaints and concerns that arise; and scrutinise NGO adherence to accepted 
codes of practice” (Ombudsman Project 1999b: 3).  Even as proponents debated various 
details, it was commonly accepted that the initiative must center on the “beneficiary 
voice” (Doane 1999).  The goal of the project was to increase accessibility and 
impartiality, to “give people an active voice in a system that otherwise could leave them 
powerless” (Ombudsman Project 1998b: 13). 
Proponents of the Ombudsman envisioned it filling two roles.  First, it would 
establish which agencies were acting within the humanitarian consensus – i.e. abiding by 
the common codes and principles.  Agencies that failed to share these basic norms would 
“effectively be blacklisted.”  Second, the Ombudsman was to monitor, advocate, and 
facilitate reform within the system and use codes of conduct to counsel agencies to reflect 
“on how their institutional rationales increase action and accountability to beneficiaries 
and fit the overall performance of the humanitarian community” (Christoplos 1999: 136; 
Mitchell and Doane 1999).  In interviews, the former Ombudsman staff emphasized the 
second role – that of facilitator – over the first – that of enforcer (Int. 60, Int. 61).  This 
was apparent in the Ombudsman feasibility study, as well, which called for “incentives 
before sanctions” (Ombudsman Project 1998b: 24).  However, it was undoubtedly the 
enforcement aspect that received the most attention. 
Despite general acceptance of the need to improve accountability to local 
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populations, the HO was received warily outside of England.  Writing in 2000, Nick 
Stockton observed: 
It is worth noting that our efforts to promote greater accountability to legitimate 
humanitarian claimants through the promotion of the Humanitarian Ombudsman 
Project has met with outright opposition from some of the Code’s signatories.  
While some are fearful of unrealistic expectations and unreasonable litigation, 
others are opposed in principle to subjecting the humanitarian act of compassion 
to technical, legal or contractual norms (Stockton 2000: 19). 
 
This was recalled in my interviews as well (Int. 34, Int. 48, Int. 60).  An Ombudsman 
figure recalled that outside of the UK, NGOs were “very hostile to this” (Int. 62).  There 
were two main reasons.  First, there were concerns – and often misunderstandings – about 
the Ombudsman and its objectives.  Second, the HO’s proponents had difficulty 
demonstrating the wider applicability of the project outside of Britain. 
 Much of the debate focused on enforcement.  Ian Christoplos, a Project 
Researcher, noted that agencies had different perspectives on the proper role of standards, 
particularly on the balance between punishment and incentives.  One camp of 
organizations felt that the Code of Conduct and other standards should be used to 
constrain and punish deviant agencies.  For others, standards were flexible guidelines to 
facilitate efforts at learning and practice with the Ombudsman in a supporting role 
(Christoplos 1999: 127).  Indeed, one of the most oft-heard fears was that the HO would 
be used to enforce Sphere’s technical standards; this was the critique made by French 
agencies like MSF and URD (Int. 32, Int. 53).  This perception bemused the HO staff.  
Said one:  “there was a lot of talk about policing.  But how on earth would we police?” 
(Int. 61).  Another was “mystified and fascinated” by the talk of enforcing Sphere; 
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“there’s no way in a million years that this had anything to do with Sphere” (Int. 60). 
However, there was an element of truth to this concern.  The Project’s documents 
consistently make the claim that the HO would enforce accepted humanitarian standards, 
by which it meant the Code of Conduct and Sphere (Ombudsman Project 1998b: 20).  
Moreover, as I have indicated, proponents of the Ombudsman were staking out a strong 
position on what was ailing the humanitarian system and how it should be constituted.  
As Christoplos wrote in 1999: 
The HAO should not work from a basic assumption that all actors have a role to 
play in the humanitarian arena.  The Codes provide a basis for identifying those 
actors that share a basic set of common humanitarian values.  Those that do not, 
including those international agencies that are too incompetent to provide a 
significant contribution, should be publicly labelled as such.  Donors, host 
authorities and the humanitarian community should naturally be encouraged to 
treat these actors as being outside the humanitarian consensus (Christoplos 1999: 
136). 
 
The initiative would play a role defining the boundaries of the field – who is and is not 
humanitarian; this is an essential attribute of self-regulation.  Similarly, Nick Stockton, 
who would later become HAP’s executive director, argued that there was a need to “drive 
a wedge between those that do comply and those that only want to sign for purposes of 
window-dressing.  The membership rules of the humanitarian club, as defined by the 
Code, need to be much tougher” (Stockton 2000: 21).  The Project’s founders were not 
going to shy away from a “public critique of some international agencies, local 
institutions and individuals, if they demonstrate that they do not share our basic moral 
values, i.e., that they do not operate within the broad moral frameworks of the Codes.”  
This could require a “joint decision to isolate certain actors who are making the situation 
174 
 
 
worse” (Christoplos 1999: 132-3). 
These ideas were not always warmly received.  Despite the backing of the British 
Red Cross, the HO reported “strong opposition” from the rest of the Red Cross family.  
The ICRC was particularly concerned that the Ombudsman’s remit might include issues 
related to protection (Doane 1999).  Participants recalled this as partly territorial – the 
ICRC did not want someone edging into their domain of action (Int. 60) – and partly 
philosophical – French skepticism of accountability, elaborated in Section V, permeated 
the ICRC system (Int. 62).  Similarly, UN agencies were wary, with the UN Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs labeling the Project “threatening” because there 
was the implication that NGOs “would shame the UN into becoming involved at a later 
date” (Ombudsman Project 1999a).  InterAction offered mixed support; its members were 
somewhat supportive, but InterAction’s head, Jim Bishop, was personally opposed to the 
HO, as well as to ALNAP (Int. 60, Int. 62). 
Some of this is attributable to the word “ombudsman” itself.  Deborah Doane, a 
Project researcher, explained that “French agencies (in which we might include the 
ICRC) have difficulty with the whole notion of an Ombudsman.  French societies have 
no similar function and there is no direct translation.  This has led to possible 
misconceptions regarding the nature of what an Ombudsman is” (Doane 1999: 9). 
There was also ambivalence about the appropriateness of the Ombudsman and, 
subsequently, HAP’s focus on complaints.  A Sphere veteran argued that the complaints 
emphasis was “a negative force” (Int. 57); this came up in the HO’s own studies, as well 
(e.g. Apthorpe and Mayhew 1999).  Indeed, despite numerous studies conducted by the 
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Ombudsman and HAP, it is far from clear that complaints mechanisms are universally 
appropriate or effective.  For example, Kirsti Lattu’s HAP-sponsored study of complaint 
mechanisms and sexual abuse in Kenya, Namibia, and Thailand found that the question 
of complaining is “still a conundrum for most of the beneficiaries” (Lattu 2008: 3).  Lattu 
encountered fears of retaliation, confidentiality, shame, and community conflict.  Some 
respondents even felt that efforts to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) had 
increased stigma and discrimination (Lattu 2008: 32-4; HAP 2008e: 43-4).  Studies in 
other cultural contexts have found similar anxiety from beneficiaries about retaliation and 
social cohesion and from aid staff about losing their jobs (Csáky 2008 ; Davey et al. 
2010: 14; IRIN 2008 ; HAP 2011a ; Bainbridge 2011 ; Beattie 2011).  HAP responds that 
these fears can be alleviated through more information (HAP 2008a), but it is apparent 
that doubts remain about how best to achieve accountability. 
Second, Ombudsman documents suggest that the perception that the Project was 
British – in location and cultural context – was pervasive and damaging.  For instance, 
there was a call for further internationalization of the Project at a Steering Committee 
meeting in December 1998, where it was also acknowledged that “the choice of location 
is symbolically important – London may be a poor choice to ‘headquarter’ the project 
(Ombudsman Project 1998c).  This came out also in consultations conducted in the 
United States in 1999 (Ombudsman Project 1999a).  However, UK agencies also feared a 
loss of ownership were the Project to be moved.  There was also a sense that debates over 
accountability were much further advanced in the UK, where people were very 
comfortable with quasi-regulation (Int. 62). 
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Despite these misgivings, the Project was, in fact, internationalized.  At the 
conclusion of Stage III, in June 2000, the Humanitarian Ombudsman Project moved from 
London to Geneva and hired an executive director.  The Project was also rechristened the 
Humanitarian Accountability Project. 
The transition from HO to HAP was a critical juncture.  Under new leadership 
and outside of London, HAP shifted direction.  As Agnès Callamard, HAP’s first 
Executive Director, framed it, “by March 2000, it had become clear that other 
accountability mechanisms needed to be considered.  Thus, the HAP was created to 
identify, test and recommend a variety of accountability approaches” (Callamard 2003).  
Callamard wrote that, compared to a sector-wide Ombudsman, “a more cost-effective and 
sustainable way of ensuring accountability to beneficiaries is therefore to work through 
existing operational agencies and ensure that individually, but preferably collectively, 
they implement strong accountability mechanisms” (Callamard 2006: 189).  HAP 
undertook five research projects in Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and Cambodia to test 
different accountability mechanisms, concluding that accountability would best be served 
by the creation of an international self-regulatory body.  This was a dramatic shift from 
the light, field-based Ombudsman.  Fourteen humanitarian agencies endorsed this 
recommendation in January 2003, and the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership 
International was officially registered in Geneva in March 2003 (HAP 2011d ; Callamard 
2003).  
For many of the former Ombudsman staff, it was anything but clear that other 
accountability mechanisms needed to be tested.  The general view was that the change in 
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direction was less a product of the research conducted than it was a case of new people 
“wanting to shape the thing in their own way” (Int. 60).  Two veterans spoke of the 
“suddenness” of the change from the context-specific Ombudsman (Int. 62; also Int. 64).  
The new location also played a role.
136
  Several described the March 16, 2000 meeting in 
Geneva, which brought together major networks and principals, as pivotal.  John Borton 
recalls this as the point at which “the consensus that had been established among the 
members over the previous two and a half years fell apart as the concept of the 
Ombudsman came in for questioning and criticism from agency chief executives,” some 
of whom had been represented by mid-level staffers and were only now realizing that a 
new accountability initiative was about to be launched (Borton 2012).  The decision was 
made to pilot two models:  an “Ombudsman-type” mechanism, with emphasis on 
listening and responding to the concerns of beneficiaries, and a “People’s Advocate” 
mechanism, focused on canvassing local populations and representing broadly-based 
issues to decision makers in the humanitarian community (Ombudsman Project 2000). 
Today, HAP International traces its heritage to the Ombudsman Project, and 
legitimately so.  There was a very clear hand off from Ombudsman to HAP and both 
initiatives were motivated by an abiding concern that the needs and desires of local 
populations were far too often ignored by international aid agencies.  For both, listening 
was at the core of beneficiary accountability, and complaints were a key element.  
However, the means by which accountability was to be achieved differed dramatically.  
Compared to the Ombudsman’s field-based mechanism, HAP promotes enduring 
                                                 
136
 A longtime HAP Board member referred to the “cauldron of Geneva,” an insular place where everyone 
knows everything that’s going on (Int. 64).  Another noted that the location in Geneva left the project 
vulnerable to forces with different interests; it was not surprising that it fell apart (Int. 62). 
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institutional change at the headquarters level.
137
  Rather than directly enforcing other 
codes, HAP has its own HAP Standard.  Instead of operating at the system level and 
directing complaints to the HO, individual organizations would be responsible for their 
own complaints.  Certification, discussed in the next section, was also a novelty.  These 
differences are presented in Table 4. 
 Ombudsman HAP 
Standards Monitor accepted Codes HAP 2010 Standard 
Locus 
Roving field-based team Headquarters-based 
Crisis to crisis Intra-organizational 
Role Facilitation Self-regulation; certification 
Complaints Directed to HO Directed to agency 
Table 4 
 
Section IV – Faith in certification 
 A critical difference between HAP and the Ombudsman – and between HAP and 
most other humanitarian Q&A initiatives – is the fact that HAP promotes certification as 
the primary mechanism for achieving accountability.  In this section, I demonstrate that 
the decision to pursue certification derived substantially from the ideologies of HAP’s 
leading figures, who drew on models from public sector accountability in designing the 
initiative.  I find that this strategy, while born of genuine conviction, has nevertheless 
been pursued in the absence of systematic evidence that certification is most effective, 
and even against the wishes of some of HAP’s largest members.  For HAP, certification 
has become synonymous with accountability and thoroughly embedded in the 
organization’s own identity. 
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 As Sara Davidson framed it in HAP’s “The Accountable Organisation,” “changes in practices at field 
level… require broader transformations, in the first place at the level of the humanitarian organizations 
themselves and the value they may place (or not) on accountability in general and accountability to the 
beneficiaries in particular as a key determinant and characteristic of interventions and interactions” 
(Davidson 2002: 42). 
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 In the HAP 2010 Standard, certification is defined as the “issuing of written 
assurance (the certificate) by an independent, external body that has audited an 
organization’s management system and verified that it conforms to the requirements 
specified in the standard” (HAP 2011c).  As I outlined in Section I, certification is the 
end result of an 18-month process that includes the development of an accountability 
framework and a quality management system, document review, and headquarters and 
field visits.  As of April 2012, 13 organizations are certified and another 16 have 
undergone baseline analyses. 
 In 2009, HAP International commissioned an external evaluation of the Project.  
The author, Geoffrey Salkeld, commented on HAP’s “single-minded emphasis on its 
version of compliance verification” and explained that in HAP’s strategic plan: 
The phrase ‘and to accredit its members accordingly’ in objective (4) has 
emerged as a leading edge objective, morphing into ‘compliance verification 
through the HAP Certification process’.  This has been done quite openly and 
transparently…  But it has been done without the whole-hearted support and 
engagement of some Member agencies and Board members.  This has resulted in 
continuing tensions (Salkeld 2009: 6). 
 
Salkeld also found a significant research gap, with “little field-level evaluation or 
assessment of the impact of the HAP certification on the quality of life, autonomy or 
dignity of beneficiaries.”   Consequently, he concluded, “the evidential platform for 
advocating the efficacy and widespread appropriateness of the HAP Certification scheme 
is not strong” (Salkeld 2009: 7). 
 Salkeld’s evaluation was disputed by HAP, which added a disclaimer prior to 
publication.  However, it is unclear which of Salkeld’s findings were contested, and I 
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found considerable evidence in HAP’s archives to confirm his specific findings on 
certification.  Starting at the very second HAP General Assembly meeting in 2004, when 
a member noted that the ‘business case’ for beneficiary accountability “has not been 
properly developed” (HAP 2004b), there have been consistent calls by HAP members for 
evidence that HAP membership and certification makes a difference on operations.  
Similar comments can be found in the minutes of GA meetings in 2008, 2009, and 2010 
and at Board meetings, as well.
138
 
The issue of evidence also emerges in the Humanitarian Accountability Reports, 
HAP’s yearly review of accountability trends in the sector.  In the 2005 edition, it was 
found that the impact of humanitarian Q&A initiatives on beneficiary accountability 
appears limited because of stakeholders’ “continued inability to measure their impact” 
(HAP 2006c: 11).  In the 2006 edition, it was again observed that no systematic research 
was carried out to assess whether beneficiaries had received better quality service from 
HAP members (HAP 2007d: 30).  In the 2007 edition, it was acknowledged that “benefits 
and cost-effectiveness of HAP’s own certification scheme need to be demonstrated more 
clearly before initiating further moves towards setting up a certification franchise in 
Australia” (HAP 2008e: 52).  In the 2008 edition, material reviewed indicated, again, that 
“more evidence is required from agencies… to convincingly demonstrate a clear 
‘business case’ for improved accountability to intended beneficiaries and local 
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 At the 6th GA meeting (2008), a member proposed that a “research project for HAP would be to 
develop a business case on why it is good to be a HAP member” (HAP 2008a).  At 7th GA meeting, 
numerous workgroups noted the slow rate of certification; one attributed this in part to the “lack of 
evidence to support certification” (HAP 2009a).  In 2010, in the context of the slow adoption of 
certification, it was asked:  “What is the impact of certification on beneficiaries?” (HAP 2010a).  At the 
15th Board meeting, the question was asked:  “Where has change occurred and what is the evidence that 
HAP is making a difference?” (HAP 2009b: 3) 
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communities” (HAP 2009c: 62).  As Knox-Clarke and Mitchell note in an October 2011 
review of accountability, the sector still does “not have a precise understanding of the 
relationship between improved accountability to clients and improved performance” and 
has had “even less success in measuring results and impact” (Knox-Clarke and Mitchell 
2011: 4). 
To be fair, HAP is not unconcerned with evidence; quite the contrary.  HAP’s 
research output is considerable and its yearly Humanitarian Accountability Report is the 
bellwether for accountability in the sector.  HAP has developed links with academic 
researchers and think tanks, including sponsoring a recent conference on “Improving 
Accountability to Beneficiaries: What Evidence is Needed?” (January 29, 2010).  To 
date, though, most of the evidence is suggestive or anecdotal.  For instance, since 2006, 
HAP has conducted an annual “perceptions survey” to gauge practitioner views of 
humanitarian action.  These studies have found that, while there is a substantial 
“accountability deficit” with respect to beneficiaries, practitioners increasingly view 
themselves as attentive to beneficiary accountability.
139
  There are also quite a few case 
studies of specific interventions and issues (e.g. Lattu 2008 ; Davey et al. 2010) and one 
has only to cull the pages of the yearly Accountability Reports to find evidence of HAP in 
practice.  However, HAP has not been able to demonstrate that certified agencies perform 
better than uncertified agencies or that improvements derive from certification.
140
  As 
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 In 2006, on a high-medium-low scale, perceptions of beneficiary accountability measured 19%-45%-
40% compared to 82%-16%-2% for donor accountability (HAP 2006c: 16).  By 2010, the deficit remained, 
but had closed:  37%-42%-21% for beneficiaries vs. 74%-23%-3% to official donors.  In fact, 
accountability to beneficiaries was now perceived to exceed that to the general public and was equivalent to 
host governments (HAP 2011e: 71). 
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 Recent research by Tearfund also failed to find a clear link between implementation of HAP 
accountability mechanisms and the quality of services delivered (Bainbridge 2011). 
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Christian Aid has explained:  “Because our membership is part of a whole move by 
Christian Aid it is difficult to identify what improvements are directly attributable to 
HAP” (qtd. in Salkeld 2009: 22).  HAP’s anecdotes do not distinguish between benefits 
derived from the policy and practice improvements that preceded certification, or from 
certification itself (Salkeld 2009: 48). 
 The evidence gap is not unique to HAP – I made similar observations for Sphere 
– and it also does not mean that certification is not, perhaps, the best direction for the 
sector.  Given the complex and multivariate nature of relief operations, it is often 
impossible to fully assess or attribute impact.  It does signify, though, that the decision to 
push certification was not made on the basis of overwhelming evidence in favor of this 
mechanism.  Rather, it derives from the ideological priorities of HAP’s founding figures, 
who were deeply influenced by neo-liberal reforms occurring in the private sector.  In 
this perspective, quality comes out of transparency and competition;
141
 the focus is on 
process, with the understanding that good practice follows from better decision-making 
and management procedures (Hilhorst 2002).  According to former Executive Director 
Nick Stockton, HAP sees itself located within the Quality Management movement (also 
known as “Quality Assurance,” and “New Public Management” (NPM)).  “As such we 
believe that meaningful consultation with ‘customers’ is both an ethical objective and a 
strategy for achieving quality management of humanitarian action” (Stockton 2005b).  
This approach is methodologically individualistic; it views the public as users and 
consumers who hold service providers to account through accountability mechanisms and 
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 “I have no doubts about healthy competition.  That’s the way the market, when it’s working with a 
degree of regulation around it, will be good for beneficiaries” (Nick Stockton, qtd. in IRIN 2009) 
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by seeking other providers.  As McGee and Gaventa found in a recent review of 
accountability debates, NPM has received prominent backing from the World Bank and 
impetus from increased stringency in aid budgets (McGee and Gaventa 2011). 
These ideas came to HAP primarily from two individuals.  The first, Agnès 
Callamard, was HAP’s first executive director, hired during the handover from the 
Ombudsman.  Callamard came from the human rights sector, where public sector reforms 
had already had considerable influence, and was central to HAP’s transformation from a 
floating field mechanism to an initiative pushing organizational change in its members 
(Int. 60).  The second, Nick Stockton, was a key figure in Sphere and the former 
Emergencies Director for Oxfam (UK).  Though Stockton had been involved in the 
Ombudsman, including as part of the Steering Group – his influence ensured that 
beneficiary accountability would be pursued outside of Sphere – it was during his time as 
executive director at HAP (2003-10) that he had the most enduring impact on the 
initiative.  While Callamard was more interested in the justice side and Stockton the 
enforcement angle, participants cited their agreement on the market approach (Int. 60, Int. 
61). 
The influence of the Quality Management movement on HAP International runs 
deep.  Consider the extent to which the International Standards Organization (ISO) 9000 
standard series guided the HAP drafting and design processes.  The ISO 9000 series is the 
world’s most established and recognized quality framework, used by around 897,000 
organizations worldwide (BSI 2010 ; Verboom 2002).  The HAP 2007 Standard was 
prepared in accordance with ISO guidelines for the development of international quality 
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management standards and is very similar in substance to the ISO 9000 quality assurance 
standard (Stockton 2008 ; HAP 2007d: 7).  The review process for developing the HAP 
2010 Standard was again guided by relevant ISO guidelines (HAP 2010b: 12; 2010d).  
ISO 19011 is also used to review performance of HAP’s independent auditors on the 
Certification and Accreditation Review Board (HAP 2010b: 34).  HAP has followed ISO 
closely for guidance on accreditation and certification, “not necessarily because it’s the 
best, but because it’s the one that’s around, and it is the international standard” (Int. 11).  
HAP acknowledges that “while it may be argued that humanitarian action is not simply a 
‘product’ or ‘service’, and that the intended beneficiaries are not just ‘customers’, the 
core ISO objective of promoting quality management is exactly analogous with HAP’s 
transformative agenda for the humanitarian system…” (HAP 2004e: 2). 
HAP’s discourse also reflects the influence of the Quality Management 
movement.  As Everett and Friesen note in a recent article, HAP’s core documentation is 
infused with business language, including language of ‘product,’ ‘quality,’ ‘customers,’ 
‘costs,’ and ‘value’ (Everett and Friesen 2010).  Indeed, terms such as ‘customer’ and 
‘product’ are found throughout HAP’s Guide to the Standard (HAP 2008c).  Everett and 
Friesen argue that the business script is “helping re-form its members’ identities as 
commercial identities” (Everett and Friesen 2010: 476). 
Everett and Friesen charge that HAP “uncritically embraces business concepts 
and ideas, unaware of their power to effect and form a commercial identity” (Everett and 
Friesen 2010: 482).  This is an important insight, though I would emphasize that this 
language has been subject to debate within the organization.  For instance, while Everett 
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and Friesen single out HAP’s use of “beneficiary” in place of “recipient,” “victim,” or 
“disaster affected person,” HAP staff were deeply uncomfortable with the term.  At the 
very first HAP Board and Advisory Committee meeting in 2003, Executive Director 
Callamard acknowledged:  “We are convinced that the use of the term ‘beneficiaries’ 
does not send the right signal” but indicated that an alternative had not been agreed upon 
(HAP 2003c ; also HAP 2008c: 8-9).  In fact, the 2010 Standard drops the term entirely, 
replacing it with the more unwieldy – but less “inappropriate” – phrasing “people the 
organisation aims to assist” or “crisis-affected people” (HAP 2010c: 6; 2010d: 5).  
However, dropping the term “beneficiary” does not signal a change of approach; HAP 
continues to situate itself in the quality assurance movement, dedicated to enabling 
organizations to meet the “needs and expectations of its customers” (HAP 2010d: 6-7). 
 Certification itself is an important element of NPM, as it provides agencies a 
means to demonstrate their quality to their consumers.  Certification, like the quality 
management framework of which it is a part, is now a constitutive part of HAP’s identity.  
As one of its staffers explained, and as is claimed in numerous documents, “it’s the fact 
that we verify, that’s what makes it different” (Int. 37; Int. 17; HAP 2010a ; 2010e: 61).  
A senior staffer remarked that “HAP is original.  There is nothing like it” (Int. 51).  
HAP’s organizational prestige has become tied up in advancing its concept.  Salkeld 
suggests that “advocacy (for beneficiaries) has become entangled with – and possibly to 
some extent identified with – advocating for HAP (i.e. promotion)” (Salkeld 2009: 20, 
54).  This is exemplified by the Humanitarian Accountability Reports, which serve a 
dual, occasionally conflicting role:  on the one hand, they are assessments of the progress 
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made by the sector in integrating accountability; on the other, they are also something of 
an annual report for HAP itself.  Consequently, growth in field-wide accountability is 
often conflated with increases in HAP’s membership and the spread of HAP certification 
(e.g. HAP 2009c: 64; 2010f: 7). 
 There are undoubtedly strategic benefits for HAP if certification is equated with 
accountable practice, but the major drivers have always been principled and ideological. 
 
Section V – A HAP divided cannot stand:  HAP’s fraught existence 
Previous sections have alluded to the turbulent nature of HAP’s brief history.   A 
staffer acknowledged that “HAP has been cautiously received by the sector” (Int. 11).  
Veterans of the initiative have called its early history “terribly fraught” (Int. 62) and “a 
tough period” (Int. 64).  As another put it, “there’s a lot of blood on the walls” (Int. 61).  
From funding difficulties to struggles to build consensus on accountability mechanisms 
to institutional transformations, HAP has faced a series of acute challenges since its birth. 
In this section, I outline three major cleavages that have characterized HAP’s 
development:  consistent opposition from major French agencies; an inconsistent 
relationship with the Sphere Project; and internal divisions, particularly between the 
Secretariat and the rest of the initiative.  In Section VI, I attribute HAP’s difficulties to 
aspects of organizational identity and leadership personality.  Specifically, HAP was 
created as a challenge to a humanitarian system that had, in the views of its founders, 
substantially lost its way.  HAP’s strategy for humanitarian reform bears the 
unmistakable imprints of its founders, with its strong, uncompromising stance on 
certification and enforcement. 
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From the Ombudsman era to today, HAP has faced consistent, concerted 
opposition from major French aid agencies, including Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) 
and Groupe URD.  For its critics, HAP, like Sphere, is part of a worrisome humanitarian 
tendency to shift responsibility for political issues from political actors (states) onto 
NGOs, and, subsequently, onto disaster stricken populations.  These agencies also 
question whether accountability is a meaningful, much less achievable, objective (Int. 
58).  As Austen Davis, former head of MSF-Holland, has framed it: 
The degree to which a humanitarian worker can be accountable to people in 
societies that have been destroyed from within is questionable…  Not everything 
is our fault and we cannot fix everything.  We have to be clear what our 
responsibilities are…  A sectoral or systemic attempt to generate humanitarian 
accountability has little currency.  It blurs responsibilities and differences of 
capacity…  Each organisation has to negotiate the terms of access and action with 
all the parties it confronts… (Davis 2003). 
 
As I discussed in Chapter 4, the French criticisms of HAP and Sphere derive 
fundamentally from different understandings of humanitarian action.
142
  Specifically, 
MSF and URD are deeply uncomfortable with the proposition that one can ever develop 
universal, or context-independent, rules for action.  This was acknowledged by HAP 
staff, who attributed MSF’s opposition to their “internal organizational philosophy” (Int. 
11, Int. 10). 
French agencies suggest that one casualty of the search for universal standards 
and metrics is humanitarian values themselves.  Austen Davis writes that accountability 
systems tend to focus on discrete events and services that are easy to monitor, and avoid 
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 As an Ombudsman figure put it, there are different approaches between northwest Europeans and 
southern Europeans.  “In Kosovo, for instance, the English sent the technocrat; the French sent the 
philosopher” (Int. 62). 
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measuring and comparing less tangible services like compassion and care.  However, he 
contends, in crisis, “the important thing in such circumstances is that someone is there to 
witness what is happening” (Davis 2007: 18).  Everett and Friesen agree:  “there are no 
measures that would seem to capture the suffering of the victims of calamity and disaster, 
suffering of course being a central moral issue for humanitarians” (Everett and Friesen 
2010: 477; see also Bendell 2006: 63). 
I would argue that the fundamental issue is not that initiatives like HAP are 
subordinating humanitarian values; I have already indicated that HAP’s approach is 
deeply imbued by its principled critique of power, and its performance monitoring tools 
are designed to be contextual.  Indeed, HAP’s own field trial in Sierra Leone emphasized 
that “the variety of contexts in which such mechanisms will operate will undoubtedly rule 
out a ‘mechanical mechanism’, and the word ‘permanent’ should not in any way 
constrain the continued learning process or limit adaptability” (qtd. in Borton 2012).  
From the earliest days, the Project accepted that “humanitarian emergencies do not 
necessarily permit the framing of clear, explicit rules and set-piece enforcement 
procedures” (Ombudsman Project 1998b: 16).  A senior HAP staffer recalled pushing 
back at a member who requested a visual flow chart of what a complaints mechanism and 
information system should look like.  “I said, ‘Well, I can’t, because the first thing in the 
book is ask the beneficiaries what they want.  If I give you the flow chart and it doesn’t 
fit what they want, I’ve already told you to do the wrong thing.  Go ask them’” (Int. 37). 
Instead, the issue is that HAP’s philosophy reflects the influence of models of 
accountability that French agencies – as well as other actors – find deeply troubling.  
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Rosie McGee and John Gaventa have come to a similar conclusion in their review of 
accountability debates, suggesting that ideological and epistemological differences have 
been articulated as methodological debates (McGee and Gaventa 2011).  At the core, 
these critics are ambivalent about the consumer-oriented model of accountability that 
undergirds HAP’s work.  For MSF-France’s Fiona Terry: 
Humanitarian action is not a commercial enterprise that can be judged according 
to market forces.  The ‘clients’ to which this initiative refers are not consumers, 
but victims of some kind of abuse that has left them powerless to meet their own 
needs.  To imagine that they will organize of their own volition to oppose the 
people that came to assist them is utopian… (Terry 2000: 21). 
 
The end result of the complaints mechanism is to shift responsibility from political actors 
to the victims themselves (Terry 2000 ; Grünewald et al. 1999). 
 These critiques closely resemble those made of Sphere, and have often been made 
in the very same publications.  For advocates of beneficiary accountability, this 
represents a conflation of HAP (and the Ombudsman) and Sphere (Int. 60).  After all, the 
beneficiary accountability movement is not promoting universal technical guidelines and 
prides itself on its attention to context and listening.  There have also been significant 
tensions between HAP and Sphere over approach, as I outline below. 
 On the other hand, HAP and Sphere genuinely do have much in common; there 
are legitimate reasons why critics of self-regulation would group the initiatives together.  
HAP and Sphere share a seminal moment in Rwanda and a commitment to 
professionalized and technically proficient humanitarian action.
143
  Both are ambitious 
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 The Ombudsman was intended as a tool for reflection on the nature of the humanitarian profession 
(Christoplos 1999: 134).  HAP, in turn, is cited by members as a key means of professionalization (HAP 
2008a). 
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attempts to shift humanitarianism from good intentions to more updated bases.  Both 
situate themselves in International Law and human rights.
144
  HAP is clearly part of a set 
of regulatory currents that emerged out of the Code of Conduct, a heritage it shares with 
Sphere.  One of the Code’s drafters called HAP the “evolution” of the Code of Conduct, 
in the sense that it includes a complaints mechanism, which was in the original design of 
the Code (Int. 14, Int. 27) and one of Sphere’s founding figures noted that the 
Ombudsman, and later HAP, filled the accountability gap left in Sphere.
145
  HAP even 
enforces Sphere, as most organizations include Sphere Standards in their accountability 
quality management systems (Int. 64, Int. 11).  As is almost universally acknowledged, 
the same people have been involved in all of these initiatives – it’s very much an Anglo-
Saxon approach (Int. 15, Int. 52, Int. 53, Int. 58, Int. 62). 
 The fact that HAP and Sphere have so much in common makes it all the more 
surprising that their relationship has never been as close as envisioned.  While it would be 
inaccurate to characterize it as overly conflictual – recall the discussion of Q&A group 
meetings and joint endeavors outlined in Chapter 4 – it has certainly been punctuated by 
moments of tension and periods of neglect.  This is illustrated by the consistent demand 
from HAP’s members and Board to bring the accountability initiatives closer together – 
one can find evidence of this in meeting minutes throughout the history of the initiative 
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 Like the Code of Conduct, Sphere, and the Code on Images, HAP shares a foundation in human rights.  
Bendell remarks that HAP’s approach is based on a rights-based view of people’s access to humanitarian 
relief and development (Bendell 2006: 19).  For HAP, accountability is a “right of anyone affected by the 
use of authority” (HAP 2010d: 1).  HAP’s public presentations clarify HAP’s international legal foundation 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Refugee Law, International Humanitarian 
Law, and other key documents (Munn 2008 ; HAP 2007c: 8; see also Beyani 1999). 
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 “We didn’t get anywhere with the idea of building in accountability to Sphere…  John [Mitchell] was 
starting this idea of the Ombudsman, and we basically said, ‘Look, we’ll support you in this idea, because 
we’re not getting anywhere in Sphere with the idea of accountability, and the Ombudsman Project morphed 
into HAP International.  So, in a sense, the accountability bit of Sphere is what HAP became” (Int. 15). 
191 
 
 
(HAP 2004b, 2006a, 2007a, 2011a, 2007b).  Most recently, in 2011, HAP acknowledged 
that even the Q&A group, to that point the strongest effort at bridging the various 
humanitarian Q&A initiatives, was losing steam.
146
  A HAP Board member called the 
lack of accord between HAP and Sphere “grossly irritating” (Int. 64). 
 HAP and Sphere’s complex relationship dates to the beginning of the 
Ombudsman, when the failure to integrate accountability and enforcement into Sphere 
led accountability proponents to create a separate initiative.  When HAP shed its project 
status in 2003, it attempted to organize a series of meetings among the directors and 
Boards of the major humanitarian Q&A initiatives and networks, including Sphere, 
ICVA, and ALNAP.  They were rebuffed.  The episode, captured in the minutes of 
HAP’s first Board meeting, is worth quoting at length: 
The origins of HAP (the ombudsman project) are linked to Sphere.  The 
Ombudsman Project was set up to ensure that Sphere standards were 
implemented.  However, when HAP was set up, both Sphere and HAP worked 
very hard to dissociate one from the other.  HAP did not want to be perceived as 
Sphere enforcing mechanism, and vice versa.  Since then, it has been difficult to 
patch up the relations between the two initiatives.  So far, the future of Sphere 
does not seem to have been associated with HAP International.  In fact, it looks as 
if the future of Sphere is imagined without HAP International!  When HAP 
International was set up, some members of Sphere management committee were 
very clear that they did not want HAP International to monitor the implementation 
of Sphere standards.  The reason might be “territorial” or because they envision 
the creation of a Sphere specific policing mechanism (HAP 2003b: 2). 
 
The following year, HAP was actually approached by Sphere to be part of their 
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 “It is a disappointment therefore, that in a context of increased opportunity that the very forum that 
brings the various Q&A initiatives together appears to be losing steam rather than providing energetic 
leadership.  From three meetings a year in 2007 and 2009 and two meetings during 2008 the Q&A Group 
managed to hold just one meeting during 2010” (HAP 2011e: 56-7).  This was acknowledged in an 
interview as well (Int. 51). 
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Management Committee, something HAP saw as a “symbolic move” (HAP 2004d: 4).  
However, their application was subsequently rejected for reasons that were unclear to 
HAP staff (HAP 2005).  Efforts at joint consultation in 2008 and 2009 again failed.
147
 
 Relations between Sphere and HAP show signs of improving since 2011, as 
evidenced by the Joint Standards Initiative (JSI), which I assess in the concluding 
chapter.  The JSI provides a framework for closer integration, including a common board, 
among HAP International, the Sphere Project, and People In Aid.  This has yielded 
considerable, but guarded, optimism.  A HAP Board member noted that the leadership 
was invested in the process (Int. 64); another veteran called it “historic” (Int. 65).  
However, a former Ombudsman staffer was more cautious, calling it a “biannual ritual” 
(Int. 61).  “Watch this space,” the HAP Board member concluded. 
 The final cleavages have been within HAP itself and relate, ultimately, to the 
question of certification.  In his independent evaluation, Geoffrey Salkeld wrote that 
HAP, though a membership-based organization, “has become increasingly Secretariat-
driven” (Salkeld 2009: 6, 24).  This is reflected in the comments of various Board 
members, who reported that the Secretariat was “exceeding its mandate” and the Board 
was “insufficiently engaged,” acting as a “rubber stamp” (50).  This has emerged as an 
issue in my own research (Int. 34, Int. 60, Int. 64). 
The fundamental issue is not the Secretariat’s leadership, per se, but the fact that 
this leadership has promoted certification.  In the HAP evaluation, certification emerged 
as the “most controversial issue” and the root of “considerable tensions in the relationship 
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 At the GA meeting in 2010, CARE International expressed frustration at the lack of coherence between 
Sphere and HAP.  HAP responded that 2009 was a golden opportunity for a joint consultation plan; 
“unfortunately, the Sphere Project colleagues did not find this to be a suitable approach” (HAP 2010a). 
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between the HAP Secretariat and some Members” (Salkeld 2009: 36, 48).  As one 
member phrased it, “putting certification at the top of HAP’s advocacy agenda without 
the general agreement of the membership has undermined efforts to promote HAP’s 
vision and mission” (qtd. in Salkeld 2009: 12).  I encountered similar sentiments in my 
research.  A former Board member explained that “there’s this tension about whether 
certification is the only root to accountability and whether HAP should really be 
encouraging all forms of accountability, not just certification, but keeping certification as 
a long term objective, perhaps” (Int. 34). 
This certification issue is deeply rooted.  At the very first Board and Advisory 
Committee meeting in 2003, it was noted that HAP had had difficulty with some NGOs 
because “the regulation component of  HAP International creates this fear” (HAP 2003c).  
At the second General Assembly, in 2004, one organization expressed concern that “the 
accreditation program will challenge the ‘raison d’être’ of many of our networks.  Could 
change the dynamics of power between existing networks” (HAP 2004b).  At the second 
Board meeting, also in 2004, it is written: 
Some Board members expressed their concerns regarding the introduction of an 
accreditation procedure; the fears behind the word accreditation and the risk of 
being seen as being accredited by the donors (associated members of the 
Partnership).  Nick [Stockton] reaffirmed that the HAP-I Statutes (Article 5 point 
4) place an obligation upon us to establish an accreditation system (HAP 2004a: 
4). 
 
These are not isolated examples.
148
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 This exchange, at the 6th GA (2008), is telling:  “CH: Certification itself is not the ultimate goal.  If 
certification is required for membership this may cause problems.”  “NS [Nick Stockton, ExD]: HAPs basic 
mandate is to verify that members comply with the HAP principles.  The development of the certification 
process has taken 4 years and is the means chosen by the GA and Board to verify compliance.  Certification 
must be a core part of our work since a unique feature of HAP is that membership involves a commitment 
to external verification of compliance.  If we do not do this, what would it mean for the status of HAP 
membership?  To drop compliance verification would remove HAPs reason for existence.  The question is, 
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While there are plenty of Board members and, increasingly, members who view 
certification as “nonnegotiable” (Int. 64) or “sacrosanct” (qtd. in Salkeld 2009: 42), 
HAP’s membership has been divided.  This is reflected in the slow pace of certification.  
By 2009, for instance, only 28% of the certification target, or 5 organizations instead of 
18, had been achieved (HAP 2009a ; 2009c: 177).  In 2010, it was asked why certain 
members do not want to get certified and whether certification should be mandatory 
(HAP 2010a).  The Secretariat has undertaken numerous efforts to change HAP 
membership categories to provide additional incentive for certification.  A 2008 proposal 
would have changed categories from “full” and “associate” members to “certified,” 
“partner,” and “associate” members.  This proposal was not approved by the Board, 
leading the Secretariat to express regrets that certification was not obligatory for full 
members (HAP 2008e: 58-9). 
Wariness of certification is not uniform across HAP’s membership.  As of April 
2012, every single one of the 13 HAP certified members is a small to medium sized 
organization, including agencies like the Danish Refugee Council (Denmark), Tearfund 
(UK), and Sungi Development Foundation (Pakistan).  On the flipside, despite being, in 
several cases, founding members, large agencies like World Vision International, CARE 
International, Save the Children UK, and Oxfam GB have not made substantial progress 
towards certification, nor have they shown interest in proceeding along these lines (HAP 
2007a ; 2008e: 107; Salkeld 2009: 39).  HAP’s Board has noticed this, asking “what 
makes small and medium organisations opt for certification?” (HAP 2009b: 3).  As a 
                                                                                                                                                 
are there other methods to do this?  At the moment, we do not have alternative models, nor has the Board 
and GA decided to develop them” (HAP 2008a). 
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former Board member explained, “certification is problematic, in particular for multi-
mandate organizations.  Oxfam finds it difficult to certify the entire organization or just 
to certify the humanitarian part of the organization; World Vision is the same thing” (Int. 
34).  Another Board member admitted that the process was “too heavy and onerous,” but 
that certification makes HAP unique (Int. 64). 
Now, just because an agency is not certified does not mean that it does not use the 
HAP Standard.  For instance, World Vision’s accountability framework is taken almost 
word for word from HAP (Int. 36).  However, in the words of a HAP staffer:  “I think all 
of the examples of success stories that we can talk about are medium size organizations 
with fairly simple structures, and I think we’re perfect for that because we need 
leadership in the organization to drive it and to hold it” (Int. 37).  As a senior HAP staffer 
put it, these members have found a “niche” in HAP (Int. 51).  Another senior staffer 
explained: 
These medium-sized agencies have big ambitions, so if they’re going to outgrow 
their size, if you like, they see the way to do it is to improve these systems, to 
improve our relationship with beneficiaries, to improve the quality and have an 
evidence of the quality.  If you’re an Oxfam or a Save, people give money in the 
street to you.  You just have a bunch of teenagers with a basket, you almost don’t 
have to do anything because your brand recognition is so great (Int. 36). 
 
This is an important point.  One consequence of self-regulation is that, if successful, it 
alters the state of the game by providing new strategies and reorganizing the distribution 
of capital in the field.  Mid-sized organizations see HAP as a means to gain prestige in 
the field by latching onto a growing area of interest – quality management. 
It is worth mentioning that HAP has traditionally relied on its largest members for 
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funds, advocacy, and legitimacy.  Until funding formulas were reworked in 2011, HAP 
received substantial financial contributions from its large organizations.  Between 2008 
and 2010 Oxfam GB, WVI, and CARE International collectively contributed over CHF 
170,000 in funds and earmarks, with similar numbers in previous years (HAP 2010b).  In 
2010, WVI and Lutheran World Federation also seconded staff members to the HAP 
teams in Haiti and Dadaab (HAP 2011b: 11).  In its early years, HAP also relied on the 
large organizations to approach institutional donors (HAP 2004c: 4-5).  From a rationalist 
perspective, it does not make much sense for HAP to antagonize its largest members. 
 
Section VI – Identity and personality 
 While certification has proven to be the flashpoint, HAP’s internal difficulties, as 
well as its relations with the rest of the field, stem from aspects internal and, arguably, 
integral to the organization, to its challenging history and to the identities and styles of its 
founding figures. 
 HAP was founded as a challenge to the humanitarian system that existed post-
Rwanda.  For Nick Stockton, in particular, the aid endeavor had devolved into a 
“humanitarian circus” characterized by the “work-hard-play-hard rituals of staff addicted 
to overtime, stress, booze and sex” (Stockton 2000: 20).  Stockton, explained a veteran 
HAP Board member, was deeply impacted by his experiences in the refugee camps of 
Zaire during the Rwanda response.  He saw the failure of Sphere and other initiatives to 
adequately take up enforcement and accountability as a betrayal of core humanitarian 
principles.  This led to his “go it alone” mentality (Int. 64).  As he later wrote, “if just a 
fraction of the resources devoted to coordination (which often looks like the machinations 
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of a clique of oligopolists closing ranks) were instead devoted to a quality assurance 
system, including the funding needed for managing meaningful complaints and redress 
mechanisms, I am certain that we would see a dramatic improvement in the quality, 
impact and reputation of the humanitarian system” (Stockton 2005b). 
 Even outside of Stockton, the beneficiary accountability project was 
fundamentally a shake to the system.  One of the Ombudsman’s founders noted that the 
HAP argument was that “the system has to change” (Int. 60).  A longtime Board member 
agreed:  “HAP has always been fueled by a sense that something has to change; it was 
founded with an element of anger, which inflects its culture and energy” (Int. 64).  HAP 
does not see itself as offering minor course corrections; rather, it perceives itself and its 
members to be playing “an important leadership role in humanitarian reform” (HAP 
2011c).  Similarly, HAP’s first executive director, Agnès Callamard, has written of 
HAP’s “transformative agenda” (Callamard 2006: 184; also Davidson 2002: 42).149  
HAP’s ambitions came out in staff interviews; one envisioned a future when 75% of 
humanitarian organizations might be certified (Int. 10); another noted that HAP was 
“trying to change the whole global system” (Int. 37).  It is revealing that the HAP 2010 
Standard dropped “Humanitarian” from its title to signal its applicability to all manners 
of an organization’s operations.  This is quite literally illustrated by the cover of the 
publication, which shows an arrow composed of multiple points of light, ostensibly 
pointing the way to improved quality and accountability (HAP 2010d).   
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 This is reflected in HAP’s General Assembly panel debate topics.  In 2004, the topic was “This house 
believes that it would be in the best interests of humanitarian beneficiaries to find an alternative to UN led 
humanitarian coordination” (HAP 2004c: 3); in 2008, the topic was “How will one small standard make a 
giant leap for humanitarianism?” (HAP 2008a).   
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 The methods promoted by the Ombudsman and HAP International derived 
directly out of its founders’ critiques of the system.  The preoccupation with listening, 
complaints, redress, and, ultimately, certification and enforcement reflected a deep desire 
to correct some of the power imbalances inherent in the humanitarian endeavor, and a 
belief that, absent strong mechanisms, large agencies would just as soon circle the 
wagons than reform.
150
  This view of the humanitarian field is world weary, even 
pessimistic, because it assumes that enforcement and certification is essential to the 
reform process; agencies will not do it on their own.  This is at the root of what several 
respondents called Nick Stockton’s “big stick” approach to accountability (Int. 62, Int. 
64).  The obstacles that this movement encountered then created a feedback loop that 
reinforced a perception amongst its partisans that they were fighting a lonely battle 
against a self-perpetuating system.  Its style turned some people off, but it brought others 
on (Int. 64). 
In many ways, HAP has been “evangelical”:  there is a purity of doctrine and a 
traditional unwillingness to pursue strategies that might introduce compromise or 
corruption.  As one of the Ombudsman’s founders framed it, “they’ve staked out high 
moral ground and put a HAP flag on it” (Int. 60; also Int. 61).  This is why HAP and 
Sphere, while having much in common, have nonetheless so often been at loggerheads.  
As a HAP Board member reflected, the two initiatives have fundamentally different 
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 Salkeld found that HAP staff dismissed large members’ skepticism over certification as “fear of having 
their programmes exposed” (Qtd. in Salkeld 2009: 47).  I encountered similar sentiments.  For instance, a 
senior HAP staffer suggested that large organizations did not want certification because they were “beyond 
the sovereign” (Int. 51); another explained, “everybody goes back to the same donors, same funding 
mechanisms, and why would you have someone come in to the organization that might show that you’re 
not as good as your competitor” (Int. 11). 
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strategies (Int. 64).  Inherent in Sphere is a belief that consensus – a big tent strategy – is 
the route to reform, and it is up to individual agencies to follow its indicators.  HAP’s 
response is that previous standards have been aspirational and unverifiable.  As a senior 
staffer observed: 
I think that is why HAP irritates people, aside from other reasons that we’ve been 
irritating in the past, that we don’t let them get away with just saying, “We’ve 
done training,” or “We’ve signed up to HAP like we’ve signed up to the Code of 
Conduct,” that we actually keep pushing it…  So HAP will come along and say, 
“So you keep saying you’re signed up to Sphere, whatever signing up means, 
you’ve got copies of the handbook.  How do you make sure it’s used and it 
doesn’t just sit around?” (Int. 37). 
 
HAP staff were generally praiseworthy about the level of detail captured by Sphere, but 
questioned its ability to effect change on the system.  As one staffer put it, “I think the 
Sphere handbook has had its day, but people don’t pay attention to it as much anymore” 
(Int. 11).  Another called it a “dictionary” (Int. 37).  A Board member was more generous 
in his assessment of Sphere, noting that its Standards are widely owned and utilized, but 
perhaps not adhered to.  “It’s improved programs, but do we better listen?  It’s hard to 
say” (Int. 64). 
 Consequently, any attempts to bridge HAP and Sphere, such as the Joint 
Standards Initiative, must consider to what extent these approaches are compatible, and 
whether it is possible to pair an approach that favors orthodoxy and purity with one that is 
based in consensus and the idea of the open tent.
151
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 This also explains why HAP and People In Aid have had a relatively close relationship.  They have 
published a memo of understanding recognizing the shared “common commitment” to enhancing 
humanitarian agency effectiveness through certification and calling for enhanced collaboration (HAP and 
Aid 2009 ; HAP 2010e: 22) and HAP has recently committed to achieving certification against the People 
In Aid Code (HAP 2011b: 16).  The main factor is that HAP and PIA share a common approach to 
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 Questions of method and approach have been difficult to disentangle from issues 
related to personality and leadership.  In my interviews, I was repeatedly told that the 
personalities of staff at HAP’s Secretariat had presented an obstacle to the initiative’s 
expansion.  A Catholic Relief Services staffer admitted, “frankly, for us, one of the big 
issues at the time was Nick Stockton.  He had a capacity to enter a room and repel 90% of 
the people in there in three minutes” (Int. 43; also Int. 53).  This individual contrasted this 
with her experience with Sphere, who “simply were not arrogant.”  As one of the 
Ombudsman staffers put it, Nick was “the biggest firebrand in the humanitarian sector; he 
had a reputation” (Int. 61).  This was not limited to Stockton; as an Ombudsman founder 
reflected, “in general, the psychology and influence of individuals is a very big issue in 
HAP” (Int. 60).  Several veterans of the initiative noted that HAP’s first co-directors, 
Agnès Callamard and Koenraad van Brabant, had strong and conflicting personalities; 
they were “two extremely headstrong people who didn’t get along with themselves or 
with others, much less with their own board” (Int. 61; also Int. 60). 
 What is apparent is that the personalities of the founding figures have been 
internalized into HAP’s organizational identity.  Salkeld referred to HAP Secretariat’s 
“defensiveness” and what some members call an “aggressive style” (Salkeld 2009: 7, 27).  
“Command and control” style leadership is what one Ombudsman veteran deemed it (Int. 
60); a HAP Board member called it “forthright – probably over so” (Int. 64).  HAP’s 
initial struggles have imbued the Secretariat with a sense of “fighting the good fight.”  
Said a HAP staffer:  “When we’re looking inward, we feel, oh gosh, we’re not as loved as 
                                                                                                                                                 
humanitarian self-regulation; these are the unique examples of humanitarian codes with certification and 
compliance mechanisms. 
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Sphere, but partially that is because it’s much harder to be part of our ‘club’ than it is the 
Sphere club” (Int. 36).  Similarly, in 2008, when HAP bid farewell to the Board’s first 
chair, Denis Caillaux, and a staff member, these individuals were remembered “after four 
years of keeping faith with a vision that was once dismissed as naïve and impracticable in 
fora as far removed as Davos, Darfur, Aceh and Abbottabad” (HAP 2008e: 41). 
 HAP staff acknowledged that they had been forceful and unpleasant in the past.  
Said one, “we did have this idea that we had to go into organizations and the way to do it 
is like this” (Int. 36).  Another referred to “shock tactics” and recalled that HAP “used to 
pressure people and be unpleasant about it and we got told point blank that the reason that 
Australian agencies hadn’t joined to that point was that they didn’t like our approach, that 
we were too pushy when people from HAP had come out and done presentations” (Int. 
37).  There is a sense that HAP no longer has to engage in these tactics; as a Board 
member put it, “we had to go through this” (Int. 64). 
 It is apparent that, in the past – if perhaps not in the future – personality and 
leadership style greatly inflected HAP’s relationships with other actors.  This was one of 
the most unanticipated findings of my research; it emerged, entirely unprompted, during 
at least a dozen interviews.  And, though I was told that personality played a role at times 
for the Sphere Project (e.g. Int. 33, Int. 46), there was generally consensus that it mattered 
much more for HAP.  As one of the Ombudsman’s founders put it, “you can see the 
future of an organization in its inception, and when you get particular types of characters, 
like you’ve had in HAP, it gets inscribed in the organization” (Int. 60; also Int. 62). 
 Given that the research on organizational fields has been far more attuned to 
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group and social dynamics than to agent-level characteristics (c.f. Fligstein 2001), this is 
an important finding.  It suggests that individual attributes – personality and leadership 
style – can have an enduring impact on the success or failure of the initiatives of which 
they are a part.  It also bears recognizing that some of International Relations’ most 
familiar concepts – socialization and suasion, norm entrepreneurship, and even soft 
power – actually implicitly hinge on some recognition that the attributes of the 
entrepreneur matters.  (Some call this “we feeling”).  As scholars of socialization and 
social influence have argued, those “like us” are likely to have the greatest success 
compelling social change (e.g. Johnston 2008 ; Risse 2000).  While parts of this are 
reducible to identity – for example, Nick Stockton was shaped by his experience in 
Rwanda – aspects are more elemental; do people like each other?  Do they get along? 
 
Conclusions 
 The tide appears to be turning for HAP International and beneficiary 
accountability.  Though 2011 was characterized by internal disruption, with the departure 
after only one year of HAP Executive Director Angela Raven-Roberts and the attrition of 
half of the Secretariat staff, 2012 began with optimism.  The appointment of a new 
executive director and new staff hires have brought the promise of a reset in relations 
between HAP’s Board and Secretariat.  Though HAP was “at the brink” in 2011 (Int. 65), 
as a sector veteran phrased it, the infusion of fresh blood in the Secretariat has, by all 
accounts, enabled a break with the post-Stockton era and the more confrontational 
approach of the past (Int. 64).  More importantly, despite turmoil in staffing, membership 
has continued to rise at a steady pace. 
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 The biggest field-wide shift has been the gradual acceptance of beneficiary 
accountability, something noticed by HAP staff, who report “no longer having to 
convince people that accountability is an important thing.  Our influence in that is really 
changing our position” (Int. 37).  Largely as a result of the advocacy of HAP members, 
beneficiary accountability is included in ECHO’s risk assessment guidelines and DFID 
(UK) and SIDA’s (Sweden) funding guidelines.  HAP certification is actually required to 
receive Danish aid and development funding and there have been similar discussions 
about requiring certification for DFID (UK)(HAP 2008e ; 2009c: 29; 2006a).  Indeed, 
one of the UK Government’s Humanitarian Policy’s seven key policy commitments in 
2011 was that beneficiary accountability be made a core element of DFID’s humanitarian 
work (HAP 2012). 
 Perhaps most symbolic of the growing acceptance of HAP’s method has come 
from the field’s major institutional centers of gravity.  In 2011, the Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee (IASC), which comprises the key UN and NGO networks, adopted 
an Operational Framework for Ensuring Accountability to Affected Populations in 
Humanitarian Emergency as part of its broader “Transformative Agenda.”  The 
framework is aimed at increasing beneficiary accountability in all phases of the program 
cycle; the 2011 Sphere Handbook and the 2010 HAP Standard were used to verify the 
framework.  In February, and again in April, 2012, the IASC Principals agreed that all 
IASC organizations should commit themselves to include accountability to beneficiary 
populations in all relevant statements and policies by the end of 2012 (HAP 2012).  On 
the NGO side, in 2011, the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), 
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which is made up of nine of the largest international networks or agencies, began to 
seriously explore NGO certification (HAP 2012).  In October 2011, Charles-Antoine 
Hofmann, the SCHR’s executive secretary, came out personally in favor of some form of 
humanitarian certification (Hofmann 2011).  A HAP Board member called SCHR’s move 
towards certification “huge” as it is an endorsement of what HAP has been saying (Int. 
64).   The endorsement of beneficiary accountability by the field’s major players signals a 
possible paradigm shift. 
 As the HAP story illustrates, the motivations for, and subsequent contestations 
over, self-regulation derive primarily from different understandings of the proper practice 
of humanitarian action.  Beyond the specific technical requirements contained in codes, 
one of their primary functions is to advance alternative models for humanitarian action.  
The debates over HAP underscore the contingency of self-regulation:  even where there 
was agreement that something needed to be done to reform humanitarian action, there 
was nothing inevitable about which initiatives would emerge, on what issues they would 
focus, and how they would be governed.  Self-regulatory initiatives are vehicles for 
promoting change in the field; as HAP demonstrates, they are also, themselves, sites of 
contestation.  When the ‘driver’ of the vehicle changes, as happened in the handover from 
Ombudsman to HAP, this can have tremendous implications on the regulatory project. 
Which ideas are promoted has consequences for the positioning of players in the 
field and the rules by which their actions are governed.  As an Ombudsman staffer 
reflected, “the debates were very much power plays about who should rule and how 
humanitarianism should be done” (Int. 62).  Another added that “it was definitely a bit of 
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a battle of positions.  Who would lead the big quality initiative?” (Int. 61).  This had very 
clear implications for the HAP/Sphere relationship. 
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Ch. 6 – Norm Entrepreneurship at the Margins:  Regulating Images and Messages 
 
 
 As humanitarianism has expanded as an industry, so too has public awareness of 
its actions – for both positive and negative.  Manifested in heightened public scrutiny of 
NGOs, media criticisms have fed into a perception in the field that humanitarians must 
reflect on – and reform – their principles and practices.  In Chapters 4 and 5, for instance, 
proponents of both Sphere and HAP International were keenly aware of the increased 
level of scrutiny of humanitarian practices.  While media coverage is not the primary 
driver of self-regulation, it has certainly increased the overall incentives.  How NGOs are 
depicted in news media has clear implications on public perceptions, fundraising, and 
operational independence. 
 Questions of representation have thus very clearly been present in previous 
chapters, but always at the background level, and always with a focus on the media’s 
impact on NGOs.  This chapter turns the lens in another direction, to look at the impact of 
images and messages on perceptions of the global South.  Specifically, it looks at NGO 
responses to issues of representation, efforts that date to the aftermath of the famine in 
Ethiopia in 1984-85.  Ethiopia was a watershed for humanitarianism, an event that 
elevated aid and development from a sideshow into a major topic of public interest.  
Galvanized by Band Aid and Live Aid – the latter viewed by an audience of two billion – 
public awareness of and funding for humanitarian action reached record levels. 
The problem, for many in the sector, was that media attention was being fueled by 
distorted and simplistic narratives and dire, even apocalyptic, images of human suffering.  
In their influential Images of Africa (1987) report, Oxfam’s Nikki van der Gaag and 
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Cathy Nash [Midwinter] reflected that this “was not the first time that the media had used 
such images…  The fact that this time the famine images became the currency of the 
media and the NGOs created a particular public consciousness of Africa” (van der Gaag 
and Nash 1987: 1).  Shocked by the graphic nature of these representations and fearing 
that the very images used to raise awareness of their work were simultaneously 
undermining it, a group of British development educators drafted the Code of Conduct on 
Images and Messages Relating to the Third World (1989).  This innovative document, 
one of the earliest attempts to codify aid and development principles,
152
 challenged 
NGOs to improve their public communications by paying attention to their core values. 
 This chapter focuses on the Code of Conduct on Images and Messages, especially 
on the case of Ireland, where, in 2004, development educators resurrected and revised the 
original Code.  Paradoxically, the Code on Images
153
 is an important case precisely 
because it is so peripheral to other efforts at codification.  Whereas the Code of Conduct, 
the Sphere Standards, and HAP International comprise the largest actors in the field and 
are supported by the main networks and donors, the Code on Images is ultimately the 
product of a small group of committed actors operating largely outside of the institutional 
centers of power.  Nevertheless, the circumstances of the Code’s birth evoke in striking 
ways key themes elaborated in previous chapters:  its drafting occurred in a context of 
organizational growth and change; its framers recognized quite clearly that the era of 
good intentions was coming to an end and sought to develop a principled code to guide 
NGO practice.  Consequently, though peripheral to the main initiatives, the Code on 
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 One of the drafters called it “the first code of conduct, per se, that I can remember” (Int. 44). 
153
 For shorthand, I refer to the initiative as the Code on Images.  This is not intended to minimize the fact 
that ethical messaging is equally important to the Code. 
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Images testifies to the widespread nature of the changes to the humanitarian 
organizational field and underscores the argument that self-regulation is not confined to 
the major players; it is a generalized humanitarian phenomenon. 
 In addition, I find that the Code on Images, like the more well-known initiatives, 
has had specific ideational functions in the field – functions that extend beyond the letter 
of its codes and commands.  Though directed specifically at image and message 
production, the Code is also, more generally, a statement on the proper practice of aid and 
development.  Specifically, it is an effort by development education (Dev Ed) to provoke 
discussions in Ireland and Europe on the place of principled action in a field increasingly 
dominated by fundraising considerations.  More generally, it is a response to a perception 
by actors in the field that traditional ways of organizing action are no longer sufficient. 
This chapter is organized in a similar fashion as other chapters.  Section I 
introduces the Code on Images and fleshes out its institutional settings in Ireland and 
Europe.  Section II traces the origins of the Code, first in the United Kingdom in 1989, 
then in 2004 in Ireland.  I source the initiative to principled critiques of image usage by 
development educators in an institutional context defined by growth, professionalization, 
and bureaucratization.  The main drivers for codification were internal.  Section III looks 
at the principles of practice embodied by the Code, with specific attention paid to 
cleavages between development educators and fundraisers and between large and small 
organizations.  Sections IV and V address the Code on Images’ institutionalization and 
impact.  I find evidence of considerable uptake in Ireland, where the Code has also served 
as a precedent for subsequent regulations.  In Europe, its impact has, to this point, been 
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considerably more uneven.  In concluding, I discuss the importance of a central office in 
motivating and monitoring efforts at reform. 
 
Section I – A Code for Images and Messages 
The current Code of Conduct on Images and Messages is the descendent of the 
original Code, passed in 1989.  Drafted and adopted by Dóchas, Ireland’s national aid 
and development platform, in April 2007, it was then adopted by CONCORD, the 
European NGO confederation for relief and development, in June 2007.  In Ireland, the 
Code has 66 signatories, as of March 2012, including Dóchas’ 43 members; at the EU 
level, it is up to national platforms to devise models for promotion and adoption. 
The Code on Images was written by NGOs in the areas of emergency relief, 
development, and development education (Dev Ed) and applies to images and messages 
used to inform (media and education), to sell (marketing and fundraising), to convince 
(advocacy and policy), and to account for (reporting)(Dóchas 2008c: 2).  It is intended as 
a framework on which organizations can build when designing and implementing their 
communications strategy.  The Code’s goal is that organizations “portray the reality of 
the lives of people with sensitivity and respect for their dignity,” that “images and 
messages should seek to represent a complete picture of both internal and external 
assistance and the partnership that often results between local and international NGOs,” 
and that  organizations “avoid images and messages that potentially stereotype, 
sensationalise or discriminate against people, situations or places” (Dóchas 2007a).  For 
the full text, see Appendix III. 
The Code on Images is a principles-based Code, much like the Code of Conduct 
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for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster 
Relief (Ch. 3).  Principles-based codes are organized around broad statements of values.  
Consequently, as the guide to the Code notes, the Code on Images is “not a prescriptive 
check-list of ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’.  Instead, the Code is a set of guiding principles that 
seeks to create a mindset and ethos within our organisations about how we represent the 
stories and situations of others” (Dóchas 2008c: 7).  In the words of a former volunteer, 
“these codes of conduct help us all to reflect carefully about what we are portraying and 
whether more damage than benefits are gained in terms of their relationship with and 
impact on the public and opinion shapers” (Rooney 2008).  Thus, there are no right or 
wrong answers; the spirit of the Code is most important element (Dóchas 2008c: 16).  
The sole exceptions are the provisions that images be used with the full understanding, 
participation, and permission of the subjects and that agencies record whether subjects 
wish to be named, and act accordingly. 
The 2007 Code broadly resembles its 1989 antecedent; they differ more in form 
and tone than content.  The 1989 Code was lengthier (1929 versus 829 words) and 
included sections specifically addressed to fundraising (General Assembly of European 
NGOs 1989).  It lacked specific instructions on gaining permission and identifying name 
and place in published images.  Differences in tone and language are most significant.  
By 2007, the language of “Third World” had been removed, not so much replaced as 
stricken from the document; the 2007 Code does not refer specifically to any one place, 
instead calling for images and messages to be chosen based on the dignity and equality of 
“all people.”  Language of solidarity has been replaced by themes of partnership.  And 
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the updated Code lacks the evangelical tone of the previous edition.  Whereas the 1989 
Code was “addressed to European non-governmental organisations” (emphasis added) 
and concluded “it is now up to you to use it,” the 2007 Code “has been written by NGOs 
working in the areas of emergency relief, long term development and development 
education.”  The change in language, as well as the elimination of the specific section on 
fundraising, was intended to make the 2007 Code more approachable. 
In Ireland, Dóchas, the Irish Association of Non-Governmental Development 
Organisations, played a central role drafting the Code of Conduct and continues to be a 
focal point in pushing implementation and creating supporting materials for training and 
interpretation.  The Code was drafted through Dóchas’ Development Education Group, a 
“small, close-knit” group in which roughly 30 Dev Ed organizations are represented (Int. 
18).  Dóchas has organized numerous trainings, convened yearly workshops, and 
produced supporting materials, including a poster and a “Guide to Understanding and 
Implementing the Code” (Dóchas 2008c).  In 2008, Dóchas also hired a communications 
officer to aid implementation of the Code (Dóchas 2008d ; 2009a: 7).  Irish NGOs have 
cited the importance of Dóchas’ role in providing institutional support for 
implementation, especially to smaller organizations that had difficulties in the initial roll-
out (Int. 5).  To be a member of Dóchas, NGOs are required to sign the Code on Images 
and report yearly on implementation. 
At the European level, the main bodies are DEEEP and CONCORD.  CONCORD 
is the European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development, representing more than 
1600 NGOs.  It consists of 15 working groups, including the DARE Forum, which covers 
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development education.  All states and organization networks are represented in each of 
the working groups.  DEEEP is located within the DARE Forum (and thus within 
CONCORD); it is a coordinating structure and receives funding as a 3 year project from 
the European Commission.  Within DARE itself there are additional working groups.  
During DEEEP 2, the Code of Conduct was one of the working groups and has continued 
to be a working group, as part of the communications group, in DEEEP 3, which began in 
the spring of 2010 (Int. 19; CONCORD 2007).  An institutional diagram can be found in 
Appendix IV.  Like Dóchas, DEEEP has convened a number of training sessions and 
seminars on the Code.
154
  National platforms are given considerable leeway on how they 
implement the Code.  Dóchas, with its membership and reporting requirements, is at one 
end of the spectrum; Cyprus, Denmark, France, and Sweden, whose national platforms 
have not endorsed the Code, are at the other end (DEEEP 2011).  In this chapter, I use 
DEEEP and CONCORD interchangeably. 
Signatories to the Code on Images commit to several actions.  They must 
announce the Code (in public communications and on their website), institutionalize the 
Code (assess communications annually, put the Code in the guiding principles, train staff, 
and ensure that suppliers, contractors, and media adhere), and account to the Code (put a 
feedback mechanism online, report to the national platform annually).  Thus, enforcement 
basically consists of the annual reporting requirement.
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Dóchas’ own reports suggest that certification “raises the rigor with which self-
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 For example, seminars were conducted in 2009 in the Czech Republic and in 2010 in Latvia (DEEEP 
2010). 
155
 The drafting team initially envisioned three levels for evaluation:  self-evaluation at the NGO level, peer 
evaluation at the national platform level, and an award for outstanding compliance from CONCORD at the 
European level (DEEEP 2006: 15).  Only the first (and arguably weakest) component is in place. 
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regulatory standards are applied” (Leen 2006: 12).  Consequently, “it can be said that the 
inability to apply sanctions is a significant limitation of the Code” (McGee 2005b: 7).  
However, there was no consensus on enforcement mechanisms as the Code was drafted; 
as Siobhán McGee wrote in her review of the Code:  “It was preferred that compliance 
remains voluntary as it was seen that NGOs as far as possible should retain responsibility 
for setting standards for their own activities…  Peer review was seen as being a 
potentially divisive rather than an affirming approach” (McGee 2005a: 7).  There was 
also little support for making the Code a requirement for Irish Aid co-funding, 
organizations fearing for their independence (Int. 23).     
There are two main reasons why the Code has remained voluntary.  First, there 
are “significant differences between people (often within the same organisations) about 
what is acceptable or not in this regard” (McGee 2005a: 8).  As I note in Section IV, there 
is much debate as to whether images and messages lend themselves well to regulation.  
As such, one of the central goals of the Code on Images was that it “encourage 
organisations to have these internal debates”156 (Ibid; also Int. 12).  Second, though the 
Code on Images is backed by an institution – Dóchas in Ireland, CONCORD in Europe – 
these institutions lack the capacity, or even the mandate, to police the regulations (Int. 4).  
In fact, as a Dóchas staffer mentioned to me, it is a big enough challenge simply “to keep 
the Code alive in everyone’s minds,” let alone police it (Int. 5; also Int. 23).  Dóchas is a 
                                                 
156
 From the same document:  “The diverse perspectives that stakeholders (fundraisers, development 
educators, advocators and communicators) hold lies at the heart of ongoing debates within and about 
NGOs, and can be seen as reflective of the key challenge of achieving coherence within NGOs.  
Opportunities to discuss and establish dialogue across functions around these issues are not common. 
Herein lies an opportunity and a responsibility for Dóchas (and other national platforms) to facilitate and 
ensure a meaningful debate occurs” (McGee 2005a: 20). 
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very small organization with only one part time staff member devoted to the Code.
157
 
I found that attitudes on enforcement may be changing for some of the Code’s key 
players.  In 2009, a Dublin conference on “Portraying the Developing World” yielded the 
recommendation that projects and programmes funded by Irish Aid should make signing 
up to the Code mandatory
158
 (Boyle 2009; also Int. 2).  And as someone close to Dóchas 
reflected in 2010: 
One of the weaknesses of the Code is the fact that it’s toothless.  At the beginning, 
I think, we didn’t want to have this idea of carrot and stick with the Code.  
However, last year, after the research, when we were just looking at basic things, 
like on the website, we could see that there were gaps.  Perhaps it’s time to go 
with the stick.  The idea was, well, what can we do to make those people think.  
The easiest thing for us – it doesn’t cost us any money – was naming and 
shaming.  We haven’t agreed to do that, but we will see. (Int. 23) 
 
In 2012, an extensive Dóchas Code review process found significant interest in 
strengthening the Code and improving compliance, but did not yield consensus on the 
appropriate mechanism.  In general, participants in the process expressed more support 
for positive mechanisms – i.e. “naming,” not “shaming” (Dillon 2012). 
 
Section II – The origins of the Code of Conduct on Images and Messages 
 
When the Sphere Project and HAP International were proposed, it was apparent 
that fear of external regulation was a feature of the drafting process.  Though I have 
argued that those external pressures were not the dominant force driving regulation, 
donor pressures nonetheless weighed heavily on the minds of some and were used by key 
                                                 
157
 As someone else involved in the process observed, Dóchas does very well, but ultimately “there’s less 
point in having a code or set of guidelines unless you have the resources to support organizations” (Int. 20). 
158
 Irish Aid has repeatedly signaled its strong support for the Code (e.g. Downes 2010 ; Dóchas 2008a).  
As of 2011, Irish Aid now requests information about whether an organization is a signatory to the Code in 
some funding applications (Dillon 2012: 7). 
215 
 
 
figures to marshal support for their regulatory projects.  With the Code of Conduct on 
Images and Messages, however, one of the drafters recalled that “the driver for the Code 
was pretty much coming from within the sector” (Int. 12).  External regulation was not a 
significant concern.  Siobhán McGee, the consultant hired by Dóchas to research the 
Code, has observed elsewhere that: 
The impetus for charity regulatory reform in the Republic of Ireland comes not in 
the wake of major scandals or a particularly high level of public discontent with 
charitable fundraising…  It can perhaps be seen more as a preemptive move, 
reflecting the fact that changing times require more advanced approaches to 
accountability, and as an attempt to protect the existing high levels of goodwill 
and trust towards the sector (McGee 2007). 
 
I found consensus among key figures that the Code had originated out of the general 
sentiment of the Dev Ed community and that there was not much public criticism at the 
time of drafting (Int. 4, Int. 13).  This was also true in 1989 (Int. 40, Int. 41, Int. 44).   
The Code, in 2007 as in 1989, came out of an essentially principled critique of the 
nature and impact of NGO and media communications.  The 1989 Code asserts:  “The 
combination of emotionally charged images and catchy slogans does make for good 
cinema, television and posters but recourse to sensationalism in order to attract the 
public’s attention can mean that the less spectacular fundamentals of an issue are 
overlooked and the positive elements obscured” (General Assembly of European NGOs 
1989).  Oxfam’s Peter Davis, active in drafting the 1989 Code and consulted during its 
revisions, has regretted that “the idea that pervades is that Africa is a broken, dusty place 
without food or hope…  Many children in the UK simply don't believe there are cars, 
cities or mobile phones in Africa” (qtd. in Gidley 2005).  In the aftermath of Ethiopia, aid 
and development workers began to realize that they shared a heavy burden in that “the 
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presentation of facts and the moral response to them are now so closely intertwined” 
(Holleufer 1996). 
These principled critiques call into question one of the pervasive tendencies in 
recent academic critiques of humanitarian imagery, which rarely acknowledge that 
representative practices have evolved or that practitioners are the least bit aware of the 
implications of their productions on Southern populations (e.g. Douzinas 2007 ; Repo and 
Yrjölä 2011 ; Malkki 1996).  On the contrary, like critically-minded academics, the 
drafters of the Code on Images were actively interrogating the implications of images and 
messages, critiquing their effects on understandings of the developing world, and raising 
questions about power and domination.  Several of the 2007 Code’s drafters even 
referenced recent academic research by Kate Manzo and DJ Clark during the course of 
interviews (Int. 4, Int. 20). 
On the other hand, a critical approach to representation should still lead us to 
question one of the assumptions underlying the Code on Images, which is that it is 
possible, in some sense, to determine where the line exists between sensationalism and 
humanity.  To the exhortations to “truthfully represent any image” or “avoid images and 
messages that potentially stereotype,” one must respond with caution.  The aspiration to 
truthfulness denies the essentially creative function of any representative practice.  As 
Nelson Goodman has written, there is “no such thing as the real world, no unique, ready-
made, absolute reality apart from and independent of all versions and visions” (Goodman 
1992: 269).  Consequently, much of the academic literature would challenge the premise 
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that a code of conduct can ever effectively address power imbalances, colonial legacies, 
and issues such as framing and decontextualization.
159
 
The first Code on Images thus came out of reaction to the portrayals of the 
Ethiopian famine in 1984-85; “such images thrust Ethiopia's deadly famine into the 
global spotlight, helping to raise billions of dollars in aid. But the pictures also sparked 
soul-searching among aid agencies who felt they reinforced debasing stereotypes of 
Africa and robbed the subjects of their dignity” (Gidley 2005).  A major player in the 
2007 Code revisions recalled the “apocalyptic images” of the Ethiopian famine in the 
media that were bringing help, but in the process “destroying a lot of work they were 
trying to do about what the developing world was and what issues of development and 
poverty were about” (Int. 4; also Int. 42, Int. 41, Dogra 2007: 164). 
The effect of these disaster images was highlighted in a major UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization/ European Community project called ‘Images of Africa’ (1985-
88).  The project brought together the UN FAO and European and African NGOs to 
critically examine information material dealing with Africa.  Images of Africa: UK 
Report (van der Gaag and Nash 1987) was one outcome of this process; it leveled 
substantial critiques of British NGO communication policies and helped lead to the 
establishment of image policies within the major agencies (Clark 2009: 167).  One of the 
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 For critiques on the use of images, see (Clark 2004 ; Clark 2009 ; Gyoh 2008 ; Benthall 1993 ; Kennedy 
2009).  In many respects, the framers of the Code have shown incredible nuance in their approach to 
images, such as in their treatment of representations of children.  Staff at Plan Finland mentioned that, in 
consideration of the Code, they were trying to move away from portrayals of children as inactive and 
without agency (Int. 7, Int. 8); others were attentive to the critique that smiling children constitute a new 
stereotype (Int. 2, Int. 3, Int. 19).  In this, they agree with Manzo (2008) and Benthall (1993), the latter 
writing that “to a large extent, ‘positive’ imagery is a lazy way out and lets INGOs ignore messy questions 
of power and ideology.”  Conversely, NGOs are unlikely to agree that childhood reproduces “tropes of 
innocence, dependence and protection [that] have a lineage in colonial ideology and development theory” 
(Manzo 2008: 636). 
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1989 Code’s key figures recalled that the images used had “actually set back 
development in a number of ways…  We were shocked by what we had found” (Int. 41; 
also Int. 44).  Oxfam and Save the Children, were among several agencies that produced 
internal guidelines; these guidelines ultimately helped inform the Code of Conduct on 
Images and Messages Relating to the Third World (1989). 
Initially, aid veterans recall that the Code had a positive effect in raising 
awareness about the consequences of atrocity images and messages.  Training and 
education work was conducted within organizations and internal guidelines were widely 
disseminated (Int. 41, Int. 42).  Many development NGOs adopted in-house standards and 
criteria for image selection and publication, and these standards were often 
institutionalized into organizational processes (Int. 40, Int. 44).  However, by the 
millennium, one of the Irish actors noted, “everyone had forgotten those rules” (Int. 4, 
Int. 12).  Dóchas research in 2005 found low awareness of the existence of the Code 
across the NGO sector, among donors, and among academics.  Where it was known, few 
people could locate actual copies of the Code (McGee 2005a, Doorly 2005, Int. 1).  One 
of the members of the Dóchas Development Education Group, entrusted with rewriting 
the Code, recounts:  “We literally found out about it, so we knew about it because 
someone looked it up and found the text, but it wasn’t a living document”160 (Int. 3). 
Thus, ultimately, despite its intentions, it is hard to say how much impact the 
1989 Code had on images.  “On the one hand,” Concern’s Michael Doorly wrote, “it 
                                                 
160
 “Nobody went through their images and their messages that they were using and their promotional 
material and went, ‘Oh, hell, I wonder if it matches up to the Code,’ in the same way they might be doing 
with this new Code” (Int. 3).  Another key figure suggested that the original Code never had much buy in, 
due to its being developed in isolation and the perception that it was preaching to, not working with, 
fundraisers (Int. 12). 
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appears as though it has had none at all…  In all honesty are we really much better off 
now in 2005 that [than] we were sixteen years ago?” (Doorly 2005: 2).  If the 1989 Code 
left any legacy at all, it was, perhaps, the memory of the debate.  Among those who knew 
it, “it was like a sore – it was very much an issue that it existed, for practitioners of 
fundraising, that it existed and that it was like an irritant, at least, that it had been brought 
about in that way and was so narrow in its approach” (Int. 12).  Its primary legacy was 
the fact that it existed, and its existence enabled it to serve as a precedent for a new group 
of ideational entrepreneurs. 
Though the 2007 Code lacked a defining event like the famine in Ethiopia, the 
motivations of its drafters strongly resembled those in 1989:  there was a deep concern 
that the strong and partial nature of the images and messages disseminated by the aid and 
development community, in conjunction with the media, was ultimately undermining the 
work they were doing.
161
  As one Irish NGO worker put it: 
What really struck me was that I saw images of black babies with flies actually 
flying around their faces.  Major organizations!  And those are the images that 
really portray the whole continent.  It’s not shown as a family, or a society, or a 
district, or a division, but as a continent.  Raising funds for Africa…  The 
language used is very paternalistic (Int. 2; also Int. 3). 
 
There was a strong feeling among those behind the Code revisions that images and 
messages “had slipped back towards the 1984 apocalyptic-type images” (Int. 4); critics 
called it “development pornography” (Gidley 2005). 
This is the context in which Dóchas, in 2004, proposed to lead development of a 
                                                 
161
 Code proponents continue to cite research to this effect, most notably the Voluntary Service Overseas’ 
2002 report on “The Live Aid Legacy” that found that 80% of the British public strongly associate the 
developing world with doom-laden images of famine, disaster, and Western aid (Downes 2010 ; see VSO 
2002). 
220 
 
 
new Code of Conduct at the EU level (DEEEP 2004, 2006).  The Irish platform 
commissioned an independent study by Siobhán McGee and set about revising the Code 
through both the Dóchas Development Education group and the DEEEP Code of Conduct 
Working Group (DEEEP 2005).  Given the lack of initial awareness of the 1989 Code, 
the revisions were essentially a distinct process.
162
  The resulting document, a Finnish 
member of DEEEP explained, “was really talked about very carefully in the European 
DEEEP forum, so in that way you can really say that that is the European NGOs’ Code” 
(Int. 1; also Int. 44). 
Without a doubt, though, it was the Irish Dev Ed community that took the lead 
role in pushing the Code.  The Finnish DEEEP representative recalled that “Dóchas were 
very much promoting this and bringing it to CONCORD” and that many in CONCORD 
had never seriously reflected on the issues of representation (Int. 1; also Int. 3).  DEEEP 
publications confirm the special role of Dóchas, noting that the Irish NGO platform 
volunteered to take the lead because “the promotion of codes of good practice is 
explicitly part of Dóchas’s mission” (DEEEP 2008).  Interviews testify to the importance 
of Irish representatives like Lizzy Noone, who was Dóchas’ DEEEP representative 
during the Code revisions.
163
 
Participants in the revisions suggested that the Irish entrepreneurs had real 
credibility on this issue.  First, they benefited from Ireland’s long history in development 
cooperation, its historic neutrality, and its non-colonial legacy (Int. 1, Int. 2, Int. 4).  Irish 
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 Several of the original figures were consulted, including Oxfam’s Peter Davis, Nikki van der Gaag, and 
Cathy Nash Midwinter, but, as one of the old guard observed, “the movers and shakers behind the 1989 
Code have mostly moved on” (Int. 42). 
163
 Remarked a colleague, “Lizzy did a lot of work on actually getting the Code through CONCORD” (Int. 
18). 
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aid is seen as being untied, focused on health and education, and not on security or 
business benefits; this contributed to Ireland’s reputation in CONCORD (Int. 3).  Second, 
the Irish platform, Dóchas, pushed the issue with considerable energy.  Dóchas claims to 
be one of the most active national platforms within CONCORD and interviewees 
concurred that there is “quite a dynamic staff at the secretariat” (Int. 1, Dóchas 2009a: 6).  
Promoting codes is a key part of Dóchas’ strategic plan – self-regulatory initiatives, 
including the Code, are an important part of the platform’s larger accountability strategy 
– and it had opportunities to do so given that, as two former DEEEP representatives 
explained, a lot of the new EU member states were not as advanced in their Dev Ed 
practices (Int. 18; Int. 44).  Dóchas members considered the Code to be Dóchas’ biggest 
achievement of 2007 (Dóchas 2008a: 15-6) and expressed to me that Dóchas had 
exercised considerable leadership in promoting the Code on Images (Int. 2, Int. 3).   
Irish NGO staff opted to revise, not simply re-use, the Code on Images because 
they perceived that, in the 15 years since the original Code’s publication, the aid and 
development environment had undergone substantial shifts.  Dóchas’ review of the Code 
highlighted EU expansion and increased contact with diversity, wider awareness of and 
support for a rights-based approach to development, the shift from a charity to a 
partnership approach with the south, and the advance of digital communications 
technology which had reduced NGO reliance on professional photographers (McGee 
2005a).  The evolution of technology has also expanded the ability of individuals and 
groups to critique agency practices.
164
 
                                                 
164
 One NGO veteran put the change as follows:  “Before, it was just one-way communications, which 
means that you just throw your things and that was out, and they now know that actually the public cares, 
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However, the 1989 Code remained an important source of inspiration, not least in 
the lessons that were derived from its failure to be institutionalized.  This was manifested 
in a considerable preoccupation with keeping the new Code alive, expressed in European 
Dev Ed newsletter articles written at the time by Code drafters Lizzy Noone and Michael 
Doorly and echoed in the McGee’s scoping study (Noone 2005b, 2005a ; Doorly 
2005).
165
  The Code study found: 
The shift from policy to implementation or from principles to practice is widely 
agreed to be where the 1989 Code fell down.  The absence of independent 
monitoring is perhaps consistent with the voluntary nature of the Code, which 
relies on the organisation’s own motivation to comply.  Missing however is 
supportive and practical guiding information for organisations on how the Code 
could become owned and institutionalised by signatories along with steps for self-
evaluation (McGee 2005a: 9). 
 
It concluded that ongoing investment and institutional guidance was essential to keep the 
Code living and relevant (Ibid: 16; also Int. 4).  The most direct suggestion was that the 
NGO network take a central role raising awareness, promoting the Code, monitoring 
adherence, and serving as a focal point (McGee 2005b: 7).  Dóchas has taken on this role 
in Ireland, promoting institutionalization within organizations, monitoring the completion 
of annual reports, and keeping the Code at the top of the agenda (Dóchas 2010c). 
 
Section III – Situating the Code 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
more and more; now they have their voices also.  It is two-way communication” (Int. 5; also Int. 12). 
165
 Doorly expressed hope that standards “will ensure that the code is not left alone atop a dusty shelf but 
rather will incorporate mechanisms that allow for those who sign up to it to be monitored and audited in 
their public awareness and education activities...  It is clear that whatever form the revised code takes it will 
be essential that we find ways to make it a ‘living’ document that holds all its signatories to account” 
(2005, 2).  Writing just after the drafting of the document, Noone (2005b) wrote that “fear of the ‘dusty 
shelf’ syndrome still looms over the Code crackers” (2), and one of the drafters recounted that within 
Dóchas, this was discussed “at length” (Int. 4). 
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At first glance, I have noted, the Code of Conduct on Images and Messages 
appears as a peripheral initiative.  Whereas it is possible to identify clear links from the 
Red Cross Code of Conduct to the Sphere Standards to HAP International – links in 
personnel, organizations, and ideologies – the Code on Images falls outside of this 
narrative.  Its origin is more clearly connected to development education; it has found its 
deepest expression in Ireland, far from NGO centers in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Switzerland, Belgium, and France.  This peripherality is deceptive.  The Code 
arose in a broadly similar macro level context as other initiatives, one characterized by 
growth in the field, professionalization, and bureaucratization.  Even in the absence of 
direct pressures from donors, drafters of the Code on Images were very aware that 
changes in the nonprofit environment had necessitated a rethinking of the ideational bases 
of action.  Code drafters also looked broadly within the field as they sought models.
166
 
As Chapter 2 demonstrated, efforts at humanitarian self-regulation have emerged 
in the context of a dramatic expansion in the numbers and size of delivery agencies.  In 
Ireland, an astonishing 57% of Dóchas’ members have been established since 1980 
(Donnat 2007: 80).  The Dóchas Strategic Plan 2005-9 “points out that a phenomenal 
growth in the NGDO sector has ‘provoked greater awareness of the role and existence of 
charitable organisations. While broadly welcomed and supported by the public, this 
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 The review process looked in detail at five codes and referenced six additional initiatives.  Of the 11 
codes, only one – the Code of Ethics of the Institute of Engineers in Ireland – comes from outside the aid 
and development sector.  The five codes studied in detail were:  The People In Aid Code of Good Practice; 
the Australian Council for International Development (ACFID) Code of Conduct for NGDOs; the Red 
Cross Code of Conduct; the NGDO Charter; and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.  I 
commented on the self-referential nature of the models to one of the framers, who noted that this might be 
seen as a weakness in the study or too narrow a focus, but “the flipside of that is that by and large the sector 
does not refer outside of itself too often and doesn’t see that it has much in common with, say, the private 
sector” (Int. 12). 
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growth has also highlighted the need for greater accountability by NGOs about the way 
they operate, and about the values underlying their work’” (Leen 2006: 2).  Growth has 
been accompanied by changes in the nature of aid and development organizations.  In 
Ireland, a key figure reflected: 
There was a time when people who were working in the development sector were 
driven by passion, or by this ‘thirst of social justice.’  At first, it was the 
missionaries – they were the ones who were doing the humanitarian work, years 
and years ago.  After that, the people who were doing it were the ones with 
passion.  But now I think, more and more – I don’t know if it’s because now it’s 
more formalized and professionalized, probably – and then this new element of 
recession hitting Ireland, which means that people have objectives, now.  
Charities are run like a multinational, especially the big ones like Concern.  There 
are objectives there (Int. 5; also Int. 1). 
 
The move to professionalize was exemplified by the closing in 2000 of the Irish 
government’s Agency for Personal Service Overseas, a program which funded the 
sending of volunteers.  Its closure was “partly a recognition of the move towards greater 
professionalization in the sector” (Int. 21).  As I explain below, professionalization also 
appears as a value – professionalism – that signals better quality work.  The Code on 
Images is, at least partly, an effort to promote greater professionalism. 
Professionalization has coincided with bureaucratization and structuration.  A 
2006 Dóchas membership survey found a substantial increase in internal financial 
reviews between 2001 and 2006, a proliferation of personnel management policies, and 
development of formal hierarchical structures (Donnat 2007).  For instance, 77% of 
organizations had an organizational chart in 2006 compared to just 43% in 2001.  The 
survey also found increased peer network membership, reporting and review 
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mechanisms, and the use of quality and accountability mechanisms.
167
  86% of 
organizations reported applying the Code of Conduct on Images and Messages; 
significant percentages also reported applying the RC/NGO Code of Conduct (34%), the 
Sphere Humanitarian Charter, and the People In Aid Code, among others.
168
 
Thus, in Ireland, as elsewhere, self-regulation occurs in a context of 
organizational growth, professionalization, and structuration.  Ireland, then, is a 
microcosm of changes that have played out across the field.  These changes fed into a 
realization on the part of the Code on Images’ drafters that the ways in which action had 
previously been legitimated were no longer going to be adequate.  “Traditionally, in 
Ireland,” a key figure reflected: 
Most of the legitimacy is founded around that particular distinctive feature of a 
non-profit, the volunteerism, the volunteer board, and so forth…  A lot of the 
giving and a lot of the asking was done on the basis of certain individuals who 
developed a strong persona or personality associated with the organization and a 
high degree of trust.  After a certain point, that’s not enough as a basis for giving 
or asking.  It isn’t sufficient.  It was necessary to move from that to something 
that was more accountable and independent (Int. 12; also Int. 13). 
 
This was a common perspective.  Another Irish aid worker noted that the public is 
“increasingly questioning the legitimacy and the credibility of NGOs, so in terms of 
enhancing legitimacy, codes are quite important” (Int. 22).  It was apparent among NGO 
staff that “good intentions are no longer enough” (Int. 21). 
Indeed, though NGOs had largely escaped criticism, there was a realization that 
this would not last.  The Code of Conduct on Images and Messages was drafted against a 
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 80% of members had implemented one or more quality and accountability systems and standards in 
2006, compared to just 40% in 2001. 
168
 These numbers are all the more remarkable given that only 20% of members work in humanitarian relief 
and development. 
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backdrop of increasing critique of traditional, respected Irish institutions.  A veteran of 
the Irish non-profit sector told me:  “We’re very conscious of the fact that, ok, the Church 
has come under scrutiny, business, banking, government – we’re next.  You know, 
there’s already beginning to be.  And you have a generation now that aren’t just going to 
accept that they’re doing good.  We’ve got to show that we make a difference, and 
therefore we’ve got to be transparent and accountable” (Int. 24).  In a Dóchas report on 
accountability, it is acknowledged that the view of NGOs as efficient and effective 
service deliverers is no longer accepted on faith; “increasingly such claims are being 
questioned…  What seems clear is that the age of blind faith in any institutions is over” 
(Leen 2006: 4). 
I witnessed this firsthand over the course of my research trips.  At a conference 
organized in Dublin in 2010 entitled “The Use of Images – A Human Rights Issue,” one 
of the keynote speakers, Nigerian Ambassador Dr. Kemafo Chikwe, cited an 
advertisement she had seen from Irish NGO Sightsavers.  The poster stated:  “Being blind 
is hard.  Being blind in Nigeria is harder.”  After joking that: 
[B]lindness is not one of the issues one hears in relation to Nigeria – it’s usually 
‘corruption’!  Dr. Chikwe asserted that this poster is an insult to Nigerians; that 
these messages and forms of fundraising should be discouraged; that these NGOs 
should not be absolved merely because they are engaged in altruistic activities 
(Downes 2010). 
 
Good intentions are no longer enough. 
My research found an Irish NGO sector preoccupied with securing legitimacy in 
the face of an altered public climate.  A Dóchas study on accountability noted that 
because NGOs are not membership organizations, they gain their legitimacy from what 
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can be seen as more fragile grounds:  expertise, working with partners, or from a 
background in a faith tradition.  Many see greater accountability, including self-
regulation, “as a means of raising their legitimacy and credibility among key 
policymakers and thus the effectiveness of their work” (Leen 2006: 4).  For Dóchas, as 
for its members, the Code of Conduct on Images and Messages was a fundamental step 
towards greater accountability, professionalism, and credibility (Int. 19, Int. 20, Int. 22; 
Dillon 2012: 5).  In its 2007 Annual Report, Dóchas called the Code the “first example of 
such mutual accountability in the Irish non-profit sector” (Dóchas 2008a: 5).  At the 
European level, too, “CONCORD members see the Code of Conduct as an important 
basis for strengthening NGO accountability” (CONCORD 2007: 6), and the Luxembourg 
national platform commented that “questioning the messages and images disseminated by 
NGOs in Luxembourgish society is central to building the legitimacy of the development 
sector and mobilising people in the North to build a fairer world” (DEEEP 2011: 8). 
Thus, while the Code on Images was explicitly concerned with images and 
messages, it was also, equally, a way to articulate the sector’s identity.169  Kate Manzo 
has argued that images of children and shared codes of conduct are “both means through 
which NGOs produce themselves as humanitarian.  These NGO codes are neither simple 
reflections of common practice nor signs of uncontested identity.  Rather, they are 
integral to a larger discursive apparatus through which humanitarian identity in general is 
constituted, revised, and reaffirmed” (Manzo 2008: 634).  Indeed, Dóchas has stated that 
                                                 
169
 One of the drafters of the 1989 Code explained that the difference between a code of conduct, and a 
policy initiative, is that “a code of conduct suggests that organizations that are engaged in this field where 
we’re all acting in a similar way need to be learning similar things, need to be questioning their own 
motives and practice” (Int. 44).  In other words, it is, at the core, an attempt to create consensus and 
coherence. 
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the Code of Conduct on Images and Messages was designed as an expression of core 
NGO values and principles, such as human dignity, respect, and truthfulness (Dóchas 
2008b).  In interviews, key figures explained that “the Code is about communicating our 
values” (Int. 5; also Int. 3).  Similarly, a DEEEP member called the document a “kind of 
tool to really make it happen for the values that we’re talking about, because we’re 
always reminding people that we are the value based organizations, and that we have our 
mission, and we have respecting human rights, and respecting this and that” (Int. 1). 
From the Red Cross Code of Conduct to Sphere to HAP to the Code on Images, 
my research has found that self-regulation is also self-representation.  Organizations are 
enacting their collective identity through codes of conduct.  Like the Sphere Project, the 
Code of Conduct on Images and Messages is the expression of a rights-based identity for 
the field.  It is driven by a strong commitment to dignity, equality, and the promotion of 
fairness, solidarity, and justice (Dóchas 2008c: 4; Leen 2006: 2; Downes 2010).  This 
explains why the 2007 Code replaced the language of charity with partnership, thus 
exemplifying the philosophical shift from aid as a unidirectional beneficence to aid as a 
basic human right.  Indeed, the 2010-2012 review of the Code observed that practitioners 
identified words like “charity,” “saving,” and “assistance” as ‘bad practice’ or ‘grey area 
practice.’  On the flip side, ‘good practice’ messages included words like “justice,” 
“empowerment,” and “working with” (Dillon 2012: 13).  Rights-based values are now 
deeply embedded in Ireland.  As an NGO veteran observed, “I couldn’t think of an 
organization within Dóchas that doesn’t have a rights-based framework” (Int. 3). 
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The Code on Images was quite consciously intended to stimulate debate within 
the field (Int. 3, Int. 44).  Specifically, the Code is an effort by the Dev Ed community to 
provoke a discussion with fundraisers over the meaning of aid and development work.
170
  
Though the 2007 Code lacks the evangelical language of the 1989 Code – whose 
existence was a “sore” for fundraisers – its drafters were very clear that they wanted to 
engage with fundraisers on questions of principle.  From the outset, it was accepted that 
diverse perspectives within organizations are reflective of a “key challenge of achieving 
coherence within NGOs” and that the Code on Images was “an opportunity and a 
responsibility for Dóchas (and other national platforms) to facilitate and ensure a 
meaningful debate occurs” (McGee 2005a: 20). 
 While the tone of the Code on Images has evolved, its nature – designed to reign 
in excesses committed in the search for funds – has remained constant.  A Dev Ed worker 
close to the drafting process remarked that “Development Education viewed itself as 
progressive and sensitive to how it used images and messages, so it viewed itself as well 
placed to develop the Code of Conduct” (Int. 18).  In nearly every interview I conducted 
in Ireland and Finland, the divide between fundraising and development education 
emerged, often unsolicited (e.g. Int. 2, Int. 3, Int. 4, Int. 12, Int. 20, Int. 41, Int. 44).
171
  
This “well-documented rift” has been discussed in academic literature as well (Manzo 
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 Dev Ed is on the periphery of many organizations; the code was a chance to take back the initiative.  As 
a DEEEP member explained:  “If development education takes an initiative, it’s often a lot more difficult to 
push that initiative through, even if it is based on absolutely sound ideas, than if you came from the inner 
sanctum of an NGO, like the policy department, or the international division.  Development education is 
always seen as a bit of a troublesome program within NGOs, because we are full of questions.  Its status is 
on the periphery” (Int. 44). 
171
 Because the Code was drafted by Dev Ed, a relatively larger number of my interviews came from 
representatives of this group.  However, I found that fundraisers were also aware of the fundraising/Dev Ed 
tension (Int. 7, Int. 8). 
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2008).  The divide is often framed as a battle between values and organizational 
imperatives.  Ruth Gidley puts it as follows:  “Whenever a sudden disaster strikes, aid 
agencies face a quandary – how to tug at donors' heartstrings with powerful images 
without breaking self-imposed rules about portraying survivors with dignity?” (Gidley 
2004).  The claim from fundraising is always that “softer images don’t bring in the 
money” (Lizzy Noone, qtd. in Gidley 2005).  An Irish development educator called this 
an “unthoughtful argument,” the claim that only “bad images raise money” (Int. 2). 
Rather than framing this as a contradiction between two objectives – fundraising 
versus values – I see the divide as evolving out of two different understandings of 
humanitarian action.  On one hand, development educators see themselves as 
representing a humanitarian identity fundamentally rooted in values like humanity.  On 
the other hand, fundraisers frequently enter the field socialized in business and marketing 
values.  Their understanding of non-profit work is more closely tied to business metrics 
like efficiency, transparency, and growth.  A figure close to the Code reflected that its 
guidelines were written with the fundraiser and communications person in mind.  
“Realistically,” he said, “every Development Education person is going to be converted 
already – you assume that they’re all going to be attracted by the idea that people’s 
dignity, respect for the people, matters more than how much money you’ll bring in.  
Whereas it’s fairly intuitive that a fundraiser will say, ‘Well, no, we can’t raise funds 
because we can’t do any work without these images.’”  Consequently the Code was 
written “to challenge them, to say, ‘Actually, you need to do this’” (Int. 3).  If the 1989 
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Code “could be seen as a kind of preaching to practitioners of fundraising” (Int. 12), it is 
clear that there were elements of this in 2007 as well. 
 
Section IV – Institutionalization and impact 
My primary research focus has been on tracing the origins of humanitarian self-
regulation initiatives, but I have also made efforts to assess impact on both meso and 
macro levels.  While compliance has consistently been difficult to gauge in the absence 
of data, measures of institutionalization, combined with interviews, has said a great deal 
about the level of uptake of codes – and thus about the extent to which they have become 
part of the fabric of the field. 
In Ireland, thanks to membership data and reporting requirements, it is possible to 
assess levels of institutionalization – though not, for reasons I discuss, to assess change in 
the images themselves.  I find considerable and consistent progress towards 
institutionalization in Ireland, albeit with gaps, particularly with internalization in large 
organizations.  Qualitatively, I find widespread optimism among practitioners within the 
field.  While the same quality of data is not available across Europe, I note that uptake 
has been considerably more uneven, owing primarily to the voluntary nature of the Code 
and the absence, in many cases, of national level ideational entrepreneurs to push 
institutionalization.  I also find that the Code has helped shift the nature of the aid and 
development debate in Ireland and served as a precedent for future regulatory efforts. 
The Code on Images has been in effect since 2007.  In many ways, then, it is still 
too early to draw strong conclusions about its impact.  For many, the fact that the Code is 
still very much on the Dóchas and European agendas is in itself a success.  This said, we 
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should not understate the Code’s initial impact in Ireland.  Dóchas’ annual reports 
provide concrete evidence of fairly impressive institutionalization.  Some of the 
highlights from the annual self-reports have been included in Figure 8.
172
 
Dóchas’ annual reports testify to strong increases over three years in basic measures of 
compliance, such as references to the Code and training.  Even where percentages have 
remained stagnant, such as in annual reporting, it should be noted that overall numbers of 
signatory organizations have continued to rise.  The 2010 reports show that 45 of 57 
organizations had returned their surveys; in 2008, 27 of 38 signatories had returned 
surveys.  There are also increases, albeit less dramatic, in areas that indicate deeper 
institutionalization of the Code.  Thus, though the vast majority of organizations had 
appointed a Code champion and increasing percentages had developed an internal 
training plan, it is noteworthy that fewer than half of respondents had developed a 
training plan and only 41% indicated that they had developed a feedback mechanism for 
public accountability.  Less than half (40%) also indicated that they had included 
implementation updates in their annual reports.  In short, the picture painted by self-
reporting is one of qualified progress, with marked improvement in some areas, reported 
compliance trending upward in most, and some lag in others. 
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 These are internal Dóchas documents provided by Irish NGO staff not affiliated with Dóchas.  The 
reports are cited as follows:  (Dóchas 2008b, 2009b, 2010b ; Guthrie 2010).  The questions were:  % of 
organizations returning survey; reference to Code made in organization’s publications; reference to Code 
on organization’s website; copies of Code circulated to staff (including volunteers) and contractors; 
organization has developed feedback mechanism to facilitate comments on the organization’s application 
of the Code; staff in organization took part in specific training on the Code; organization has developed an 
internal plan for staff training on the Code; organization has appointed a Code Champion and/or 
Responsible for the Code. 
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Figure 8 
 
In 2010, Dóchas commissioned a consultant to assess signatories’ compliance 
against the Code.  The consultant looked at websites and online materials for all 57 
signatories (at that time) to analyze basic compliance (Guthrie 2010).  The study, while 
narrow, found broad levels of compliance with the Code, but also noted lags in terms of 
reference to the Code, its visibility, and the availability of feedback mechanisms.  What 
was perhaps most striking was the gap between what the consultant observed of 
compliance and what signatory agencies had reported to Dóchas.  Specifically, the study 
found much lower instances of the Code being published on agency websites and 
implementation of feedback mechanisms.  It should be noted that the analysis was 
exclusively web-based.  Moreover, the study was conducted in March and April 2010, 
whereas reporting data dates to June, so it is possible that the actual gap is not as dramatic 
as what is depicted in Figure 9.  Also, my own research, conducted in 2012, closely 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Annual
reporting
Code in
pubs.
Code on
website
Code to
staff
Feedback
mech
Staff
training
Training
plan
Code
champion
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
o
rg
s 
Annual reporting - Dóchas 
2008
2009
2010
234 
 
 
mirrored the self-reporting data from 2010.  However, for Code proponents, gaps 
identified by the survey directly motivated renewed discussions about enforcement and 
naming and shaming.  In fact, it could be argued that organizations that fail to announce 
the Code and implement a feedback mechanism are failing to implement the two key 
aspects of accountability (Int. 19, Int. 23). 
 
 
Figure 9 
 
In Europe, the record has been much more mixed.  While the DEEEP has 
continued to push the Code, including conducting a member survey on implementation in 
2011, and the Code has been translated into 10 languages, there is a wide disparity among 
national platforms.  Ireland, Luxembourg, and Austria have taken the most steps to 
promote the Code of Conduct.  For instance, Luxembourg’s national platform, the Cercle 
de coopération, has endorsed the Code, led multiple trainings, and conducted innovative 
exercises inviting the public to analyze NGO materials.  Austria has conducted trainings 
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and is working to develop a country-specific manual for the use of the Code (DEEEP 
2011).  Other national platforms, including Belgium, Finland, Malta, and Portugal, have 
endorsed the Code and held trainings.  However, progress in these countries has been 
slower.  In Finland, I found strong support for the Code at Kehys, the Finnish national 
platform, and awareness of the Code at several NGOs, including Plan Finland (Int. 1, Int. 
6, Int. 7, Int. 8, Int. 9).  However, a recent DEEEP report found that few organizations are 
using the Code in their daily work.  Finally, there are a number of countries that have 
failed to either endorse or promote the Code, including Cyprus, Denmark, France, and 
Sweden (DEEEP 2011). 
The data highlighted here represents that which is easiest to measure about the 
Code on Images; it says little about the actual images and messages themselves.  In my 
interviews, I encountered a tremendous will to see an impact and a perception that images 
have improved.  The consensus tended to be that the Code was “hugely helpful” (Int. 19), 
that NGOs have made “loads of progress” (Int. 23), and that the Code is working 
(Downes 2010).  As one DEEEP representative noted to me: 
I definitely think that you see less nowadays of the child with, you know,… 
barbed wire in their eyes to represent a particular illness…  You look at Oxfam, 
they’re all, ‘I am David, I have a story, I have a life, I’m not just a cardboard 
image to elicit guilt, but I’m actually a complex person with a background.’  So 
those kinds of images are now very strong, and I do think the Code has had an 
impact in that regard (Int. 3). 
 
Similar ideas were expressed in numerous interviews (e.g. Int. 5, Int. 6, Int. 8). 
However, if images have shifted – and this is an open question – this is not the 
same as saying that the Code has caused this shift.  The same interview respondents who 
expressed confidence that images had changed could provide anecdotes, but accepted the 
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virtual impossibility of assessing impact on a macro level.  As a Finnish development 
educator commented to me:  “Of course, images have shifted, but the question is how 
much we, as the NGOs, have played the role in doing that.  Of course, the environment is 
changing all the time – that’s the fashion – you have to follow that, you can’t take it out 
of the whole of society” (Int. 1).  Little actual analysis of images has been conducted, and 
those studies that exist are considerably less sanguine than practitioners about 
improvement.  In 2009, for instance, British academic DJ Clark suggested that: 
NGO usage of images has changed very little over the past 10 years, and that the 
concern for the nature of Majority World representation had not made a 
significant impact on the sourcing of images.  Although 60% of the organisations 
surveyed in 2003 claimed they had changed the way they used images over the 
previous 10 years, the quantitative research revealed very little statistical 
differences (Clark 2009: 167). 
 
Similarly, Kate Manzo has argued that the most powerful reflections of humanitarianism 
are found in images of children that violate the guiding principles of codes of conduct on 
images and messages (Manzo 2008: 635).  It should be noted that although Manzo takes 
the 2007 Code into account, her writing is aimed at a more theoretical level.  
Furthermore, DJ Clark’s research, dating to 1994 and 2003, also predates the 2007 Code.  
What is clear, though, is that the Code’s impact on images is far from decided. 
Much of this can be attributed to the subject matter – it would be impossible to 
find the “perfect picture” that tickets every box (Int. 3) – and to the breadth of the Code’s 
language – “I like the fact that it’s not an exercise about ticking the box, but it makes it 
difficult to apply” (Int. 20).  Concerns are frequently raised about whether it is safe to 
name children (Int. 19), difficulties getting permission (Rooney 2008), finding ways to 
respect cultures without overly sanitizing images (Int. 7, Int. 8), and understanding the 
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“text-heavy” Code (Int. 19, Int. 20).  NGO staff also note that the high volume of images 
they work with, the capacity necessary to police social media, and review requirements 
can all stretch resources, especially for smaller organizations.  This came out especially 
in the first year of Dóchas implementation (Int. 5, Int. 4).  These concerns have led 
Dóchas to pilot the development of an illustrated guide to the Code (Dillon 2012). 
 Compliance data also flattens out distinctions among different types of 
organizations.  In my interviews, I found that small to medium-size organizations were 
more likely to report institutionalization of the Code; where they had failed, they were 
more likely to attribute this to a lack of capacity.  On the other hand, large organizations, 
especially those with sizeable fundraising wings, tended to have more difficulty gaining 
and maintaining commitment at all levels of the organization.  This mirrors my findings 
in Chapter 5, where I showed that HAP International has had the greatest success with 
medium-sized organizations. 
 Bigger organizations, I was told repeatedly, were “struggling.  They’re well-
organized in their regular jobs, but perhaps they have too many departments – it would be 
easy for them to include Code in their existing strategy, but in reality I’m not sure that it’s 
really translated as well as could be” (Int. 5).  Another individual noted that “the bigger 
the organizations, the more challenges because they have to coordinate with more people, 
and it’s all separate departments having their own objectives and targets of what they’re 
doing, so I think it’s way more difficult for those people even though they have the will 
to do something.  Perhaps the will is not the same in all of the departments” (Int. 23).  
These are capacity reasons. 
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The universe of large Irish organizations is not extensive; it comprises Concern 
International, Trócaire, and Goal.  Of these, Goal is not a member of Dóchas and is not a 
party to the Code on Images; in a sense, it is outside the system, “not engaging with 
Dóchas on the issue of images and messages, not involved in trainings” (Int. 2).  
However, Goal was felt to have some of the most shocking imagery.  This was attributed 
to the peculiarities of the NGO – that it was family run, very hierarchical – and to its 
CEO, a former journalist (Int. 4, Int. 2).  The other two large organizations, Concern and 
Trócaire, are quite active in Dóchas and well-represented at meetings on Code 
implementation and strategy.  Indeed, of the key Code drafters, one of the most important 
was a Concern development educator, Lizzy Noone, and her successor as Dóchas DEEEP 
representative was John Smith of Trócaire.  But organization buy-in has been harder to 
achieve, particularly because buy-in must be achieved at multiple levels of the agency. 
In large organizations, we also find a microcosm of the larger field-wide divide 
between development education and fundraising.  As a staffer at a development education 
organization explained:  “We don’t have to go out on the street and get public funding 
with booklets.  So, therefore, we can have a slightly loftier position on it than someone in 
a big organization like a Trócaire, Concern, or any of the big agencies that have to rely on 
fundraising to do their education to people” (Int. 3).  The large NGOs have 
correspondingly large fundraising sections.  Thus, there are compelling organizational 
reasons why larger NGOs would use stronger images.  As a veteran of the Irish nonprofit 
sector observed, there are instances when, especially in emergency response situations, 
large agencies “sometimes show photographs that I don’t think are really upholding the 
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principle of the Code, but I think they also make a specific decision to do that.  I think 
they decide that actually, maybe this photograph is not really respecting the dignity of the 
person in it, but this is an emergency, we need to shock people a little bit” (Int. 19; Dillon 
2012: 6). 
 
Section V – Talking principles, precedent 
 
Because the Code of Conduct on Images and Messages is so recent, it would be 
imprudent to make overly forceful statements on its impact on the aid and development 
field in Ireland and Europe.  For example, despite its objectives, it is unlikely that the 
Code has yet had time to alter the fundamental dynamic between fundraising and 
development education.  What is apparent, though, is that the document is actively being 
used by some development educators to provoke conversations within their organizations 
and across the field about the meaning and purposes of aid and development work – 
though, as Eilish Dillon found in her 2010-2012 review of the Code, there is still room 
for improvement (Dillon 2012).  As a staffer at one of the large Irish agencies explained, 
the Code is an advocacy tool:  “You can come with your Code of Conduct to your 
colleagues and say, ‘You know, this is something that the organization as a whole has 
signed up to.’  We just need to remind ourselves when we’re creating campaigns, when 
we’re creating public awareness, that we are mindful of this” (Int. 18).  At other 
organizations, I heard similar stories about the Code being used to re-orient discussions 
around questions of principle.  At one mid-sized NGO, a worker noted that he had 
inserted the Code into advertising discussions during the response to the earthquake in 
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Haiti in 2010.  This individual called the Code a “powerful device” for shifting the 
discussion from fundraising to principles (Int. 59). 
Put more simply, the Code on Images, like other codes, is a platform on which 
ideational entrepreneurs can build their arguments, a basis for engaging with other 
societal actors.  For instance, the Code on Images enables NGOs to engage with media 
actors on questions of principle.  In recognition of the powerful role of the media in 
shaping public opinion, it was always envisioned that NGOs would use the Code to 
pressure the media to reflect on its images and messages (McGee 2005a: 21; Int. 3; 
Doorly 2005: 2).  This has not been the Code’s primary focus, but it has continually come 
up as an issue (Int. 4, Int. 2).  Indeed, one of the purposes of the 2009 conference 
“Portraying the Developing World” was to engage with the media (Boyle 2009).  In 
addition, as I discuss below, the outcome of the Charities Act 2009 demonstrates the 
power of self-regulatory initiatives to channel state regulatory intervention in ways that 
suit the sector’s desires for independence of action.  As a precedent for sector regulation, 
the Code on Images was integrated into the Act. 
The Code on Images has also given Dóchas itself a platform for exercising field 
leadership – in Europe, as in Ireland.  A non-Irish member of DEEEP recalled:  “The 
Irish took it on, they led it, for the DEEEP forum, but also for their own interests.  
Dóchas saw an opportunity to actually get a debate going within all the NGO members of 
Dóchas...  For Dóchas, it was a Code they could get accepted – it was a pan-Irish Code” 
(Int. 44).  Although Dóchas is one among peers in the sense that it is a signatory to the 
Code, not a secretariat (Int. 23), as the national platform it holds agenda setting power 
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and commands a high level of respect.  Dóchas’ own publications tout its leadership in 
developing and promoting the Code of Conduct.  For instance, in its 2006 Annual Report, 
Dóchas wrote:  “Taking an EU-wide leadership position, Dóchas members developed a 
new Code of Conduct on Images and Messages” (Dóchas 2007b: 4).  In its 2007 Annual 
Report, Dóchas called the unanimous adoption of the Code on Messages “arguably the 
most significant development during 2007,” emphasizing that it “demonstrates the power 
of NGO self-regulation” (Dóchas 2008a: 4).  And, in its 2008 Annual Report, Dóchas 
maintained that development NGOs were well ahead of charity regulation and that Irish 
NGOs were “leading the way” in terms of NGO accountability (Dóchas 2009a: 3; 2010a: 
19).  In addition to the Code on Images, Dóchas has developed the Code on Corporate 
Governance.
173
  To the extent that Dóchas has successfully used the Code to improve its 
stature in the field, it demonstrates the potential for self-regulation to shift the position of 
actors within a field. 
Finally, even in such a short period of time, the Code on Images has started to 
weave itself into the regulatory fabric of the field in Ireland.  The 2007 revisions looked 
heavily within the field of aid and development for models, including the Red 
Cross/NGO Code of Conduct, which addresses images, and the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (McGee 2005a ; Dóchas 2008c: 13).  The Code is also just one of several 
initiatives pushed by Dóchas as part of its accountability framework.
174
  Perhaps most 
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 Dóchas argues that the Code on Corporate Governance has been accepted by the wider non-profit sector 
as an excellent basis for the development of sector-wide standards (Dóchas 2010a: 4). 
174
 These include CONCORD’s NGDO Charter, which Dóchas members are required to sign, and the 
Dóchas-developed Code of Good Practice on Corporate Governance.  On its website, Dóchas lists the Code 
on Images side by side with the Code of Conduct, People in Aid, Sphere, ECB, and HAP, among others.  
And Irish organizations take part in multiple initiatives.  For instance, Concern is a signatory to the NGO 
Code of Conduct, the Code on Images, HAP International, and feeds in to Sphere. 
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importantly, the Code on Images has already served as a precedent for other initiatives.  
One of the Irish coders referred to the Code as “one link in the chain, one piece in the 
jigsaw” (Int. 18).  Since 2007, it has influenced two major initiatives inside Ireland, both 
of which up the ante in terms of enforcement. 
First, Comhlámh, a Code signatory and itself a membership organization, has 
developed a “Code of Good Practice for Volunteer Sending Organisations” and a 
“Volunteer Charter.”   Collectively, these standards are intended to promote accountable, 
professional practice among volunteer sending organizations (both nonprofit and for-
profit).  The Code on Images was a major influence; the Code itself is included in the 
back of the document and its principles are encompassed by the Code of Good Practice’s 
Third Principle, which is that organizations “provide marketing and imagery consistent 
with good practice, and clear expressions of organisational aims, ethos and values” 
(Comhlámh 2009: 2).  It actually goes even further than the Code on Images in setting up 
rigorous compliance measures, including a yearly self-audit and a voluntary external 
auditing process with, possibly, the option of earning a ‘kite mark’ through certification 
(Int. 21; Int. 22). 
Even more recently, the Code on Images has helped shape the early 
implementation of the Irish Charities Act 2009.  The Act specifies that the operational 
and administrative aspects of nonprofit fundraising will be regulated by agreed codes of 
practice developed within the sector; the goal is to improve public confidence in charities 
through transparency and accountability (ICTR).  At the government’s invitation, the 
Irish Charities Tax Reform Group (ICTR) has taken the lead role in the development of 
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codes of good practice; this process yielded the Statement of Guiding Principles for 
Fundraising (ICTR 2008).  In the words of one of the people involved in the study, the 
Code on Images played a major role: 
What we were able to say was, “Here is an example of the sector in Ireland taking 
steps to regulate itself” – the sector in Ireland being very underdeveloped and 
with very weak infrastructure compared to the US or other countries.  So the Code 
on Images ends up being part of the regulatory framework which the government 
is introducing for all of the registered charities in Ireland…  It is now listed as part 
of the registry process.  And what it does do is give the sector some footing and 
some possibilities to engage with the state when it comes to developing a 
regulatory framework, because you have people at the table by virtue of having 
gone through some of the other processes who are able to say, “This is how it’s 
working” (Int. 12). 
 
As a result, the Code on Images was actually incorporated as part of the guiding 
principles of ICTR’s work.  The Guiding Principles go further than the Code in setting up 
tight compliance mechanisms.  Indeed, ICTR is very clear that the Guiding Principles are 
not self-regulation but co-regulation:  “You had people who had interests of the sector at 
heart, but were very clear about standards” (Int. 24).  There was a real demand from the 
sector for this, which was “very conscious that all it would take was one scandal and 
everyone then suffers.  And there were mini ones, there are always little controversies, 
and it damaged everyone, so there was a real demand – the sector wanted this, probably 
more than the government, in a sense” (Int. 24). 
 
Conclusions 
 The Code of Conduct on Images and Messages, developed in isolation from other 
major self-regulation initiatives, nonetheless exemplifies the transformations in aid and 
development in recent decades.  Born in a context of organizational growth and change, 
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the Code is ultimately the product of a small group of ideational entrepreneurs motivated 
by ideas of proper practice.  Like the RC/NGO Code of Conduct, Sphere, and HAP, then, 
the Code has served as a vehicle for advancing new understandings of humanitarian 
identity and principles.  Specifically, the Code has been a means for development 
education to provoke a conversation with fundraising, a platform for Dóchas to 
demonstrate European leadership in the area of accountability, and a tool for practitioners 
to rethink their principles of action in a time in which good intentions are seen as no 
longer being enough.  Thus, quite aside from the question of its impact on images, codes 
have powerful implications for NGO practice. 
 At the level of practice, the Code exemplifies findings in previous chapters that, 
collectively, suggest the importance of small groups of entrepreneurs in motivating 
change and the necessity of a central institution to serve as a focal point for codification.  
Like the Red Cross Code of Conduct, the 1989 Code struggled to remain alive in the 
absence of a secretariat.  When Irish agencies “dusted off” the Code in 2004, they learned 
important lessons from the failure of the first version.  DEEEP and, especially, Dóchas 
have played key roles keeping the Code fresh and relevant.  Like the Sphere and HAP 
main offices, Dóchas has served as a focal point in efforts to stimulate institutionalization 
of the Code.  The continued vitality of the Code is clearly linked to the continued 
willingness of Dóchas and DEEEP to keep supporting its institutionalization. 
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Ch. 7 – Conclusions 
 
 
Since the drafting of the first codes of conduct in the late 1980s, self-regulation 
has become a widespread and far-reaching humanitarian phenomenon.  The publication 
of the Code of Conduct on Images and Messages Relating to the Third World in 1989 and 
the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and 
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief in 1994 marked the 
beginning of a movement to codify field-wide principles and develop standards to govern 
practice.  Until this point, humanitarian interventions were still largely based on 
experience, intuition, and field sense; where there were guidelines, they were largely 
agency-specific.  Today, practitioners have at their disposal a wide range of metrics, 
indicators, and guidelines.  In real ways, compassion has been codified; it has been 
subjected to processes of rationalization and rule-making. 
Today, the codification phenomenon continues apace, most notably with the 2011 
launch of the Joint Standards Initiative (JSI).  The JSI process, which brings together the 
Sphere Project, HAP International, and People In Aid, potentially foreshadows the 
development of a coherent approach to humanitarian quality and accountability.  This 
initiative, as well as several other changes, is assessed in this concluding chapter.  I begin 
by returning to this dissertation’s main themes and findings before assessing trends and 
future areas for research. 
 
Main findings 
 I have approached the study of humanitarian self-regulation through a detailed 
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analysis of the origins and development of four key initiatives – the Red Cross Code of 
Conduct, the Sphere Project, HAP International, and the Code of Conduct on Images and 
Messages.  I have presented these individual efforts at standard setting as belonging to a 
broader struggle by humanitarians to clarify their sector’s deontology, establish its 
identity, and define the rules by which it is practiced.  Theoretically, this research has 
been underpinned by the sociological concept of the organizational field.  Organizational 
fields are local social orders constituted by organizations.  The humanitarian 
organizational field, which includes thousands of operational agencies, large and small, 
spread across the globe, has historically been dominated by large organizations in the 
power centers of Europe and the United States.  This is reflected in the major regulatory 
efforts, which are nearly all situated in the global north. 
Applied to this research, the organizational field has provided an alternative to the 
rational actor models so preeminent elsewhere in Political Science, which have recently 
made their way into the study of humanitarianism.  Rather than assuming the existence of 
atomistic, egoistic actors, I have been attuned to the interrelations among agents, their 
points of contact and friction, and the shared social frames by which events become 
intelligible.  In Chapter 1, I suggested that the organizational field helped elucidate three 
aspects of code design and promotion:  constitution, competition, and connection.  Let us 
return to these points. 
 One of the research’s key findings is that ostensibly technical or principled 
standards are also constitutive; to adhere to a set of standards, to embed it in an 
organization, and to put it into practice, is tantamount to adopting a new humanitarian 
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identity.  Though self-regulation is rooted in professional trends and punctuated by events 
like those in Ethiopia and Rwanda, it is reducible to neither and it was not inevitable.  
From the Code of Conduct to HAP International, each initiative emerged out of a 
political, highly contingent process of ideational entrepreneurship and negotiation.  
Veterans like Peter Walker, Tony Vaux, and Nick Stockton were motivated by deep and 
enduring beliefs that prevailing practices – those rooted in charity and good intentions – 
were simply not sufficient.
175
  Though the approaches to standardization have differed, 
often dramatically, one commonality has been the decision to use standards to advance 
alternative accounts of what humanitarianism is and how it is practiced.  As former HAP 
consultant Sara Davidson put it:  “It is self-regulation… that distinguishes ‘the 
accountable organisation’ from its peers” (Davidson 2002: 13).  Self-regulation thus 
becomes the signifier of a new humanitarian order:  that which is rights and duty-based, 
professional, and technically proficient. 
 As a number of commentators have noted, documents like the Code of Conduct 
and Sphere’s Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards have come to operate as 
“soft law” in the humanitarian field (e.g. Slim 2006: 160).  To the extent that signing up 
is now obligatory for membership in key bodies like DFID and SCHR and expected by 
institutional donors, these standards are coming to define the rules of the humanitarian 
game and the conditions for entry into the humanitarian field.  Field-level implementation 
remains profoundly uneven, but my research uncovered considerable evidence of 
organizations integrating these standards into their standard operating procedures and 
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 For HAP, planning relief without respecting and accounting for disaster survivors is “charitable” rather 
than “humanitarian” (HAP 2011c). 
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practitioners identifying them as foundational documents.  The Code, Sphere, and, 
increasingly, HAP are part of the acquis of the humanitarian field. 
 It is precisely because codes carry ideational baggage that they are contested.  The 
study of self-regulation is the study of how the field of humanitarianism is governed (by 
what rules) and of who does the governing (where are the centers of gravity).  Each 
initiative has faced questioning – sometimes even outright opposition – by humanitarians 
with different understandings of how humanitarianism should be practiced.  The Code of 
Conduct was drafted at a time when development NGOs were entering a domain 
previously dominated by the ICRC and MSF; the Code’s roll-out was punctuated by 
diverging opinions on its applicability and reach.  Was the Code just intended for disaster 
response, as the ICRC argued, or could it be used more broadly, as has come to pass?  
Sphere and HAP faced an acute Anglo/French cleavage on questions of universals, 
context, responsibility, and, ultimately, codification itself.  With HAP, there were 
additional debates within the Anglo camp on models and mechanisms for ensuring 
accountability.  Finally, the Code on Images was intended to provoke a meaningful 
conversation between development educators and fundraisers on questions of values and 
identities. 
These contestations relate to, but are not reducible to, fear of enforcement.  Where 
the topic of enforcement – monitoring, reporting, and sanctions – has been broached, it 
has certainly raised the temperature of the discussions.  This was evident in the 
development of Sphere, where talks on enforcement broke down, and very much a 
feature of the Ombudsman/HAP story.  However, among the most vocal opponents of 
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regulation, the crucial issue has not been fear of enforcement, i.e. of being publicly held 
to account for commitments.
176
  Rather, enforcement increases the stakes of the 
regulatory game.  The issue is which standards will be enforced, how they will be 
enforced, and to what end.  The debate over these rules is a debate over rule itself. 
 Finally, the field approach to self-regulation has illuminated the increasing 
connectedness of the humanitarian sector.  This was quite apparent in the analysis 
conducted in Chapter 2, where evidence was provided of the technological, 
informational, and organizational structures that increasingly join humanitarians together 
in a common endeavor.  There was also evidence of this in each empirical chapter, as 
personnel, concepts, and organizations recurred across initiatives.  In terms of personnel, 
a handful of individuals drove most of the initiatives.  Peter Walker was a key proponent 
of the Code of Conduct and Sphere; Nick Stockton of Sphere and the Ombudsman/HAP, 
and John Mitchell of the Ombudsman and ALNAP.  John Borton, who wrote Study 3 of 
the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, founded ALNAP and writes 
HAP’s yearly Humanitarian Accountability Reports.  The standards themselves form 
something of a regulatory web, with the Code of Conduct and the Humanitarian Charter 
providing the values, Sphere the standards, and HAP the compliance verification.  The 
processes by which the Sphere Handbook and HAP Standard were updated included 
mutual consultations and, on the ground, there are joint deployments, field meetings, and 
evaluations.  Membership also overlaps considerably.  Concern International is a 
signatory to the Red Cross Code and the Code on Images, a certified member of HAP 
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 Though this undoubtedly does figure in the calculations of many agencies, my research found that the 
most common objections, by far, related to issues of identity or capacity. 
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International and People In Aid, has fed into the Sphere Standards, and is a party to 
several other national and international quality instruments.  World Vision International 
is a board member of HAP, Sphere, and People In Aid and a signatory to the Code of 
Conduct, among others.  These are not isolated examples; they illustrate just how 
embedded the large humanitarian agencies are in the humanitarian web. 
 
Trends in self-regulation 
 The recent history of humanitarian quality and accountability has been 
characterized by a progressive deepening, as well as rapid expansion, in the scope and 
number of initiatives.  While these two trends are expected to continue in the near future, 
they are also not likely to go unchallenged; already, there are increased pressures on 
humanitarians to demonstrate the added value of Q&A, as well as to improve coherence 
among these initiatives.  This section and the subsequent section assess these trends. 
 Viewed historically, there has been a very clear trend – particularly among the 
major Anglo-Saxon codes – towards more institutionalization and stronger enforcement.  
The 1994 Red Cross/NGO Code was voluntary, abstract, and floating, set up without an 
institution to oversee implementation.  It was foundational, but it was also not robust; 
future initiatives have increased their levels of specificity and oversight.  The Code 
influenced the Sphere Project (1997), which yielded detailed technical guidelines and was 
supported by a main office, and HAP International (2003), which was set up with a 
secretariat, certification, and reporting requirements.  Similarly, the first Code of Conduct 
on Images and Messages (1989) was voluntary, abstract, and floating.  Subsequent efforts 
to revive the document in Ireland and Europe very clearly reflected a realization that 
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voluntary adherence to a code goes only so far; without supportive architecture, a 
standard risks being relegated to the ‘dusty shelf.’  Irish entrepreneurs thus positioned 
Dóchas in Ireland to keep the Code alive; to an extent, DEEEP has performed the same 
function in Europe through its working groups.  In Ireland, as implementation has 
proceeded, there is increasingly discussion about stronger mechanisms, and efforts have 
been made to specify the Code’s abstract principles through the development of an 
illustrated guide. 
 What the framers of these initiatives have recognized is that it is not enough to 
draft a set of standards and hope that they will be adopted by the wider community.  A 
voluntary, unenforced, aspirational code – such as the Red Cross Code or the 1989 Code 
on Images – may be widely signed on to, and it provides space for flexible interpretation 
and response, but, as experience has shown, implementation will be uneven and it will be 
a struggle to keep the code alive, current, and relevant.  Structures must actually be put in 
place to promote, pressure, and support implementation, encourage adherence, and 
facilitate revisions and updates.  This process is a balancing act; agencies that are on 
board with a voluntary, decentralized process will not necessarily favor a permanent 
institution or enforcement – as was the case with MSF and Sphere.  A more stringently 
enforced code has a higher likelihood of being implemented, but will attract fewer 
members because it leaves less room for flexibility in practices and interpretations and 
imposes higher administrative costs. 
 This dilemma – flexibility versus standardization – is inherent to the process of 
rule-making and bureaucratization; it is being experienced in humanitarian agencies 
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across the field.  At the same time that they are developing system-wide standards, NGOs 
have expanded their own repertoire of rules and procedures.  A HAP staffer noted that 
Oxfam America, for instance, has a 51 page organogram (Int. 11)!  Margaret Buchanan-
Smith captured this trade-off in a recent article in Humanitarian Exchange: 
Experienced mavericks in the aid business recount nostalgically how much 
freedom they were given by their organisations to lead, design and run 
humanitarian programmes in the 1970s and 1980s, with only the occasional report 
back to head office.  A huge amount of trust was placed in their hands and in their 
abilities.  But we also know that many mistakes were made…  Turning the clock 
back is not an option.  However, … there has been a growing tendency in the 
sector in the last 15 years to try and nail down how it ‘should be done’.  The ever-
increasing corpus of standards and guidance materials that has resulted may have 
inadvertently discouraged the initiative and innovation associated with leadership 
(Buchanan-Smith 2011: 20). 
 
 The progressively rule-bound nature of the system is also exemplified by the 
sheer number of standards that exist, with new initiatives appearing each year.  One 
World Trust’s database of global civil society self-regulatory initiatives includes 309, of 
which 33 are labeled “Humanitarian / emergency relief.”  The HAP 2010 Humanitarian 
Accountability Report sounded a cautionary note, explaining that:  “New initiatives seem 
to be established with little apparent reference to, or coordination with, existing initiatives 
and programmes.  Similarly, existing initiatives are being carried forward by different 
groups of actors often in parallel to, and with limited engagement with, initiatives that are 
quite closely related” (HAP 2011e: 54).  ALNAP’s Knox-Clarke and Mitchell suggest 
that the performance of humanitarian organizations could actually be damaged by the 
confusion generated by large numbers of initiatives.  They note that:  “Many 
humanitarians – and particularly those working at the field level – are confused by the 
253 
 
 
variety of approaches and frustrated by the burden of form-filling and reporting” (Knox-
Clarke and Mitchell 2011: 4). 
 There is already evidence that local staff are sometimes unable to differentiate 
among Q&A initiatives.  In Aceh, HAP found that aid workers did not always understand 
the differences between HAP and Sphere (HAP 2006c: 33); Church World Service 
reported confusion among Sphere trainees in Islamabad over the large number of Q&A 
standards (Wooster 2008: iii).  In Chapter 5, I also noted that critics of the 
Ombudsman/HAP frequently conflated the initiative, and their critiques, with Sphere.  
Issues relating to confusion have been raised at various Q&A group meetings (e.g. Q&A 
Meeting Report 2007 ; Sphere Project 2009e: 3). 
 The other critical issue is capacity.  Even the largest international NGOs now 
devote significant resources to fulfilling Q&A, in-house, and donor evaluation and 
reporting requirements.  HAP’s 2007 Accountability Report raised this issue in great 
detail: 
Many field staff reported their bewilderment at the prospect of being asked to 
participate in a HAP accountability audit, an SCHR accountability peer review, a 
People in Aid Code Audit, an ECB real-time participatory evaluation, a DEC or 
ACFID Code of Conduct compliance evaluation, an ALNAP joint-evaluation, a 
Sphere implementation review, an IASC Guidelines on the Prevention of Sexual 
Exploitation implementation audit, an accreditation process under the UN cluster 
initiative and, soon perhaps, a “Global Professional Standards” self-assessment 
launched under the NGO Impact Initiative (HAP 2007d: 42). 
 
More anecdotally, a humanitarian worker interviewed for a recent ALNAP study 
“recounted how, in the 1990s, he used to spend 90% of his time in the community and 
10% on reporting.  Now he spends at least 50% of his time communicating with 
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headquarters.  This is how rigorous and demanding reporting requirements have become” 
(Buchanan-Smith 2011: 19).  The risk is that standards have become ends in themselves. 
 
Impact and coherence 
 While the deepening and proliferation of codes is not soon to abate, it is 
increasingly being challenged.  Humanitarians face two lines of questioning that are 
likely to intensify in the future:  First, there is mounting pressure on aid workers to show 
the added value of Q&A initiatives – to demonstrate impact.  Second, there will be a 
stronger push for coherence, or even mergers, among the leading initiatives. 
 As I found in each chapter, the question of self-regulation’s impact on 
humanitarian outcomes is not an easy one to resolve.  Though humanitarians are 
immensely interested in assessing impact, crisis situations simply do not lend themselves 
naturally to precise measurement.  Consequently, though anecdotes suggest that Q&A 
has had a genuine impact on practice, it is difficult to demonstrate this in a systematic, 
generalizable way; the need to self-regulate has often been taken on faith or logic by its 
proponents.  This is not likely to be enough in the future.  As Antonio Donini has asked: 
For all the advances in technology, all the training in management, 360 degree 
exercises, and contingency planning workshops, how well has the massive 
institutionalization that has taken place over the past 15 years of conflict and 
crisis improved the effectiveness of the sector? Are the 250,000 humanitarian aid 
workers of today doing a better job than those who battled for access and space in 
Biafra? (Donini 2007: 3) 
 
ALNAP’s Knox-Clarke and Mitchell have admitted that more work on impact is needed, 
and that, at this point, “the systematic demonstration of results and impact still seems to 
be beyond the capacity of the humanitarian community” (Knox-Clarke and Mitchell 
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2011: 5). 
While attention to impact is a legitimate objective, it carries certain risks.  One of 
the primary drivers of self-regulation is to shift the bases of legitimate action.  This is an 
ideational function, not something that can readily be adjudicated by better baseline 
measurement or evaluation.  Consequently, humanitarians must ensure that impact not be 
the sole metric by which quality is judged, lest it reinforce an already strong tendency to 
focus on that which is measurable, such as goods distributed or focus groups held, and 
not on that which is immeasurable, like solidarity, efficaciousness, and autonomy.  If 
measurable impact becomes the sole arbiter of a standard’s usefulness, those standards 
that lend themselves naturally to measurement will logically be privileged over those that 
are more flexible and open to interpretation. 
A second implication of proliferating standards is that there is now growing 
pressure on the major initiatives to improve coherence and interoperability.  Although 
some of this is coming from donors, there is also momentum within the sector to reassess 
the relationships among the standards.  As a former senior staffer at HAP explained, “it 
has never made sense to me that three very tiny secretariats are each going to the same 
donor to ask for administration budgets when we could be sharing office space” (Int. 66).  
It is inefficient, costly, and often results in duplication of services.  This movement has 
been given a recent boost by the SCHR, which hosted a workshop in December 2010 
with PIA, HAP, Sphere, VOICE, and ICVA to discuss standards.  This high-powered 
gathering yielded the recommendation that different Q&A initiatives be consolidated into 
“a single quality and accountability portal that would act as an umbrella custodian of 
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these norms and standards with a clear Q&A brand” (qtd. in HAP 2012: 40).  This 
recommendation helped create momentum for the Joint Standards Initiative (JSI). 
Though the representatives of many of the humanitarian Q&A initiatives have 
met on a regular basis since 2003 – first in a group called Quality and Accountability 
Initiatives (QUAINT); later in the Q&A Group – progress towards a joint approach has 
been sporadic.  As one of Sphere’s founders reflected, each of the Q&A initiatives had 
developed its own persona, with Sphere, HAP, ALNAP all saying to each other, “‘Yes, 
we should cooperate, but you cooperate with me because I’m not going to give up any 
power.’  Little fiefdoms” (Int. 15).  In interviews in 2011, I encountered several members 
of the Q&A Group who were frustrated by what they perceived as a lack of organization 
and direction (Int. 46, Int. 52).  As I noted in Chapter 5, despite some progress in joint 
HAP/Sphere deployments, it was felt that the Q&A Group had started to lose steam. 
The Joint Standards Initiative appears different.  Launched on July 20, 2011, at a 
meeting hosted by SCHR, representatives of Sphere, HAP, People In Aid, and ALNAP 
agreed to strengthen their collaboration, including developing a common brand for 
Sphere, HAP, and PIA, creating a single web portal, commissioning an evidence-based 
study to demonstrate the added value of international standards, and, ultimately, 
developing a common field handbook (HAP International et al. 2011).  This was 
followed by a joint deployment in the Horn of Africa in 2011 and a meeting of the joint 
Boards of Sphere, HAP, and PIA in April 2012.  Senior staff at HAP International have 
even floated the idea of a possible merger of the initiatives (Int. 66).  While the process is 
still in its very early stages, several participants spoke highly of the depth of commitment 
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from the leadership at HAP, Sphere, and PIA (Int. 64, Int. 65, Int. 66).  Maintaining this 
appears to be essential if the JSI is to be successful. 
The JSI is a potentially dramatic, far-reaching development; if successful, it 
would signal the realization, 15 years after the post-Rwanda JEEAR, of a unified 
approach to humanitarian quality and accountability.  Inter-operability among the three 
self-regulatory initiatives would mean a coherent regulatory approach to a wide range of 
NGO practices.  From principles (Sphere’s Humanitarian Charter) to relief standards 
(Sphere’s Minimum Standards) to beneficiary accountability and quality management 
(the HAP Standard) to the management of personnel and human resources (the PIA 
Code), the JSI’s coverage would be comprehensive.  The efficiency gains would be 
tremendous.  The peril, of course, is that such a large initiative would threaten to squeeze 
out alternative approaches to quality, such as Groupe URD’s Compas Qualité or 
Coordination Sud’s Synergie Qualité.  A unified JSI would command the lion’s share of 
donor funding and practitioner attention; it would foreshadow a possible hegemony of 
Anglo-Saxon approaches to Q&A, thus becoming the definitional statement of what 
constitutes legitimate humanitarian practice. 
 
Future research directions 
 The discussion of trends underscores the fast-track evolution of humanitarian self-
governance.  While this research is among the first to look at this phenomenon, it is 
unlikely to be the last.  It is only appropriate to conclude by posing several questions for 
further inquiry. 
 What is the nature of the relationships among different organizational fields and 
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under what conditions do ideas from one field successfully diffuse into another field?  
The field of humanitarianism is a relatively recent construction and its roots are 
polymorphous; it encapsulates aspects of international law, medicine, development, 
religion, human rights, and business.  Self-regulation is an attempt to impose a level of 
coherence on these disparate elements.  Though the Code of Conduct and Code on 
Images looked largely within the sector for inspiration, subsequent efforts have looked in 
a comparative fashion at innovations in other fields.  Sometimes these ideas fit naturally, 
as was the case with Sphere’s rights-based approach; this reinforced a growing tendency 
in humanitarianism to present humanitarian needs as essential human rights.  Other ideas 
have proven more difficult to integrate.  Part of the challenge for HAP has been to 
overcome the perception among its critics that quality management techniques are 
foreign or ill-suited to humanitarianism.  Research on the interplay between various fields 
would be well positioned to address questions of diffusion and reception. 
 Additional research might also apply the organizational field approach to 
regulatory efforts outside of humanitarianism.  For instance, how neatly does the 
humanitarian experience with codification map onto the history of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR)?   How deeply embedded is CSR in the identities of various 
corporations?  What has been its impact on the rules of the game and who has benefited? 
 Finally, there is space for additional research on Q&A in a southern context.  
There is considerable evidence that the self-regulatory phenomenon extends far beyond 
Europe and the United States; a 2010 study by OneWorldTrust and World Vision 
identified 90 national self-regulatory initiatives in 54 southern countries (HAP 2011e: 
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25).  Sphere and HAP have also made concerted efforts to include southern 
representation in their governance, such as with Sphere India, and two thirds of HAP’s 
membership is southern (Int. 64).  However, the drivers for and development of these 
global standards has come predominantly from the global north and questions remain 
about their universal applicability, as I found with both the Code of Conduct and Sphere.  
Research in this vein would investigate the drivers of southern self-regulation and the 
ease with which the major Q&A initiatives have been implemented in southern locations. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
Interviews 
 
- Interview 1, 6 July 2009, Helsinki, Finland 
- Interview 2, 16 July 2009, Dublin, Ireland 
- Interview 3, 16 July 2009, Dublin, Ireland 
- Interview 4, 17 July 2009, Dublin, Ireland 
- Interview 5, 17 July 2009, Dublin, Ireland 
- Interview 6, 28 July 2009, Tampere, Finland 
- Interview 7, 29 July 2009, Helsinki, Finland 
- Interview 8, 29 July 2009, Helsinki, Finland 
- Interview 9, 29 July 2009, Helsinki, Finland 
- Interview 10, 28 June 2010, Geneva, Switzerland 
- Interview 11, 28 June 2010, Geneva, Switzerland 
- Interview 12, 30 June 2010, by telephone 
- Interview 13, 30 June 2010, by email 
- Interview 14, 3 July 2010, Geneva, Switzerland 
- Interview 15, 3 July 2010, Geneva, Switzerland 
- Interview 16, 8 July 2010, Maynooth, Ireland 
- Interview 17, 8 July 2010, Maynooth, Ireland 
- Interview 18, 8 July 2010, Maynooth, Ireland 
- Interview 19, 13 July 2010, Dublin, Ireland 
- Interview 20, 14 July 2010, Dublin, Ireland 
- Interview 21, 14 July 2010, Dublin, Ireland 
- Interview 22, 14 July 2010, Dublin, Ireland 
- Interview 23, 16 July 2010, Dublin, Ireland 
- Interview 24, 16 July 2010, Dublin, Ireland 
- Interview 25, 20 July 2010, Dublin, Ireland 
- Interview 26, 20 July 2010, Dublin, Ireland 
- Interview 27, 21 July 2010, England 
- Interview 28, 23 July 2010, Birmingham, England 
- Interview 29, 27 July 2010, London, England 
- Interview 30, 28 July 2010, London, England 
- Interview 31, 3 August 2010, Geneva, Switzerland 
- Interview 32, 3 August 2010, Geneva, Switzerland 
- Interview 33, 3 August 2010, Geneva, Switzerland 
- Interview 34, 4 August 2010, Geneva, Switzerland 
- Interview 35, 4 August 2010, Geneva, Switzerland 
- Interview 36, 13 August 2010, Geneva, Switzerland 
- Interview 37, 13 August 2010, Geneva, Switzerland 
- Interview 38, 13 August 2010, Geneva, Switzerland 
- Interview 39, 23 November 2010, by email 
- Interview 40, 23 November 2010, by email 
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- Interview 41, 26 November 2010, by telephone 
- Interview 42, 26 November 2010, by email 
- Interview 43, 2 February 2011, by phone 
- Interview 44, 15 February 2011, by phone 
- Interview 45, 19 April 2011, by phone 
- Interview 46, 3 June 2011, Cambridge, MA 
- Interview 47, 3 June 2011, Medford, MA 
- Interview 48, 4 June 2011, Medford, MA 
- Interview 49, 4 June 2011, Medford, MA 
- Interview 50, 4 June 2011, Medford, MA 
- Interview 51, 4 June 2011, Medford, MA 
- Interview 52, 4 June 2011, Medford, MA 
- Interview 53, 5 June 2011, Medford, MA 
- Interview 54, 5 June 2011, Medford, MA 
- Interview 55, 5 June 2011, Medford, MA 
- Interview 56, 5 June 2011, Medford, MA 
- Interview 57, 6 June 2011, Medford, MA 
- Interview 58, 6 June 2011, Medford, MA 
- Interview 59, 13 December 2011, by email 
- Interview 60, 27 March 2012, by phone 
- Interview 61, 13 April 2012, by phone 
- Interview 62, 13 April 2012, by phone 
- Interview 63, 16 April 2012, by email 
- Interview 64, 10 May 2012, by phone 
- Interview 65, 18 May 2012, by email 
- Interview 66, 7 June 2012, by email 
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APPENDIX II 
 
The Code of Conduct (1994) 
 
The Code of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and 
NGOs in Disaster Relief, was developed and agreed upon by eight of the world's largest 
disaster response agencies in the summer of 1994. 
 
The Code of Conduct, like most professional codes, is a voluntary one. It lays down ten 
points of principle which all humanitarian actors should adhere to in their disaster 
response work, and goes on to describe the relationships that agencies working in 
disasters should seek with donor governments, host governments and the UN system. 
 
The code is self-policing. There is as yet no international association for disaster-
response NGOs which possesses any authority to sanction its members. The Code of 
Conduct continues to be used by the International Federation to monitor its own 
standards of relief delivery and to encourage other agencies to set similar standards.  
 
It is hoped that humanitarian actors around the world will commit themselves publicly to 
the code by becoming a signatory and by abiding by its principles. Governments and 
donor organizations may want to use the code as a yardstick against which to measure the 
conduct of those agencies with which they work. Disaster-affected communities have a 
right to expect that those who assist them measure up to these standards. 
 
Principles of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and 
NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes 
 
1.The humanitarian imperative comes first. 
 
2.Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without 
adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone. 
 
3.Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint. 
 
4.We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy. 
 
5.We shall respect culture and custom. 
 
6.We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities. 
 
7.Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief 
aid. 
 
8.Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting 
284 
 
 
basic needs. 
 
9.We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we 
accept resources. 
 
10.In our information, publicity and advertizing activities, we shall recognize disaster 
victims as dignified human beings, not hopeless objects. 
 
(Annexes not included here)  
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APPENDIX III 
 
Code of Conduct on Images and Messages (2007) 
 
Preface 
This Code of Conduct on Images and Messages has been written by NGOs working in the areas 
of emergency relief, long term development and development education.  The purpose of this 
Code of Conduct is to provide a framework on which organisations can draw when designing and 
implementing their public communications strategy. The Code offers a set of guiding principles 
that can assist practitioners in their efforts to communicate their organisation’s programmes and 
values in a coherent and balanced way. 
 
Signatories to this Code are acutely aware of the many challenges and difficulties entailed in 
conveying the scandal and injustice of poverty while striving to meet the ideals of the Code. It is 
a reality of our world today that many of the images of extreme poverty and humanitarian distress 
are negative and cannot be ignored. To ignore them would run counter to the spirit of this Code 
which is to portray the reality of the lives of people with sensitivity and respect for their dignity. 
 
Images and messages should seek to represent a complete picture of both internal and external 
assistance and the partnership that often results between local and international NGOs. 
 
The values of human dignity, respect and truthfulness as outlined in the Code, must underlie all 
communications. The signatories to this Code are committed to these principles, and will translate 
them into internal policies and procedures.  They are also committed to working constructively 
with others whose work involves communicating on issues of global poverty, to explore ways of 
reflecting these principles in other fields of communications. 
 
By signing and promoting this Code, NGOs will continue to keep the development agenda very 
much in the public eye and to look beyond the sound bite or single image to reflect the values 
espoused in this Code. 
 
Code of Conduct on Images and Messages 
a. Guiding Principles 
Choices of images and messages will be made based on the paramount principles of: 
• Respect for the dignity of the people concerned; 
• Belief in the equality of all people; 
• Acceptance of the need to promote fairness, solidarity and justice. 
 
Accordingly in all our communications and where practical and reasonable within the need to 
reflect reality, we strive to: 
• Choose images and related messages based on values of respect equality, solidarity and 
justice; 
• Truthfully represent any image or depicted situation both in its immediate and in its wider 
context so as to improve public understanding of the realities and complexities of 
development; 
• Avoid images and messages that potentially stereotype, sensationalise or discriminate 
against people, situations or places; 
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• Use images, messages and case studies with the full understanding, participation and 
permission (or subjects’ parents/guardian) of the subjects; 
• Ensure those whose situation is being represented have the opportunity to communicate 
their stories themselves; 
• Establish and record whether the subjects wish to be named or identifiable and always act 
accordingly; 
• Conform to the highest standards in relation to human rights and protection of the 
vulnerable people. 
• Conform to the highest standards in relation to children's rights according to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); as children are the subjects most 
frequently portrayed 
 
b. Declaration of Commitment 
As signatories to this Code, we confirm that our commitment to best practice in communications 
affects the entirety of our organisation. 
 
By signing the Code, we commit to putting in place meaningful mechanisms to ensure that the 
Code’s principles are implemented throughout all activities of our organisation. 
 
Our responsibilities as a signatory to this Code lead us to be accountable in our public 
communications as follows: 
1. We will make the existence of the Code known to the public and all our partners and will 
provide a feedback mechanism whereby anyone can comment on the fulfilment of the 
Code and where any member of the public will have a ‘right to challenge’ our application 
of the Code. 
2. We will communicate our commitment to best practice in the communication of images 
and messages in all our public policy statements by placing the following statement on 
our relevant public communications (annual reports, website, policy statements, 
governance documents, leaflets and communication materials etc): 
 
 “<Named Organisation> has signed the code of conduct on images and messages 
(www.namedorganisation.org/code) please send your feedback to 
code@namedorganisation.org” 
 
3. We commit to assess our public communications on an annual basis according to the 
guiding principles. 
4. We will include reference to adherence to the Code in the guiding principles of our 
organisation and ensure that the top management take the responsibility of implementing 
and adhering to the code 
5. We will ensure that all relevant suppliers, contractors and media will adhere to the Code 
when working with our organisation. 
6. We commit to training our staff on the use of images and messages. 
7. We agree to meet on an annual basis and share our experience of using and implementing 
the Code with other signatory organisations. 
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APPENDIX IV 
 
CONCORD’s Institutional Structure (2008) 
 
 
